Degree of vertical integration and its buffering effects on political uncertainty by Ouraiprywan, Nilawan
  
Some pages of this thesis may have been removed for copyright restrictions. 
If you have discovered material in Aston Research Explorer which is unlawful e.g. breaches 
copyright, (either yours or that of a third party) or any other law, including but not limited to 
those relating to patent, trademark, confidentiality, data protection, obscenity, defamation, 
libel, then please read our Takedown policy and contact the service immediately 
(openaccess@aston.ac.uk) 
1 
 
 
 
DEGREE OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND ITS BUFFERING EFFECTS ON 
POLITCAL UNCERTAINTY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NILAWAN OURAIPRYWAN 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ASTON UNIVERSITY 
May 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nilawan Ouraiprywan, 2015 
Nilawan Ouraiprywan asserts her moral right to be identified as the author of this 
thesis 
 
 
 
 
This copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is 
understood to recognize that its copyright rests with its author and that no quotation 
from the thesis and no information derived from it may be published without proper 
acknowledgment. 
2 
 
ASTON UNIVERSITY 
 
DEGREE OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND ITS BUFFERING EFFECTS ON 
POLITCAL UNCERTAINTY 
 
Nilawan Ouraiprywan 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
2015 
 
THESIS SUMMARY 
 
The focus of this study is on the governance decisions in a concurrent channels 
context, in the case of uncertainty. The study examines how a firm chooses to 
deploy its sales force in times of uncertainty, and the subsequent performance 
outcome of those deployment choices. The theoretical framework is based on 
multiple theories of governance, including transaction cost analysis (TCA), agency 
theory, and institutional economics.  
Three uncertainty variables are investigated in this study. The first two are demand 
and competitive uncertainty which are considered to be industry-level market 
uncertainty forms. The third uncertainty, political uncertainty, is chosen as it is an 
important dimension of institutional environments, capturing non-economic 
circumstances such as regulations and political systemic issues.  
The study employs longitudinal secondary data from a Thai hotel chain, comprising 
monthly observations from January 2007 – December 2012. This hotel chain has its 
operations in 4 countries, Thailand, the Philippines, United Arab Emirates – Dubai, 
and Egypt, all of which experienced substantial demand, competitive, and political 
uncertainty during the study period. This makes them ideal contexts for this study. 
Two econometric models, both deploying Newey-West estimations, are employed 
to test 13 hypotheses. The first model considers the relationship between 
uncertainty and governance. The second model is a version of Newey-West, using 
an Instrumental Variables (IV) estimator and a Two-Stage Least Squares model 
(2SLS), to test the direct effect of uncertainty on performance and the moderating 
effect of governance on the relationship between uncertainty and performance. 
The observed relationship between uncertainty and governance observed follows a 
core prediction of TCA; that vertical integration is the preferred choice of 
governance when uncertainty rises. As for the subsequent performance outcomes, 
the results corroborate that uncertainty has a negative effect on performance. 
Importantly, the findings show that becoming more vertically integrated cannot help 
moderate the effect of demand and competitive uncertainty, but can significantly 
moderate the effect of political uncertainty. These findings have significant 
theoretical and practical implications, and extend our knowledge of the impact on 
uncertainty significantly, as well as bringing an institutional perspective to TCA. 
Further, they offer managers novel insight into the nature of different types of 
uncertainty, their impact on performance, and how channel decisions can mitigate 
these impacts.  
Keywords: Concurrent Channels, Transaction Cost, Political Uncertainty, Secondary 
Data, Institutional Environment 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1 Background  
Uncertainty has long been a principal interest of a number of theories in 
organization, marketing and strategic management (Sutcliffe and Zaheer 1998). 
Studies have shown that environmental uncertainty has substantial influence on 
organization structures and processes (Huber, O'Connell and Cummings 1975). 
One of the reasons that contribute to the ongoing debate amongst scholars is that 
uncertainty is a broad concept and has been conceptualized in many ways.  
In the marketing channel literature, uncertainty is a key construct in agency theory 
and transaction cost analysis (TCA). For agency theory, uncertainty is one of the 
factors that make it impossible for the principal to monitor the agent with complete 
certainty (Bergen, Dutta and Walker 1992). In TCA, uncertainty is regarded as the 
major determinant in defining the firm‘s choice of governance and ultimately its 
performance. Under TCA, uncertainty is the second most analyzed independent 
variable, and was, as early as 2004 examined in 87 statistical tests (David and Han 
2004) as it plays a key role in inter-organization relationships (Ganesan 1994). 
TCA posits that uncertainty, especially behavioral uncertainty, increases 
transaction cost. In addition, the role of uncertainty also has been of interest in 
institutional environment literature (Enders, Sandler and Parise 1992; Grewal and 
Tansuhaj 2001). Literature on governance mostly focuses on the dichotomous 
choice of governance mode (market vs. hierarchy) in time of uncertainty (cf. 
Gatignon and Anderson 1988; Folta 1998). However, empirical investigation about 
the impact of uncertainty on performance is still limited. The limitation of works in 
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this area led to the motivation for this study to understand how uncertainty impacts 
governance and the subsequent performance outcomes of that governance 
decision. 
Three types of uncertainty are investigated in this study. The first two are demand 
and competitive uncertainty which are the industry-level market uncertainties. The 
third uncertainty, political uncertainty, is an important dimension of institutional 
environments that captures a political system and set of regulations in different 
locations (Demirbag, Glaister and Tatoglu 2007). Although political uncertainty 
represents non-economic circumstances and is exogenous to governance, it is a 
crucial type of uncertainty that is institutional and fundamental as it impacts 
businesses and thereby possibly governance. How governance is impacted – in 
terms of direction and strength – is, however, unknown. 
The study employs the longitudinal secondary data from a Thai hotel chain which 
has its operations in Thailand, United Arab Emirates (UAE) – Dubai, the Philippines, 
and Egypt. Each of these countries experienced a high degree of uncertainty in 
challenging ways during the period of this study. The recent 2007 global financial 
crisis, which greatly affected United Arab Emirates – Dubai, together with ongoing 
political turmoil in Thailand, the Philippines and Egypt during 2007- 2012 provide a 
unique opportunity to investigate and compare the impact of different types of 
uncertainty on performance. The hotel industry is suitable as it provides a unique 
setting to the study because most hotel operations are standardized which makes 
the data comparable across hotels. The industry operates as an open system, is 
strongly affected by the external environment, and is usually quite adaptive 
(Coulter 2002; Jogaratnam and Wong 2009). These characteristics allow a study to 
clearly understand the performance impact of uncertainty (Coulter 2002). 
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1.2 Theoretical framework 
The theoretical framework is based on multiple theories in the area of governance, 
such as transaction cost analysis (TCA), agency theory, and institutional 
economics, to lay out relationships among key variables; namely, mode of 
governance, uncertainty, and performance. The relationship between uncertainty 
and performance is addressed through the lens of TCA, which suggests that firms 
that align their mode of governance with transaction dimensions will economize on 
transaction costs. This alignment should result into greater competitive 
performance relative to those who do not (Williamson 1985; Klein, Frazier and 
Roth 1990; Geyskens, Steenkamp and Kumar 2006).  
However, TCA emphasizes the choice between ―make‖ vs. ―buy‖ (market vs. 
hierarchy), rather than considering the use of both simultaneously. Although TCA 
does consider the possibility of a firm sourcing both internally and externally of two 
different products (cf.Dutta, et al. 1995), it does not address why the balance of 
using both channels for the same product shifts.  (Sa Vinhas and Anderson (2005) 
and Parmigiani (2007) focus on the simultaneous reliance on both firm and third 
party sales forces concurrently. Such concurrent use is typical in practice but 
uncommon in research (Heide, Kumar and Wathne 2014). The term ―concurrent 
channels‖ means using both direct and indirect channels to transact in the same 
geographical region and sell the same products. These direct and indirect channels 
may serve different market segments or compete for some or all customers or 
customer segments in the market (Cespedes and Corey 1990). ―Concurrent 
channels are better for customers because customers can choose the channel that 
can better suit their needs. Concurrent channels might also be better for firms 
because suppliers can increase coverage and thus performance‖ (Sa Vinhas and 
Anderson 2005, p.507). Building on the cross-sectional foundations laid by Sa 
Vinhas and Anderson (2005) and Parmigiani (2007), this study extends their work 
13 
 
by considering dynamic shifts between these two channels when they are 
employed simultaneously. The choice of uncertainty variable is based on both 
market factors and the institutional environment (a set of political, social, and legal 
elements) that are fundamental for exchange. This choice follows the suggestion 
by Oxley (1999) that the combination of governance mechanisms and institutional 
environment will improve understanding of inter-firm relationships. The study also 
considers that the employment of multiple theories will help shape channel 
structures and processes as a whole system, rather than relying on only one theory 
(Oxley 1999).  
1.3 Objectives of the study 
Extensive research has been carried out to better understand TCA, especially the 
relationship between transaction dimensions and mode of governance. A series of 
theoretical reviews (cf. Rindfleisch and Heide 1997; David and Han 2004; 
Geyskens, Steenkamp and Kumar 2006; Palmatier, Dant and Grewal 2007; 
Macher and Richman 2008) share suggestions on the research gaps which future 
studies should address. First, future studies should find more evidence to support 
TCA propositions regarding relative performance of governance forms. Second, 
dynamics in governance forms should be considered. Third, the ―institutional‖ 
variables which shed light on the underlying circumstances that TCA framework 
does or does not work should be included. 
As for the first research gap, governance choices are often categorized into make, 
buy, or hybrid and rarely as a continuous measure of governance. In addition, most 
of the studies are cross-sectional. The lack of continuous measurement and 
longitudinal design limits our understanding of the dynamic impact of transaction 
factors on other constructs, especially in a concurrent channels setting. In 
particular, how the deployment of direct and indirect channels may change 
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according to the changes in transaction factors. More longitudinal studies in this 
area are needed (Rindfleisch and Heide 1997; Geyskens, Steenkamp and Kumar 
2006). 
The second research gap addresses the performance implications of governance 
choices which make it difficult to offer a complete view of theory (Rindfleisch and 
Heide 1997). The most common applications of TCA focus on the antecedent that 
leads to governance decisions but research that focuses on the performance 
outcome of aligned and misaligned governance decisions is still limited. Future 
research should pay more attention to the influence of governance choice on 
performance (Rindfleisch and Heide 1997; David and Han 2004; Heide, Kumar and 
Wathne 2014) and identify those factors that are revelant for performance in a 
particular context (Macher and Richman 2008). 
The third gap focuses on the potential causes behind the mixed findings on 
empirical works relating to TCA‘s prediction of the impact of uncertainty on 
governance. David and Han (2004) suggest that the variation of findings might 
result from the exclusion of the institutional or contextual variables that are the 
underlying condition when transactions occur. Including these contextual variables 
would allow future empirical works to have a deeper understanding of the 
conditions under which TCA works and does not work.  
Understanding the gaps in the current literature, there are three primary objectives 
this study aims to achieve.  
1. To understand the role of TCA in a dynamic concurrent channels context 
and how firms adapt their channel deployment in response to the 
environmental uncertainty.  
2. To examine the impact of governance choice on performance.  
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3. To deepen the understanding of uncertainty, especially the role of political 
uncertainty on governance and performance. 
The first objective of this study addresses the first literature gap. The motivation for 
this objective is awareness that the majority of the studies in this area have mostly 
focused on the relationship between transaction dimensions and a discrete mode 
of governance choice (make, buy, or hybrid). Little attention has been paid to a 
concurrent channels context. The focus here is on how the change in demand, 
competitive, and political uncertainty affects how firms adapt their channel 
structures in a concurrent channels context, using their own or an independent 
sales force as a simultaneous ―make‖ and ―buy‖ decision to respond to these 
various types of uncertainty. This is done by observing the change in ―degree of 
vertical integration‖, which is the percentage of total sales that customers place 
directly (without going through channel intermediaries) with the firm. A higher 
percentage of degree of vertical integration means a higher proportion of sales 
placed through direct channels.  
The second research objective concerns the subsequent performance effect of 
governance choices. The principle of TCA suggests that organizational 
performance is enhanced when the governance structure of the transaction aligns 
with the underlying dimensions of the exchange (which is known as the 
discriminating alignment hypothesis) (Williamson 1975). When uncertainties 
increase, a hierarchical form of governance is preferred to a market-based form. 
When such a choice for hierarchy is indeed made, higher performance results 
compared to when the opposite choice of market is made. Therefore, in this 
concurrent channel context, a higher degree of vertical integration should translate 
into better performance when uncertainty rises. 
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The third objective, which corresponds to the third gap, is derived from the notion 
that uncertainty is a broad concept (Klein, Frazier and Roth 1990; Harrington 2001; 
Santoro and McGill 2005), that different types of uncertainty impact governance 
choices differently (Folta 1998; Beckman, Haunschild and Phillips 2004), and that 
institutional variables need to be included in the study. The multidimensional 
aspect of uncertainty is explored by having a separate conceptualization and 
measures for each uncertainty variable, not just an overall measure of uncertainty 
as one aggregated concept. In addition, the study considers the third research gap 
by extending TCA investigation to include political uncertainty which is an 
institutional variable. Political uncertainty is important for the fact that it is 
exogenous, but is fundamental to the transaction.  
1.4 Research questions and hypothesis 
In particular, three main research questions will be examined in this study: 
 What is the impact of demand, competitive, and political uncertainty on 
governance? 
 What is the impact of demand, competitive, and political uncertainty on 
performance? 
 Does vertical integration buffer or amplify the effect of uncertainty on 
performance?  
The first research question focuses on how dynamic changes in demand, 
competitive, and political uncertainty trigger how firms shift their channel structure 
towards direct or indirect sales forces. This is done by looking at the relationship 
between each type of uncertainty and the degree of vertical integration. The 
second question looks into the different impact of each uncertainty on performance 
and whether or not they affect performance in the same direction. The last question 
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sets out to understand the performance effects of such choices, accounting for the 
fact that these types of uncertainty may impact the governance-performance link.  
According to TCA‘s discriminating alignment hypothesis, Williamson (1975) 
suggests that ―internalization is seen to allow the absorption of external uncertainty 
through specialization of decision making and saving in communication expenses, 
facilitating adaptive, sequential decision process, which is argued to have optimal 
properties under such conditions. Furthermore, high integration economizes on 
transactions by harmonizing interests and permitting a wider variety of sensitive 
incentive and control processes to be activated‖ (Williamson 1975, p.23). However, 
there is another theoretical position which argues that looser structures (i.e. less 
vertically integrated) are more effective under conditions of high external 
uncertainty (Tosi, Aldag and Storey 1973; Salancik and Pfeffer 1978). A flexible 
organization may be better able to adapt to changing circumstances. Highly 
integrated organizations are to some extent separated from the environment and 
might be slow to react. Hence, firms that choose an integrated governance 
structure in an uncertain environment may find it difficult to manage and adjust to 
the environment (Klein, Frazier and Roth 1990). Empirical evidence that supports 
both sides of the argument is extant but inconclusive; different types of uncertainty 
seem to react to a particular mode of governance differently. By answering the 
research questions, the study seeks to understand factors that cause these 
differences.  
1.5 Data and research method 
The approach to empirical research adopted for this study is a quantitative, 
longitudinal design. The context of this study is the hotel industry in 4 countries: 
Thailand, the Philippines, United Arab Emirates - Dubai, and Egypt. All of these 
countries faced considerable uncertainty during the study period (2007 – 2012), 
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which creates an outstanding opportunity to study the impact of political uncertainty 
under both normal and unusual circumstances. The operationalization of all 
variables uses objective measurement to enhance understanding of the true 
performance outcome of different market characteristics. Specifically, fine-grained 
data at the monthly level are employed for all variables. The longitudinal nature of 
the data is crucial as it allows the study to investigate this transaction dimensions-
governance-performance linkage dynamically as opposed to the cross-sectional 
design in previous empirical analysis (cf. Brouthers 2002; Mooi and Ghosh 2010; 
Castañer, et al. 2014) Longitudinal data, due to its primary advantage in measuring 
changes and ability to establish causations (Rindfleisch, et al. 2008), allows the 
study to investigate performance changes due to the changes in uncertainty level 
without having to be concerned about between subject variations if cross-sectional 
data is employed.  
The research data in this study is either obtained or constructed from three main 
sources: 1) sales and financial data from the focal firm, 2) government authorities, 
and 3) a risk rating agency, covering the span of 5 years from January 2007 to 
December 2012 (72 monthly periods). Sales and financial data from a hotel chain 
are used as measurements for channel deployment, performance competitive 
uncertainty, and firm level control variables. Government authorities, specifically 
the tourism authority and national banks of each country provide information on 
tourism demand and economic indicators. The data obtained from the risk rating 
agency represents a measure of political uncertainty. 
Two econometric models deploying Newey-West estimations are deployed to test 
13 hypotheses. The first model is an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator and 
the second is an Instrumental Variables (IV) Estimator using a Two-Stage Least 
Squares model (2SLS). Both models are estimated with Newey-West (1987) 
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standard errors, which produce consistent estimates when autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity errors are detected in the residuals. The first model, which 
corresponds to the first research question, estimates the relationship between 
channel deployment and the three uncertainties. The second model tests 
hypotheses 6-13 which are set up to answer research questions 2 and 3. The focus 
of this model is the relationship between channel deployment, uncertainty, and 
performance, specifically on the moderating role of channel deployment. As 
endogeneity is detected, an Instrumental Variables (IV) estimator using Two-Stage 
Least Squares (2SLS) is employed as the estimation method.  
1.6 Theoretical implications 
Considering the aforementioned gaps in the current literature, there are three 
theoretical contributions from this study. The first implication is to extend 
knowledge about the effect of uncertainty beyond the original discrete choices of 
governance ―make, buy and hybrid‖ in an attempt to explain how uncertainty will 
affect the channel deployment in a concurrent channels context. The second 
implication is to bring performance into the relationship and to investigate the 
performance effects of a particular governance decision. The third contribution 
focuses on the extension of TCA to include institutions, here in terms of politics and 
the inherent uncertainty of it. The unique situation and timeline provide the 
opportunity to truly understand different types of uncertainty, both market and non-
market.  
The first implication focuses on extending evidence on the effect of uncertainty 
beyond the original choice of governance, make, buy and hybrid, in an attempt to 
explain how uncertainty will affect the deployment of channels in a concurrent 
channels context. This is done by investigating the extent to which firms choose to 
vertically integrate (degree of vertical integration), taking a dynamic and 
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longitudinal view, and their subsequent performance implications. Although the 
relationship between uncertainty and choice of governance is one of the most 
tested relationships in TCA, the evidence is inconclusive and mainly focuses on 
discrete governance choices. For example, Russo (1992) found that uncertainty 
was negatively related to backward integration in the electricity generating industry, 
which is contrary to the theory (assuming the presence of asset specificity). The 
TCA review by David and Han (2004) shows that among the 37 tests on 
relationship between uncertainty and vertical integration, only 9 show the positive 
relationship, while 6 tests show the opposite relationship. Only 52 percent of the 21 
tests on the effects of the interaction between asset specificity and uncertainty on 
the hierarchy-market choice were supportive.  
The second contribution this study makes to the TCA literature is to bring 
performance into the relationship to investigate how uncertainty affects governance 
decisions and the subsequent performance outcome of those decisions. Most TCA 
research focuses on the relationship between transaction factors, typically asset 
specificity and uncertainty, and choice of governance and seeks a choice of 
governance that minimizes transaction cost under those particular circumstances. 
However, the level of empirical support for uncertainty and performance, which is 
TCA‘s core area, is still low and a more thorough empirical investigation of the 
theory's foundation is vital to advance the theoretical development (David and Han 
2004). This study adds to the literature in this area by including a comprehensive 
model that contains multiple types of uncertainty to exhibit their impacts on 
performance and interaction effects.  
The final implication focuses on the extension of TCA to include political 
uncertainty – a key institutional variable. This is done to determine if the institutional 
variable also affects governance decision and performance and, in particular, if 
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TCA‘s discriminating alignment hypothesis can be applied if the institutional 
variable were to be considered as one of the transaction attributes. As different 
uncertainties seem to have different impact on performance, the result of this study 
suggests that uncertainty must be disaggregated. This also indicates that the TCA 
prediction must be applied with caution. TCA‘s prediction that vertical integration is 
an appropriate response when uncertainty rises may not be applied in all cases 
involving uncertainty. The result shows that becoming more vertically integrated 
neither buffers nor amplifies the negative impact of the two market uncertainties, 
demand and competitive, on performance. On the contrary, the moderating effect 
of vertical integration on the relationship between political uncertainty and 
performance is the only relationship that follows TCA‘s prediction. The result shows 
that vertical integration can significantly buffer the negative impact of political 
uncertainty on performance which is consistent with TCA‘s view that vertical 
integration allows firms to smoothly adapt to unforeseen contingencies as authority 
structures allow firms to have a better information flow, thus they can better 
respond to the uncertainty (John and Weitz 1988). It also provides a firm the 
opportunity to develop specific capabilities to cope with the situation (Novak and 
Stern 2008).  
In addition to the theoretical contribution, the lack of longitudinal research stated in 
the major TCA reviews (Rindfleisch and Heide 1997; David and Han 2004; 
Palmatier, Dant and Grewal 2007) are also addressed in this study through its 
longitudinal design based on secondary panel data at a fine-grained (monthly) 
level.  
1.7 Management implications 
As uncertainty is a difficult topic to deal with, but this study hopes to provide an in-
depth understanding of different types of uncertainty and the magnitude of their 
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impact on performance. Managers have to face various types of uncertainty in their 
business operations ranging from regular changes in demand or competitors to 
extreme turmoil, for example, the political unrest caused by the red-shirts during 
2008-2010 in Thailand, and the Egyptian uprising in 2011. Some can be extremely 
hard to deal with for hotel managers because many traditional instruments, such as 
lowering the price or increasing advertising, are very costly and may even be 
counterproductive. This leaves channel deployment as one of the few remaining 
instruments.  
Our first contribution is to provide management with an understanding of how 
political uncertainty affects business operations, so it can prepare to deal with the 
situations arising. In practice, management usually makes business forecasts 
based on historical performance and market factors without taking the non-market 
factors into consideration. As a result, business operations are conducted without a 
proper plan to deal with those institutional factors. When these institutional factors 
arise, managers do whatever it takes to secure the business without giving a 
thorough consideration of the most efficient governance structure. This creates 
opportunity cost because those resources have not been spent on the ―right‖ 
activities. The result of this study shows that the effects of political uncertainty on 
performance are significant and channel deployment can play a role in buffering 
that effect.  
The second contribution is to provide management with an understanding of the 
nature of different types of uncertainty, their effects and the interactions among 
them. As this study uses real market evidence, managers can benefit from this 
insight by considering how each uncertainty present in the marketplace influences 
concurrent channel deployment and the performance impacts. Management can 
use this as a guideline to handle each specific type of uncertainty. 
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1.8 Outline of the thesis 
This thesis is organized into seven chapters, including this introduction chapter. 
Chapter 2 begins by reviewing the literature in the area of governance. Chapter 3 
focuses on the literature on uncertainty, its disaggregation and impact on other 
constructs. Chapter 4 presents the hypotheses and conceptual model of the study. 
Chapter 5 is concerned with the research method used for this study. Chapter 6 
presents the findings of this research, focusing on the empirical results. Finally, 
Chapter 7 integrates the entire study, providing a summary of the findings, 
discussing implications of the study, and presenting suggestions for future 
research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
GOVERNANCE THEORY 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a literature review of multiple theories in the areas which 
cover the business models of governance such as transaction cost analysis (TCA), 
agency theory, and institutional economics. While the discussion will mainly focus 
on the transaction cost analysis framework, other theoretical frameworks, 
specifically agency theory and institutional economics, will be discussed to provide 
complementary theoretical perspectives on the key variables of this study which 
are governance, uncertainty, and performance.  
Following this introduction section (2.1), section 2.2 presents an overview of 
transaction cost analysis which is the theoretical backbone of this study. TCA 
development is discussed in sub-section 2.2.1. Next, sub-section 2.2.2 provides 
the overview for TCA‘s definition and applications. The central question and 
structure of TCA are discussed in sub-section 2.2.3 and 2.2.4, respectively. Sub-
section 2.2.5 discusses the relevancy of TCA to other governance theories. Mode 
of governance and performance are discussed in section 2.3. Specifically, section 
2.3.1 focuses on concurrent channels. The subsequent sections in this chapter will 
focus on the key elements of TCA. The next three sections focus on each 
transaction dimension. Asset specificity is discussed in section 2.4. Uncertainty is 
reviewed in section 2.5. The last dimension, frequency is explained in section 2.6. 
Each section contains sub-sections which focus on definition and empirical 
evidence. Section 2.7 focuses on the outcome variable which is performance. TCA 
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limitations and criticisms are briefly discussed in section 2.8. Finally, section 2.9 
concludes this chapter. 
2.2 Transaction cost analysis 
Transaction cost analysis (TCA) is an interdisciplinary approach to the study of 
organizations that joins economics, organization theory, and aspects of contract 
law and is probably the most widely discussed theory on how firms can gain 
competitive advantage through efficient organization of their economic transactions 
(Steenkamp and Geysken 2012). According to Williamson (2010), the progress of 
TCA since its origin by Ronald Coase in 1937 can be grouped into 3 stages: 
informal (1930 – 1970), pre-formal (1970s), semi-formal (1980‘s and beyond) 
(Williamson 2010). These three stages are discussed in the following sub-section 
(2.2.1).  
2.2.1 Development of TCA from Ronald Coase to Williamson 
Informal (1930 – 1970) 
As described by Williamson (2010, p.675), the concept of transaction cost 
originated with Ronald Coase in his classic 1937 paper on ―The Nature of the Firm‖ 
which was the first study to apply the concept of transaction costs to the study of 
firm and market organization. Upon considering the theory that firm (hierarchy) and 
market are alternative methods of coordinating production, Coase observed that 
the decision to adopt one or the other should not be taken as given, but should be 
derived. Coase explained that the standard economic theory at that time omitted 
the basis on which governance mode should be selected and that the missing 
concept is transaction cost (Williamson 2010). The original work by Coase (1937) 
includes only two forms of governance, market (buy) and hierarchy (make or firm or 
vertical integration), and proposed that market and hierarchy are alternative 
governance structures that differ in their transaction cost, and (under some 
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conditions) the costs of conducting economic exchange in a market may exceed 
the costs of organizing the exchange within a firm (Bensaou and Anderson 1999).  
Transaction cost analysis derived from the combination of ideas from Ronald 
Coase (1937) and John R. Commons (1932) (Williamson 2010). TCA includes 
Coase‘s premise that the standard assumption of zero transaction cost needs to be 
replaced by the concept of positive transaction costs. Later, the notion of positive 
transaction costs is combined with John Commons‘s (1932) concept on 
governance from the institutional economics which states that ―The ultimate unit of 
activity… must in itself include three principles; conflict, mutuality; and order. This 
unit is a transaction‖ (Commons 1932, p.4). Specifically, governance is viewed as 
―the means by which to infuse order, thereby to mitigate conflict and realize mutual 
gain‖ and states that a transaction is the unit that contains these three principles 
(Williamson 2010). 
Pre-formal (1970s) 
In this stage, transaction cost analysis becomes more developed and structured 
through the work of Williamson and others. TCA‘s concept by the end of this stage 
includes its dependent variables, mode of governance, and the three transaction 
dimensions. The focus of the study has been expanded to include other transaction 
dimensions, for example, uncertainty that may affect the choice of governance. 
The competing theory is a neo-classical view of channels as a production function 
which has two streams of work. The first stream is from Bucklin (1967, 1972) and 
the other from Stern 1969 (John and Reve 2010). As summarized by John and 
Reve (2010), Bucklin‘s proposition of this theory is that ―competitive pressures 
would select for efficient channel structures that balanced supply costs against end 
customers‘ willingness to pay. However, this line of inquiry was not particularly 
promising with respect to empirical work as refutable conjectures were largely 
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absent. Given the empirical bent of the field of marketing, these frameworks lay 
largely unutilized‖ (John and Reve 2010, p.249). The second stream was 
originated by Stern (1969). This stream focuses on the utility of applying social 
psychological and sociological theories of structuring human interaction to 
understand inter-firm interactions in channels. As these theories accentuate social 
processes like power and conflict to explain how firms within channels might 
interact with each other in recurring exchanges, the empirical work in this line 
expanded rapidly as it is useful to firms in developing tactics to motivate and 
manage suppliers, dealers and other channel members. However, subjects of 
channel structure such as market or hierarchy and vertical restraints remained 
outside the scope of inquiry (John and Reve 2010). The narrower focus of this 
competing theory has made the TCA framework a more widely-applied theory. 
The work that puts the closure to this stage of TCA is Williamson‘s paper in 1979 
that identifies the 3 transactional dimensions; specific investments, frequency and 
uncertainty, as independent variables and governance structure, market, bilateral, 
trilateral and unified governance modes, as the dependent variables. A relatively 
structured TCA framework presented in this paper helped grow TCA empirics 
(John and Reve 2010).  
In an effort to clarify the main premise of TCA, that firms organize their exchange 
relationships to minimize transaction costs that arise when it is difficult to value the 
goods or services exchanged and the mechanism to do it is through governance 
structure, opportunism and the limited capability of individuals in processing 
information are added (Levy 1985). Market and hierarchies are the conventional 
modes that Coase refers to in his paper and are still the two main governance 
structures considered (Williamson 2010). Williamson defines them as:  
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Markets: Transactions are governed through competitive pressures that 
assure that the qualitative and quantitative value of a good or service 
being exchanged is accurately reflected in its price 
 
Hierarchies: Transactions are governed through voluntary associations 
of individuals or organizations that use agreed-upon rules to equitably 
divide the rewards of joint activities (Williamson 1991; Menard 1996) 
Each mode of governance, identified by Williamson (1985) is described by the two 
main attributes: incentive intensity and administrative authority. The effect on 
efficiency of each attribute is opposite. In market governance both buyer and 
suppliers face high-powered incentives in that they each receive their own net 
receipts. The power of incentive will be low in hierarchical governance in that both 
parties only get their costs reimbursed. As for administrative authority and control, 
parties in market governance maintain administrative control over their own 
production process. In hierarchical governance, parties relinquish administrative 
control over processes to form an ―interface-coordinator‖ (Tadelis and Williamson 
2010).  
Semi-formal (1980s and beyond) 
TCA at this stage is formed and developed to include a fairly complete set of 
transaction dimensions and elaborates on the underlying behavioral assumptions 
of opportunism, bounded rationality, and risk neutrality in order to make predictions 
of the appropriate mode of governance under different circumstances. The 
highlight study in this period is Williamson‘s 1985 book, titled ―The Economic 
Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting.‖ This book 
expands the modes of governance to recognize in-between forms of organization, 
hybrid modes, such as relational contracting (Robicheaux and Coleman 1994). The 
29 
 
expansion of TCA to include other variables was necessary at this point as 
criticisms were directed toward TCA for being overly simplistic on its opportunism 
assumption. For example, Heide and John (1992) highlight TCA‘s limitation for the 
reason that the theory provides incomplete explanations as a number of underlying 
conditions that might be crucial to governance decisions are excluded. This study 
discovered that the positive effect of asset specificity is only contingent upon the 
presence of relational norms and recommends the potential value of theoretical 
integration in the area of governance for future studies (Heide and John 1992).The 
majority of empirical research in this semi-formal stage still centered on the 
discriminating alignment hypothesis (Williamson 1991) which holds that 
―transactions, which differ in their attributes, are aligned with governance structures, 
which differ in their costs and competencies, in a discriminating (mainly, 
transaction-cost-economizing) way‖ and the differences in mode of governance 
have already been indicated as factors that contribute to the different costs and 
competencies (Williamson 1991, p277). This means transactions that align mode 
of governance with transaction dimensions will minimize the total transaction cost, 
the sum of the two counterbalancing costs which are ex ante contracting and ex 
post transaction problem, which can be translated into superior competitive 
performance relative to those who do not (Williamson 1985; Mooi and Ghosh 2010). 
For example, Mooi and Gilliland (2013) test this premise in the context of contract 
enforcement and satisfaction of problem resolution by comparing the satisfaction 
with the problem of aligned and misaligned contract enforcement. The results show 
that alignment can enhance satisfaction with problem resolution which supports 
TCA‘s discriminating alignment hypothesis. Castañer, et al. (2014) investigates if 
innovation alignment increases performance in the aircraft industry. The findings 
show that firms that align their innovation with transaction dimensions have higher 
unit sales and shorter time-to market. 
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In more recent studies, governance is usually conceptualized as one of three broad 
discrete types; market, hierarchy, or hybrid. Typically transactional properties(plus 
controls) serve as independent variables to explain these governance types 
(Macher and Richman 2008). The empirical work moves beyond its initial focus of 
governance mode, market or hierarchy, to interpret a wider range of empirical 
phenomena i.e. the organization of labor, dominant firms, contracting for natural 
monopolies, non-standard contracting (including franchising, exchange relations 
and take-or pay agreements), corporate governance, pubic bureaus, reputation, 
and even marriages. More recently, researchers have utilized TCA in exploring the 
organization of firm innovation, economic and political reform, privatization, and the 
performance effects of organizational choice in public policy (Macher and Richman 
2008; Williamson 2010).  
To date, TCA propositions have been substantially investigated and validated 
(Macher and Richman 2008) and ―despite what almost 30 years ago may have 
appeared to be insurmountable obstacles to acquiring the relevant data [which are 
often primary data of a micro analytic kind], today transaction cost economics 
stands on a remarkably broad empirical foundation‖ (Geyskens, Steenkamp and 
Kumar 2006). There is no gainsaying that transaction cost economics has been 
much more influential because of the empirical work that it has engendered‖ 
(Williamson 2010, p.221). 
2.2.2 Definition and application 
Although Williamson (2010) states that TCA still has not yet reached its full 
formalization, the advancement of this theory is rapid. The theory has been used 
as a framework to study a variety of aspects related to efficiency in transactions. 
One reason for its wide application, as Williamson (1985) claims, is that it can be 
used to examine any problem that can be framed as a contracting problem, it can 
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provide a superior theoretical foundation than that of previous work, which mostly 
focuses on mechanistic processes of increasing commitment, and it relies on 
realistic behavioral assumptions and firm-specific factors (Klein 1989). The 
evidence to support this claim are the findings from major TCA empirical 
assessments (cf. Shelanski and Klein 1995; Rindfleisch and Heide 1997; David 
and Han 2004; Macher and Richman 2008; Steenkamp and Geyskens 2012) which 
show the breadth of TCA applications and which agree that the theory has been 
used to explore beyond the initial focus on governance choice. Specifically, 
empirical assessment by Macher and Richman (2008) makes two conclusions 
regarding TCA‘s application. First, TCA has been used as a theoretical lens to 
explore the range of phenomena, i.e. organization of labor, dominant firms, 
contracting for natural monopoly, non-standard contracting (including franchising, 
exchange relations and take-or-pay agreements), corporate governance, public 
bureaus, and reputation. More recent studies include the area of organization of 
firm innovation, economic and political reform, privatization, and the performance 
effects of organizational choice, and public policy. Second, TCA has become more 
interdisciplinary. Not only can it be applied to study a broad range of phenomena, it 
also has compatibility and complementarity with other social science theories 
(Macher and Richman 2008).  
TCA plays an important role in understanding the relationship between buyers and 
sellers. Its unit of analysis, as in other economic approaches to the study of 
organization, focuses on the efficiency of transaction which provides ―a unified 
interpretation for a disparate set of organizational phenomena‖ (Williamson 1981, 
p.573). The core of TCA focuses on ―transactions and the costs related in 
completing transactions by one institutional mode rather than another‖ (Williamson 
1975). As all contracts are effectively incomplete, transaction costs incur for 3 
reasons. First, individuals lack the knowledge and skill to accurately predict and 
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plan for future contingencies that may rise. Second, even if perfect planning can be 
achieved, it is hard for transaction partners to negotiate and carry out the plan. 
Lastly, although the planning and negotiating are successful, it is difficult for parties 
to communicate their plans in a way that an less informed third-party (i.e. a court) 
could reasonably enforce them (Macher and Richman 2008). 
TCA regards firm as a governance structure and the transaction, a transfer of a good 
or service, as the unit of analysis. The central claim of the theory is that transactions 
will be managed in such a way that transaction cost or the total cost involved in 
carrying the transaction is minimized (Rindfleisch and Heide 1997). Therefore, 
transaction costs refer to ―the costs of running the system which include the sum of 
the two counterbalancing costs, ex ante and ex post costs. Ex ante cost contains 
activities such as drafting and negotiating contracts and ex post cost involves items 
such as monitoring and enforcing agreement‖ (Rindfleisch and Heide, p.31). The 
early works only focus on the binary choice because the middle-range solutions 
were thought to be unusual, inferior and unstable (Bensaou and Anderson 1999). 
Over time, TCA has been revised to reflect empirical reality on the middle range 
solutions, i.e. the hybrid governance form, which is in practice the more common 
choice (Williamson 1981). Each form of governance is supported by a different 
application of contract law, and each employs its own coordination and control 
systems (David and Han 2004).  
 
2.2.3 Core/central questions 
The objective of transaction cost analysis is to describe contracting arrangements 
on efficiency grounds (Shelanski and Klein 1995). It focuses on ―transactions and 
the costs that attend completing transactions by one institutional mode rather than 
another‖ (Williamson 1975). The key question is whether a transaction is more 
efficiently performed within a firm (vertical integration) or outside it by third parties 
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(market governance) (Williamson 1985). Therefore, the majority of empirical 
research in transaction cost economics centers on this ―make or buy‖ question. 
Macher and Richman (2008) found that most studies using TCA consider 
organizational mode as the dependent variable and transactional attributes as the 
independent variables. The most common empirical approach is to explore 
whether the difference in the degree of transactional attributes will result in a 
different choice of governance according to TCA‘s predictions. 
2.2.4 Dimensions/predictions/assumptions 
The structure of TCA consists of 4 main parts. The first part is the underlying 
behavioral assumptions of bounded rationality and opportunism, and transaction 
cost minimization. The second part involves the so-called transaction dimensions 
which are transaction-specific assets, uncertainty, and frequency. The third part is 
the variety of transaction costs. The fourth part is the different mode of governance, 
market, hierarchy, and hybrid.  
Regarding the underlying behavioral assumptions, which include two perspectives 
on human decision making, bounded rationality is the behavior that is ―intendedly 
rationale but limited‖ (Williamson 1981, p571). It is an inability and/or unwillingness 
to process all available information as individuals find it difficult to plan, predict and 
solve for the various problems that may rise. Consequently, transaction costs are 
incurred to acquire and interpret information (Slater and Spencer 2000; Leiblein 
2003). The assumption of opportunism suggests economic actors are ―self-seeking 
interest with guile‖ (Slater and Olson 2000, p.67), which refers to the risk that the 
other transaction partner seeks only self-interest through withholding information or 
cheating (Ghosh and John 1999; Mooi and Ghosh 2010). 
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The second part refers to transaction dimensions which are the principal 
dimensions in which significant transaction cost consequences accrue. 
Transaction-specific assets refer to the assets that are tailored to a particular 
transaction and have no use outside this particular transaction. Uncertainty is the 
disturbances to which transactions are subjected to, and frequency refers to the 
recurrence of the transactions (Williamson 1999). 
As for variety of transaction costs, its classification tends to be different from study 
to study but to essentially refer to the same basic elements.  
Initially, Coase‘s (1937) broadly classify the cost into ex ante and ex post based on 
whether the cost incurs pre or post transaction (Rindfleisch and Heide 1997). 
Williamson (1985) and Dyer (1997) use (1) search costs, (2) contracting costs, (3) 
monitoring costs, and (4) enforcement costs (Williamson 1985). Search costs 
involve the costs of collecting information to identify and evaluate potential 
transaction partners (Dyer 1997). Contracting costs can be both ex ante and ex post 
and the balance of the two helps determine the level of contract specificity. The ex 
ante cost includes the cost associated with negotiating and writing an agreement 
and the ex post cost are the costs associated with the problems firms face in the 
execution stage due to non-performance (Mooi and Ghosh 2010). Monitoring costs 
are the costs associated with monitoring the contract to ensure that each transaction 
partner fulfills the predetermined responsibilities. Enforcement costs include the 
costs related to ex post bargaining and sanctioning a trading partner that does not 
perform according to the predetermined responsibilities (Dyer 1997). Monitoring 
costs refer to the costs associated with monitoring the agreement to ensure that 
each party fulfills the predetermined set of obligations. Enforcement costs refer to 
the costs associated with ex post bargaining and sanctioning a trading partner that 
does not perform according to the agreement (Dyer 1997). The decision to enforce 
35 
 
should depend on the balance of cost and benefit of taking these corrective actions 
(Mooi and Gilliland 2013). Mooi and Gilliland (2013) defined enforcement according 
to Antia et al. (2006) as corrective actions aimed to alleviate transaction problems 
and found that although enforcement may result in poor performance, the result of 
not enforcing might be worse. 
The last part of the TCA structure is the different mode of governance, market, 
hierarchy, and hybrid. The early works only focus on the binary choice of market or 
hierarchy because the middle-range solutions were thought to be uncommon and 
unstable (Williamson 1991; Bensaou and Anderson 1999). Over time, TCA has been 
reviewed to include the middle range solution, hybrid, which is a more common 
practice (Williamson 1991). This is evident by an empirical review done by Shelanski 
and Klein (1995) which identifies that hybrid contracting modes are among the five 
major categories of empirical works explained by TCA.  
The framework to answer this central question of ―make or buy‖ rests on the 
interplay between two main assumptions of human behavior, bounded rationality 
and opportunism, and three key dimensions of transactions; (1) asset specificity, the 
extent to which transaction-specific investments are needed to facilitate an 
exchange, (2) uncertainty, the unpredictability of relevant circumstances surrounding 
an exchange, and (3) frequency, the extent to which transactions recur (Williamson 
1985; Klein, Frazier and Roth 1990). According to transaction cost theory‘s 
discriminating alignment hypothesis, economic organization is an effort to ―align 
transactions, which differ in their attributes, with governance structures, which differ 
in their costs and competencies, in an economizing way‖ (Williamson 1991, p.277).  
Therefore, firms that follow TCA‘s prescription and align their mode of governance 
with transaction dimensions will economize on transaction costs, which should 
result in superior subsequent performance relative to firms who do not (Williamson 
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1985; Klein, Frazier and Roth 1990; Geyskens, Steenkamp and Kumar 2006). The 
assumption is that market governance is more efficient in production costs than 
hierarchical governance because of the benefits of competition in the market. 
Transactions within integrated companies may be free of competitive pressure and 
also be subject to bureaucratic complications which make them less efficient. 
However, when asset specificity is involved, the rise of transaction dimensions will 
raise the costs of market governance in safeguarding, adapting and evaluating, to 
minimize the subsequent risk of exploitation due to the three behavioral 
assumptions, bounded rationality, risk neutrality, and opportunism to the point that 
market governance becomes inefficient since its cost will be higher than that of 
hierarchical governance. Hierarchical form of governance is a more efficient option 
since it can minimize these unnecessary transaction costs (Williamson 1975, 1985; 
Heide 1994; Robicheaux and Coleman 1994).  
The original TCA framework suggests that the interaction between external 
uncertainty and asset specificity, rather than the individual transaction dimension, 
is the key determining factor of a firm's governance decision (Anderson and 
Schmittlein 1984). As a consequent, later empirical works on TCA expand their 
focus to each individual transaction dimension (Heide 1994). The rationale is that 
each transaction dimension is distinct and impactful on its own, different processes 
and costs to handle each of them regardless the presence of asset specificity 
(Heide 1994). Recently, empirical applications of TCA have diversified its focus to 
other TCA elements that might also affect transaction cost (Anderson and 
Schmittlein 1984). For example, Dyer (1997) discovered that transaction costs do 
not necessarily increase with the increase in asset specificity. Other factors such 
as commitment, information sharing, or mixture of safeguard, may contribute to a 
rise of transaction costs. 
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2.2.5 Transaction cost analysis and other governance literature  
Prior to TCA, the answer to ―make or buy‖ decisions in the marketing literature was 
based on production-cost arguments. The basic assumption of that argument is 
that all firms desire more control, hence, integration is preferred. This arrangement 
will work if there is a large enough volume that firms can enjoy economies of scale 
and of the learning curve. While this perspective provides a good explanation in 
terms of efficiency, it does not address ―control‖ which is better explained using 
TCA (Klein, Frazier and Roth 1990). It could be said that TCA provides a superior 
explanation because by addressing ―control‖, TCA also supports the ―efficiency‖ 
aspect as the mechanisms of control under the right circumstances can also 
reduce costs, hence, ―efficiency‖ is improved. Nonetheless, applying TCA solely as 
a framework to understand governance might be inadequate as TCA focuses only 
on the efficiency of transaction in its original conceptualization by Coase (1937) 
which states that the appropriate governance mode is the one that has the lowest 
combination of transaction and product costs. This conceptualization neglected 
other underlying conditions that might play a role in shaping governance decisions. 
The explanation to the issue in governance should be more prolific if TCA is joined 
with other complementary theories in governance (Mooi 2014). Heide and John 
(1992) state that the applicability of TCA is limited since TCA does not account for 
the mechanisms that allow firms to implement the desired governance structure, 
and integration with other governance theories should offer a more complete view 
on the influential factors (Heide and John 1992). Using multiple frameworks should 
increase robustness in the finding of a particular phenomenon as the focus can be 
on other facets beyond the scope of a specific theory (Eisenhardt 1988). 
Besides TCA, another economic model that focuses on similar issues and can be 
used to provide complimentarily perspective to extend knowledge regarding 
governance decisions is agency theory (Bergen, Dutta and Walker 1992). Agency 
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theory is developed in information economics literature and is an economic 
governance model that focuses on determining the most efficient contract that 
governs the relationship between one party (the principal) who delegates work to 
another (the agent). This relationship is presented whenever the principal depends 
on the agent to undertake some action on the principal‘s behalf given that it is 
difficult for the principal to have the complete information to monitor the behavior of 
the agents thoroughly due to exogenous factors such as environmental uncertainty 
(Eisenhardt 1989; Bergen, Dutta and Walker 1992; Williamson 1998; Kunz and 
Pfaff 2002).  
The heart of agency theory is the goal conflict between principal and agent that may 
rise due to assumptions regarding humans (self-interest, bounded rationality, risk 
aversion), organizations (conflicts among members, information asymmetry between 
principal and agents), and information (information is a commodity that can be 
purchased) (Eisenhardt 1989). How the standard agency model works as described 
by Kunz and Pfaff (2002) is that the relationship starts with a risk-neutral principal 
employing a risk-averse agent to act on his behalf. However, the agents usually 
retain some information from the principal, i.e., how the agents allocate their efforts 
is unattainable, creating information asymmetry between the parties. Therefore, 
information asymmetry and differences in risk preferences together with assumption 
of the agent‘s self-interest lead to the likelihood that the agent may not act as agreed 
in the contract (Kunz and Pfaff 2002). These problems can occur both in pre- and 
post-contractual periods and are often mentioned in agency literature as adverse 
selection and moral hazard (Bergen, Dutta and Walker 1992). Adverse selection is 
an agent‘s misrepresentation of his or her own ability which is a pre-contractual 
problem and moral hazard, a post-contractual problem, refers to the agent‘s lack of 
effort to conform to the contract (Eisenhardt 1989; Bergen, Dutta and Walker 1992). 
To summarize the above, the focus of agency theory is to find the most efficient 
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contract for the principal that governs the principal-agent relationship, i.e., to 
minimize goal conflicts, given the conditions of information asymmetry and changing 
environment (Bergen, Dutta and Walker 1992). Empirical investigations often include 
the comparison of contract design that is optimum in terms of efficiency (Kunz and 
Pfaff 2002). Given that agency theory‘s emphasis is on risk and reward, the term 
―efficiency‖ is viewed as not in either one of those aspects but as the optimum risk-
reward tradeoff (Eisenhardt 1988). 
Eisenhardt (1989) summarizes that the development of agency theory is 
progressing in 2 branches, positivist agency theory and principal-agent research. 
Both branches have a contract as the unit of analysis and share common 
assumptions about humans, organizations, and information. The differences 
between these two branches are in their focus and method to derive the answer. 
The positivist agency theory attempts to identify the situations in which conflicts are 
likely to rise and mostly focuses on the special cases, while the principal-agent 
research is more concerned with finding the most efficient contract for any given 
agency situations (Eisenhardt 1989). The differences between positivist and 
principal-agent branches are summarized in table 2.1 below. 
 Positivist Principal-Agent 
Key focus Situations in which conflict 
between principal and 
agent are likely to rise 
General theory of principal-
agent relationship. Testing 
theoretical assumptions 
Theoretical perspective Describing various 
governance 
mechanism/contract 
alternatives that solve 
agency problem 
Determining the most 
efficient contract, specially 
behavior vs. outcome 
based contract 
 
Research Method Less mathematical Logical deduction, 
abstract ,mathematical 
proof 
Empirical works Focus on special case Broader focus. General 
theoretical implications 
Source: Eisenhardt 1989 
Table 2.1: Positivist vs. Principal-Agent Agency Theory 
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Similar to TCA, agency theory is a useful framework in studying issues regarding 
governance and efficiency. Both theories share a number of similarities regarding 
their goals and assumptions. Eisenhardt (1989) found that among 5 perspectives in 
organizational literature, the most similar ones are TCA and agency theory as TCA 
shares 5 out of agency theory‘s 7 assumptions. Nonetheless, TCA and agency 
theory differ in their focus. While the goal of TCA is to design the most efficient 
mode of governance (i.e. direct or indirect sales force) that will minimize the total 
transaction cost for the firms, agency theory‘s objective is to understand the 
relationship between principal and agent (i.e. firm and employees) in order to 
design the most efficient compensation plan to motivate employees to work in a 
way that yields optimum efficiency to the firm (Kraft, Albers and Lal 2004). Agency 
theory is suitable for investigating situations which involved factors that are unique 
to the theory i.e. factors that create difficulty in contracting and controlling the 
performance of agents. Hence, the theory might be most useful to investigate 
situations involving 1) considerable goal conflicts between a principal and its 
agents 2) sufficient environmental uncertainty to trigger the risk sharing implication 
of the theory, 3) extensive information asymmetries, or 4) difficulties in 
performance evaluation (Bergen, Dutta and Walker 1992).  
Among those similarities and differences, one commonality in TCA and agency 
theory is the assumption of exogenous variables beyond the scope of both theories 
which is assumed to be the reason for the variances in empirical results (Kunz and 
Pfaff 2002). For example, recent research in agency theory has started to pay 
more attention to environmental uncertainty, which is exogenous to the exchange, 
but is the underlying reason for the assumption that the principal-agent contract is 
incomplete due to the state of nature (Nilakant and Rao 1994). These exogenous 
variables are known as the institutional environment that shapes the organizational 
structure. This is supported by Grewal and Dharwadkar (2002, p.82) which stated 
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that ―marketing channels literature predominantly has used an efficiently based 
task environment perspective and largely overlooked a legitimacy-based 
institutional environment approach in studying channel attitudes, behaviors, 
processes, and structures. Therefore, it is important that firms develop a 
comprehensive conceptual framework that incorporates the institutional 
environment into current marketing channel research.‖  
The institutional environment variables are the factors that capture the non-
economic circumstances that are relevant and crucial for any business to take into 
consideration in addition to market factors (Delios and Beamish 1999; Brouthers 
2002). Empirical evidence in both TCA and agency theory confirm that these 
institutional variables are impactful to the governance decisions. For example, 
several studies in choices of entry modes in foreign markets (cf. Gatignon and 
Anderson 1988; Roberts and Greenwood 1997; Chatterjee and Singh 1999; Davis, 
Desai and Francis 2000; Brouthers 2002) suggest that the institutional context has 
a significant influence on entry mode choice and performance because of the type 
and use of organizational capabilities and the connection with entry mode choices. 
Henisz (2000) found that the interaction of contractual and political hazards has a 
significant effect on governance which emphasizes the importance of institutional 
variables. Findings from Kabadayi, Eyuboglu and Thomas (2007) shows firms that 
align their channel system, strategy, and the environment have a superior 
performance to firms that do not.  
―The institutional theory then focuses on the necessity of organizational legitimacy 
which concerns social fitness leading to the development of processes that result 
in the formation of institutions and the emergence of corresponding institutional 
mechanisms that influence the internal polity and economy of marketing channels‖ 
(Grewal and Dharwadkar 2002, p.84). This viewpoint suggests that organization 
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practices, structure, and processes reflect patterns of doing things that evolve over 
time and these patterns become a legitimate way of doing things within the 
organizations. These patterns are shaped by industry practice, organizational 
culture and management traditions (Eisenhardt 1988). Unlike TCA and agency 
theory which view efficiency as the basis of organization, institutional environment 
focuses on the necessity of organizational legitimacy. As summarized by Grewal 
and Dhawadkar (2002), there are 3 primacies that influence the legitimacy of 
channel members: 1) regulatory institutions, 2) normative institutions, 3) and 
cognitive institutions. Each primacy has its own underlying process and 
mechanism that governs channel attitudes, behaviors and structures of channel 
members (Grewal and Dharwadkar 2002). Regulatory institutions refer to the legal 
system which is represented by government at any level, and influence channel 
members through the process of regulating. Normative institutions are the 
associations or agencies that can use a social obligation requirement to induce and 
regenerate patterns within channels. These institutions concerned with procedural 
legitimacy require channel members to embrace socially accepted norm, and 
behaviors (Selznick 1984), and influence the channel members through the 
process of validation. Cognitive institutions focus on culturally supported habits 
which subtly influence channel behaviors through the process of habitualizing 
(Grewal and Dharwadkar 2002). Empirical studies in this area focus on how these 
institutional elements, namely; industry traditions, legislation, and social and 
political belief, shape organizational structure. In particular, some facet of these 
elements contains environmental factors that are adequately influential to impose 
form and structure on subordinate organizational units (Scott 1987). Therefore, 
extending a governance theory such as TCA with institutional and cultural context 
variables would enhance understanding in the area as these variables are the 
underlying conditions of exchange (Brouthers 2002). 
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Williamson summarizes in his recent paper in (2010) that transaction cost 
economics advanced the understanding of governance by describing the firm not 
only in technological terms (as a production function) or prices and output, supply 
and demand, but in organizational terms as a governance structure through the lens 
of contract/governance (Williamson 2010). TCA provides concrete operationalization 
of governance as an economizing response to the Commons‘ (1932) 
pronouncement of transaction, (also known as the ―Commons triple‖) which states 
that ―The ultimate unit of activity … must contain in itself the three principles of 
conflict, mutuality and order. This unit is a transaction.‖ (p.4), in that ―governance is a 
means by which to infuse order, thereby to mitigate conflict and realize mutual gains‖ 
(Williamson 1999, page 1090) Although it is sufficient to examine governance issues 
based on TCA solely, more insightful explanations could be obtained if TCA is 
coupled with other perspectives in governance, agency theory and institutional 
environment in particular. As suggested by Bergen, Dutta and Walker (1992, p.8) 
―given that TCA and agency are concerned with similar issues and appear to be 
moving toward even more common conceptual ground, blending constructs and 
propsitions from the two theories may further improve our understanding of 
marketing phenomemon.‖ While TCA focuses on the efficiency of transactions, 
agency theory concentrates on principal-agent conflict which would be substantially 
useful in explaining opportunism, which is also one of TCA‘s underlying assumptions. 
The institutional environment adds an explanation of how environmental 
circumstances shape the organizational structure, practices, and value, which 
provides thorough perspectives on uncertainty, which is one of TCA‘s transaction 
dimensions. 
2.3 Mode of governance 
The definition of governance in TCA starts with a combination of the definition from 
Commons (1932) which emphasizes conflict and Coase (1937) which views 
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governance as the way to coordinate production. Later, although there seems to be 
no formal governance definition, the definitions become more established by 
Williamson in the pre-formal stage to TCA to focus on efficiency as the goal of 
governance. Scholars in the semi-formal stage then add precision and dimensions 
to the construct.  
In transaction cost theory, the mode of governance is ―the mechanism that facilitates 
transaction partners to achieve the most efficient and effective transaction, when a 
good or service is transferred across a separable interface‖ (Anderson and Weitz 
1986). Broadly, the term governance traditionally has been defined as a "mode of 
organizing transactions" (Williamson and Ouchi 1981). A more precise concept is 
offered by Palay (1984, p.265) who states that governance is ―a shorthand 
expression for the institutional framework in which contracts are initiated, negotiated, 
monitored, adapted, and terminated.‖ Heide 1994 restates the definition offered by 
Palay (1984) and defines governance as a multi-dimensional construct that looks 
into the relationship between contract partners from the beginning of the relationship 
until the end. This includes the elements of control, relationship maintenance, 
monitoring, and enforcement (Heide 1994). Defined in response to the Commons 
triple, governance is ―a means by which to infuse order in a relation where potential 
conflict threatens to undo or upset opportunities to realize mutual gains‖ (Williamson 
1999, p.1090). Table 2.2 presents various governance definitions. 
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Author Year Governance Definition 
Commons 1932 The means by which order is accomplished in a 
relation in which potential conflict threatens to undo 
or upset the opportunities to realize mutual gains 
Coase 1937 Methods of coordinating production 
Williamson 1975 A unified authority structure that leads to efficiency 
Williamson 1979 The mechanism that firms use to organize their 
exchange relationship to minimize transaction costs 
that arise when it is difficult to value the goods or 
services exchanged 
Williamson, 
Ouchi 
1984 Mode of organizing transactions 
Palay 1984 A shorthand expression for the institutional 
framework in which contracts are initiated, 
negotiated, adapted, and terminated 
Anderson, 
Weitz 
1986 The mechanism that facilitates transaction partners 
to achieve the most efficient and effective 
transaction, when a good or service is transferred 
across a separable interface 
Heide 1994 A mechanism that looks into the relationship 
between contract partners from the beginning of the 
relationship till the end. This includes elements of 
control, relationship maintenance, monitoring and 
enforcement 
Williamson 1999 A means by which to infuse order in a relation 
where potential conflict threatens to undo or upset 
opportunities to realize mutual gains 
Table 2.2: Governance definitions 
TCA states that market and hierarchy are alternative mechanisms for managing 
transactions, and that the choice of one or the other is based on the costs 
associated with the transaction which includes bargaining, assembling information, 
and monitoring compliance (Williamson 1975; Cespedes 1988). What raises these 
costs is the presence of transactional hazards i.e. dependence on the owner of a 
specific asset, small numbers of potential contractors, and imperfect information. 
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The cost involved with these hazards can be both ex ante i.e. managerial time in 
drafting a contract and ex post cost i.e. the costs occurred during the execution 
stage due to nonperformance (Mooi and Ghosh 2010). The theory predicts that 
firms will expand the scope of their own activities (through vertical integration) 
when opportunistic potential is significant and will transact with third parties when 
threats due to asset specificity, small numbers, and imperfect information are not 
significant (Teece 1986; Macher and Richman 2008). More recent works include a 
series of ―hybrid‖ modes which are the intermediate mode between market and 
hierarchy. This mode features a range of internal organization that runs along the 
continuum of market and hierarchy which a firm can set up without complete 
ownership or vertical integration (Williamson 1985; Dutta, et al. 1995; Rindfleisch 
and Heide 1997).  
Under these hybrid modes, transaction partners are independent but are bilaterally 
reliant to a non-trivial degree (Williamson 1991a). The individuality of each partner 
matters in the sense that each could not be replaced without cost to the other 
(David and Han 2004; Williamson 1991). The movement from market to hierarchy, 
hence, involves a trade-off between the high-powered incentives and adaptive 
properties of the market, and the safeguards and central coordinating properties of 
the firm (Shelanski and Klein 1995). For example, Folta‘s (1998) study on how 
uncertainty affects governance decisions uses the governance choice, minority 
investment, joint venture, and acquisition which reflect the choice that a firm used 
to access new R&D projects as a dependent variable. The choices are 
operationalized through the equity position of the focal firm in the biotechnology 
firm. If the focal company‘s equity position is less than 50%, it is categorized as 
minority investment. A joint venture is the formation of a new firm by two parent 
firms. If a focal firm owns 50 percent or more in a new firm, it is categorized as an 
acquisition. In summary, governance structure is no longer the discrete choice 
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between market and hierarchy, but the continuum between these two extremes 
(Folta 1998).  
Williamson (1985) argued that each mode of governance is described based on 
the two main attributes, incentive intensity and administrative authority, with a 
distinction of their strength and weakness. Incentive intensity is the extent to which 
a technologically separable stage of economic activity appropriates its net profits. 
Administrative authority and control is the autonomy in both operating and 
investment respects as well as on procedural controls i.e. routines such as 
accounting procedures. In a market, transaction partners face high-powered cost 
incentive and maintain control over their own production process, and adaptations 
must be renegotiated. For hierarchy, both parties are in low-powered cost 
incentives and relinquish administrative control over processes to form an 
interface-coordinator relationship (Williamson 1985; Tadelis and Williamson 2010). 
Therefore, hierarchy mode offers greater protection for specific investments and 
provides relatively efficient mechanisms for responding to change where 
coordinated adaptation is necessary. Compared to market governance, hierarchy 
provides managers weaker incentives to maximize profits and normally incurs 
additional bureaucratic costs as well. Between these two choices are a variety of 
hybrid modes i.e. complex contracts, reciprocal trading, partial ownership, or 
franchises which can be relational based or equity based (Williamson 1991). 
The elaborations of how these two attributes work are also present in channel and 
sales management literature. For example, the agency literature indicates that 
control and reward systems are the crucial elements for a firm to achieve optimal 
utilization of its direct sales force (Kraft, Albers and Lal 2004). Incentive is a tool to 
align the interests of the firm and its sales people to motivate salespeople to act in 
the firm's interest. Supervision is needed to the monitoring of salespeople to 
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ensure that they perform the activities according to the firm‘s requirements. To 
some degree, these control mechanisms are substitutable, suggesting that the firm 
can reduce the level of supervision if more incentive compensation is used (John 
and Weitz 1989).  
Figure 2.1 ―the continuum of relationship‖ based on Peterson, Wysocki and Harsh 
(2001) displays the continuum of relationship from a spot market which is the most 
extreme governance structure on the market side to a full vertical integration. In 
―spot market transactions‖, there is no presence of asset specificity and 
relationship continuity is not taken into account. The transaction, therefore, fully 
depends on the market price mechanism. When asset specificity is present, 
another extreme is the full vertical integration. Under this mode, transaction 
partners are under joint ownership and control (Macher and Richman 2008).  
 
Figure 2.1: Continuum of relationship  
2.3.1 Concurrent channels 
The recent literature on TCA does not only introduce a series of ―hybrid‖ modes, but 
also the concept of ―plural governance‖ or ―concurrent channels.‖ Concurrent 
channels refer to the use of two or more forms of governances, such as markets and 
Spot market Specifications
Relation-based
Alliance
Equity-based
Alliance
Vertical 
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Characteristics of “Invisible-Hand” Coordination
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Limited Information sharing
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Long-term Relationship
Open Information sharing
Interdependence
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Source: Peterson et al.(2001)
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hierarchies, simultaneously (Bradach and Eccles 1989). The expansion to TCA to 
include the intermediate mode of governance, hybrid, has also brought scholar‘s 
attentions to the study of ―plural governance‖ or ―concurrent channels‖ which is, in 
fact, a more common practice than the dichotomous choice of ―make or buy.‖ 
Bradach and Eccles‘s (1989) suggests TCA research should not only pay attention 
to individual modes of governance but consider combinations of mixed governance 
mode or plural governance that enable economic actors to minimize transaction 
costs (Bradach and Eccles 1989). Rindfleisch, et al. (2010) views that plural 
governance will be particularly useful when the transactions are exposed to multiple 
exchange hazards (i.e. Safeguarding, evaluation, and adaptation) or when single 
governance might be insufficient to control for these hazards. For example, to adapt 
to changing markets, IBM in the 1980‘s went from exclusively direct channels to a 
system including various types of intermediaries i.e. distributors, retail computer 
dealers, and value-added dealers when it shifted its focus to include lower price 
products i.e. personal computers. These channels accounted for increasing 
proportions of IBM‘s revenues and intermediaries have become important channels 
for other IBM products as well (Cespedes, 1988). The study of three networks in the 
packing industry by Lorenzoni and Lipparini (1999) shows that using multiple 
channels, both formal and informal, as a mean for organizing, accessing and 
transferring knowledge, will strengthen the position of the firm. Firms should 
collaborate to improve and expand their core competencies rather than employing 
third party for capabilities which firms have not yet acquired. Rothaermel, Hitt and 
Jobe (2006) found that using concurrent channels is beneficial to a firm‘s product 
development and the success of new products as it allows firm to access external 
knowledge while enjoying the benefit of efficiency and lower cost from vertical 
integration. A more recent example can be witnessed in the travel industry. Shifts in 
technology have changed the way tourists make decisions about their trip. In the 
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past, tourists depended on travel agencies to provide various services i.e. 
information provision, consulting, transaction, ticketing, etc. However, the arrival of 
online sites i.e. Expedia and Tripadvisor, allows users to book a plane ticket, filter 
and sort out hotel based on their preference (Van Bruggen, et al. 2010). Hence, 
hotels and airlines can no longer depend on travel agencies solely on their selling 
function. Empirical evidence also suggests using concurrent channels or 
simultaneous reliance on a mixture of various governance modes in the presence of 
multiple exchange hazards i.e. adaption, performance evaluation, and safeguarding 
problems will put firms in an advantageous position i.e. lower transaction costs, than 
firms that rely on a single governance (Heide and Wathne 2006; Rindfleisch, et al. 
2010).  
Single channel strategies are being increasingly replaced by multiple channel or 
concurrent channel strategies - when a firm makes a product available to the market 
through two or more channels of distribution - for most or all of their products 
(Frazier 1999). Concurrent channels are better for both customers and firms. 
Customers can choose to buy from the channel that fits with their needs while firms 
can increase their coverage and sales and gradually adjust their cost and capability 
structures to suit customer (Sa Vinhas and Anderson 2005). This is particularly 
important if firms want to expand their businesses through exporting. Findings from 
Bello and Gilliland (1997) suggest that, by not depending solely on one mode of 
governance such as vertical integration, firms can use multiple governances when 
expanding their business overseas by managing their foreign markets through 
foreign subsidiaries. The utilization of multiple channel structures enables 
companies to reduce business risks by allowing them to serve additional segments. 
This can be predominantly vital in the case of volatile environments. In these 
circumstances, the needs and preferences of consumers, and the composition and 
size of market segments change swiftly (Bello and Gilliland 1997). Therefore, firms 
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focused on a single channel will be in a risky position, while those firms relying on a 
multiple channels will be in a safer position, because their revenue sources are 
diversified (Coelho and Easingwood 2004). In addition to business expansion, 
concurrent channel structure is beneficial to a firm‘s governance mechanism in 
monitoring and relational norms. ―Monitoring is better in suppressing opportunism as 
the direct sales force can provide relevant performance benchmark and undermine 
the effect of relational norms due to a threat of backward integration‖ (Heide, Kumar 
and Wathne 2014, p.1165).  
Concurrent channels typically create channel conflict. As channel structure 
becomes more dependent on intermediaries, these intermediaries may choose to 
follow their own agenda instead of viewing themselves as part of the larger channel 
(Van Bruggen et al. 2010). It is impossible for manufacturers to prevent channel 
types from competing with each other, either because both channel types contact 
the same customer or because the customer sets them in competition against each 
other. (Sa Vinhas and Anderson 2005). Nevertheless, despite some conflicts, 
concurrent channels approach does appear to lead to a stable, long-term 
equilibrium (Van Bruggen et al. 2010).  
TRANSACTION DIMENSIONS 
This section discusses the three transaction dimensions: asset specificity, 
uncertainty, and frequency. The perspective from other governance theories will be 
discussed where relevant. 
2.4 Asset specificity 
―One of the key initiatives of early transaction cost analysis was to define the 
relatively ignored condition of asset specificity as an important attribute of 
transactions‖ (Tadelis and Williamson 2010, p.11). Among the three transaction 
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dimensions identified by TCA, asset specificity receives the most attention as the 
effect of asset specificity on the choice of governance is the most tested 
relationship in TCA (Macher and Richman 2008) as it is the critical determining 
factor of vertical integration decisions particularly when examined together with 
other transaction dimensions i.e. uncertainty and product complexity (Anderson 
and Schmittlein 1984; Masten 1984; Shelanski and Klein 1995). Six different types 
of asset specificity are addressed in TCA empirical analysis. Regardless of type, 
asset specificity has the effect of placing transaction partners in a bilateral 
dependency relation, which creates bargaining problems as transaction partners 
attempt to appropriate the quasi rents generated from relationship specific 
investments (Macher and Richman 2008). 
2.4.1 Definition of asset specificity 
Transaction-specific assets are assets that are tailored to a particular transaction 
and have no alternative use outside of the particular transaction which gives rise to 
a safeguarding problem (Williamson 1985). Asset specificity can sometimes arise 
spontaneously, without conscious and costly investments, as occurs with 
knowledge and skills that are incidentally acquired by the parties while working 
together (Klein 1989; Tadelis and Williamson 2010; Steenkamp and Geyskens 
2012). Williamson (1983) first identified that there were four main types of asset 
specificity and added two more in his later work in 1991. The first type is site 
specificity, in which transaction partners decide upon a specific location to build 
their immobile assets to minimize costs of transportation and inventory. The 
second type is physical asset specificity which refers to relationship-specific 
equipment and machinery. The third type is human asset specificity which refers to 
transaction-specific knowledge or human capital, achieved through specialized 
training or firm-specific skills and knowledge. The fourth type is dedicated assets 
which refers to additional investments that would not have been made outside a 
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particular transaction in order to sell increased output to that particular customers 
(Shelanski and Klein 1995). The fifth and sixth types, brand name capital and 
temporal specificity (sometimes call episodic specificity), were added subsequently. 
Brand name capital specificity refers to investment in reputation i.e. advertising. 
Temporal specificity refers to investments made to enable the timely response of 
human assets (Leiblein 2003). Whatever form, these assets cannot be redeployed 
outside of the relationship without loss of productive value (Williamson 1985). 
The increase in asset specificity is problematic because it might increase transaction 
costs due to opportunism (Dyer 1997). Without the presence of specific assets, TCA 
favors market governance because of its cost efficiency and strong performance 
incentives relative to that of vertical integration. However, the presence of specific 
assets will cause market governance to fail as it increases the cost of partner 
replacement thus creating bilateral monopoly in which transaction partners may feel 
that they can act opportunistically without being replaced (Carson, Madhok and Wu 
2006). In summary, although specific assets can improve productivity, the incentive 
to make these specific investments is mitigated by the idea that the more specific the 
asset becomes, the lower its value in other use. Hence, the owner of these specific 
assets is exposed to great risk (Dyer 1997). Hence, TCA fundamentally states that 
the response to alleviate this problem and safeguard the relationship is hierarchical 
governance or vertical integration because the relationship and control process 
authority available through vertical integration embody greater safeguarding 
capability (Williamson 1985). The scenario described by Williamson (1985) is that 
the projected cost of the transaction will increase if the transaction must be 
supported by transaction-specific assets. This is because specific investments by 
transaction partner create scope for the other transaction partner to renegotiate the 
contract opportunistically when the surrounding conditions change as the asset has 
no use outside of the relationship. By organizing such transactions under 
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hierarchical governance, both transaction partners face low-powered cost incentives, 
enhanced monitoring, and the threat of sanctions that can limit opportunistic 
behavior and facilitate cooperative adaptation (Williamson 1985). In conclusion, TCA 
predicts that if asset specificity is high, firms are more likely to use vertical 
integration.  
2.4.2 Empirical evidence on asset aspecificity 
The number of empirical studies on the effect of asset specificity is vast. Many of 
these studies have made distinctions between different types of asset specificity i.e. 
site, physical, and human asset specificity as suggested by Williamson (1985) 
(Shelanski and Klein 1995). For example, Klein (1989) and Klein, Frazier and Roth 
(1990) found a positive effect of asset specificity on vertical control. Coles and 
Hesterly (1998) found strong evidence that asset specificity, both physical and 
human, is an important factor in the decision to vertically integrate transactions for 
hospitals. Kraft, Albers, and Lal (2004) found that a direct sales force is more likely 
to be employed with increasing transaction specific assets, decreasing amount of 
time devoted to selling, decreasing selling requirements, increasing uncertainty in 
the selling environment, decreasing number of customers per salesperson and 
decreasing effectiveness of salespeople. 
However, the empirical evidence on the effect of asset specificity on the choice of 
governance, market or hierarchy, is not consistent in the research findings. The 
empirical review by David and Han (2004) found that only 58% percent aligns with 
TCA‘s prediction that firms tend to choose hierarchical form of governance as their 
mode of governance when transaction dimensions rise. Dyer (1997) suggested 
that there are situations in which an identical level of asset specificity may result in 
a different level of transaction costs. The reason is that transaction cost might differ 
because of other factors i.e. commitment, scale and scope of exchange, inter-firm 
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information sharing, mix of safeguard, and level of investment in co-specialized 
assets. The study on governance and uncertainty by Folta (1998) also found that 
integration may not be an ideal mode of governance when asset specificity rises. 
The argument underlying this position is that under some specific conditions, there 
might be significant cost in acquisition which offsets the benefits of superior 
administrative control.  
2.5 Uncertainty  
The second important transaction dimension in determining the appropriate 
governance form is uncertainty. In TCA, uncertainty is one of the primary exchange 
characteristics that facilitates opportunism which will give rise to transaction 
difficulties i.e. frequent reassessments and redefinitions of selling activities (John 
and Weitz 1989), and subsequently, higher transaction cost. When markets 
experience problems as a result of human factors; bounded rationality and 
opportunism, the problems will be more severe if the level of uncertainty is high. 
This will eventually create ―market failure‖ because the market governance 
becomes a costly and inefficient mechanism to govern the exchange (Williamson 
1975; Heide 1994; Carson, Madhok and Wu 2006). For example, Williamson (1975) 
elaborates that uncertainty in the foreign market provides the potential for outside 
intermediaries to behave opportunistically and it will be difficult to both write and 
enforce complex contingent claims contracts. Therefore, transaction costs of 
market governance are increased and firms will have more incentives to vertically 
integrate so as to have more capability to absorb uncertainty through specialization 
of decision-making and savings in communication expenses (Williamson 1975). 
Nonetheless, Williamson (1985) states that the effect of uncertainty on the choice 
of governance is conditional and not uncontroversial. The conditional effect is due 
to the notion that uncertainty only favors vertical integration (and hybrid) under 
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conditions of high asset specificity because both the cost and the possibilities of 
hold-up from opportunistic behavior are higher. The continuity between the 
transaction partners becomes important, and adaptive capabilities become 
necessary. Failure to support uncertainty under conditions of high asset specificity 
with protective governance structures will result in costly haggling and mal-
adaptation. Without the presence of asset specificity, the rationale for vertical 
integration would not be legitimate as market governance will hold across 
standardized transactions of all kinds, regardless the degree of uncertainty 
(Williamson 1985). Under this condition, there would be no assets at risk or that 
need protection by means of vertical integration from possible opportunism. The 
continuity of the relationship matters little and new transaction arrangements can 
easily be arranged by both parties if necessary. It will be less costly for a firm to 
contract on the market for goods and services in an uncertain environment than to 
assume the risk of producing them internally. Therefore, the effect of uncertainty 
will instead depend on other factors such as competitive conditions. For example, 
Walker and Weber (1987) test the interactive effects of uncertainty and competition, 
and show that sales volume uncertainty increases the probability of vertical 
integration when the competitive condition is low. If firms face the issue of demand 
uncertainty without the presence of asset specificity, it may be cheaper to buy the 
component than to make it internally and there are many potential suppliers in the 
market (Walker and Weber 1987). Therefore, uncertainty increases the likelihood 
of integration for asset-specific transactions; non-asset specific transactions will 
not be integrated, even in the context of highly uncertain environments. These 
statements suggest a main effect for asset specificity alone, while uncertainty is 
more appropriately examined as an interaction effect with asset specificity 
(Shelandski and Klein 1995). However, since it is unlikely for firms to have zero 
asset specificity, especially with regard to human assets, it should be appropriate 
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to say that the effect is unidirectional. The concept of zero asset specificity may 
only exist in the most basic commodity market (Klein 1989). 
Moving beyond the conventional governance form of ―make or buy‖, another 
noteworthy question is where hybrid governance stands in this conditional effect of 
uncertainty. David and Han (2004) suggests that in times of high uncertainty, 
market governance and hierarchy are preferable to hybrids (David and Han 2004) 
as hybrid forms, due to their 'intermediate range' of asset specificity which tends to 
shrink, and may even disappear (Williamson 1991). This is because hybrid 
adaptations cannot be made separately (as with market governance), or by 
authority (as with hierarchy), but require mutual agreement (Williamson 1991). For 
example, in alliances (a form of hybrid), contracting under uncertainty requires 
partners to specify, monitor, and control numerous contract contingencies, 
including the quality of partner resource contributions and the control of know-how 
(Oxley 1997). Given the high costs of using contracts to control uncertainty, TCA 
argues that firms will prefer the superior incentive alignment and control of 
hierarchical governance, especially when there is uncertainty about partner 
intentions, task requirements, or the need to rewrite contracts as external 
disturbances arise (Pisano 1989). Therefore, when considering the efficient 
governance forms that minimize the combined costs of opportunism and 
administration arising from uncertainty and asset specificity (Williamson 1985; 
Shelanski and Klein 1995), a hybrid form of governance may not be the right 
solution 
As for the controversy aspect, certain organization theorists argue that firms should 
try to maintain their flexibility in times of high uncertainty as a flexible organization 
is seen to be better able to adapt to changing circumstances. Therefore, a less 
vertically integrated choice of governance should be more appropriate (Salancik 
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and Pfeffer 1978; Klein, Frazier and Roth 1990). Highly integrated organizations 
may neglect the environmental effect and hence be slow to respond. Firms that 
choose integrated governance structure in an uncertain environment may 
encounter management complications in addition to the uncertainty. Overall, 
uncertainty is a broad concept and different aspects of it lead to both a desire for 
flexibility and cost reduction (Klein 1989; Klein, Frazier and Roth 1990).  
2.5.1 Definition of uncertainty 
Although uncertainty has long been studied in many areas, the adopted definitions 
and operationalization differ between empirical applications. In the early days, 
some studies operationalized uncertainty as a uni-dimensional construct (cf. Knight 
1921; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Levy 1985). Increasingly, researchers question 
that uni-dimensional assumption (Sutcliffe and Zaheer 1998) and adopt a multiple 
dimensions approach to measure uncertainty.  
Broadly, uncertainty is defined as the disturbances to which transaction is subject 
to both internal and external to the firm (Williamson 1999; Klein, Frazier and Roth 
1990). TCA literature theorizes uncertainty into behavioral and environmental 
uncertainty based on Williamson‘s (1975) work, which identifies that human and 
environment are the two key uncertainty factors that affect transaction cost. 
Behavioral uncertainty (also called internal uncertainty) is viewed as the difficulties 
associated with monitoring the ex post contractual performance of transaction 
partners (Slater and Spencer 2000). Behavioral uncertainty can be reduced once 
firms create contractual and governance safeguards that align with the risk they 
face (Williamson 1991). This construct also receives attention in the agency 
literature as it involves control problems between principal and agents. The 
empirical work on behavioral uncertainty and its operationalization is much less 
than that of environmental uncertainty (Heide and John 1990) and is relatively 
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straightforward as the construct has fewer operationalization issues. Gatignon and 
Anderson‘s (1988) study on degree of control over foreign subsidiaries defines 
internal uncertainty as a firm‘s inability to assess its agent‘s performance. Santoro 
and McGill (2005) studied the impact of behavioral uncertainty, partner and task 
uncertainty, on asset co-specialization. The study conceptualizes partner 
uncertainty as partner-specific experiences. The higher the mutual partner-specific 
experience, the lower the partner uncertainty. Task uncertainty is conceptualized 
as the uncertainty related to tasks in each development stage. The higher the task 
uncertainty, the higher the contracting cost, which makes vertically integration a 
more efficient mode of governance relative to market governance. The results 
show that alliances choose governance structure i.e. bilateral cross licensing, 
minority equity, based on the type of uncertainty confronted. The result is 
consistent with TCA‘s prediction that firms choose hierarchical forms of 
governance when partner and task uncertainty rise. Bello and Gilliland (1997) 
focus on internal uncertainty and operationalize as psychic distance which is the 
environment which focal firm has a direct stage on. 
Environment uncertainty (also called external uncertainty), is a property of the 
decision environment within which exchange takes place. It creates adaptation 
problems on account of bounded rationality to the relevant circumstances 
surrounding the exchange being too numerous or unpredictable to be specified ex 
ante in a contract. The empirical findings on the effect of environmental uncertainty 
on choice of governance are mixed (David and Han 2004; Santoro and McGill 
2005; Fink, et al. 2006; Geysken, Steenkamp and Kumar 2006). The explanation 
for these findings‘ inconsistency is the varying operationalization (Klein 1989). 
Although the construct of uncertainty has been disaggregated in more recent 
transaction cost, strategic management, and organizational theory research 
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(Milliken 1987), there is still no agreement in the literature on the meaning of 
uncertainty, which causes the result to be quite heterogeneous (Fink, et al. 2006).  
2.5.2 Empirical findings on uncertainty 
The empirical assessment by David and Han (2004) shows that only 9 of the 37 
studies are in the same direction as TCA‘s prediction that hierarchy is preferred to 
market governance when uncertainty increases. The meta analysis by Geyskens, 
Steenkamp and Kumar (2006) also supports the notion that the effect of 
uncertainty on the choice of governance is heterogeneous. Their study found that 
asset specificity, volume uncertainty, and behavioral uncertainty favor hierarchy 
over market. In contrast, when technological uncertainty is present, market is 
preferred over hierarchy. 
The first explanation for these inconsistencies is the varying operationalization of 
this uncertainty (Klein 1989). For example, Duncan (1972) classifies perceived 
uncertainty into 4 types based on simple-complex and dynamic-static dimension. 
The result shows that decision units with dynamic environments always experience 
significantly more uncertainty in decision making regardless of whether their 
environment is simple or complex. The result from Levy (1985) supports a positive 
relationship between unanticipated events and vertical integration and negative 
relationship between anticipated events and vertical integration. Klein‘s (1989) 
study shows a positive effect of complexity on vertical control, but a negative effect 
for dynamism. Hu and Chen (1993) discovered that socio-cultural factors and 
uncertainty (economic risk) are the factors that influence the percent of foreign 
ownership. Sutcliffe and Zaheer‘s (1998) study shows that three sources of 
uncertainty act independently of each other on vertical integration and emphasize 
the need to treat uncertainty as a distinct set of constructs rather than as an 
undifferentiated concept. Beckman, Haunschild and Phillips‘s (2004) study on the 
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impact of uncertainty on partner selection identifies two types of uncertainty based 
on whether it is specific to the focal firm only or affects the entire market. Firms that 
experience high market uncertainty may have a low firm-specific uncertainty. The 
result of the study shows that firms choose different actions in response to different 
types of uncertainty. Carson, Madhok and Wu (2006) differentiate uncertainty as 
having two aspects, volatility and ambiguity, in their study about the impact of 
uncertainty on the effectiveness of relationship governance. This distinction follows 
the general definition of empirical work in governance branch of transaction cost 
economics based on Williamson‘s (1985) conceptualization. The result from the 
study shows volatility and ambiguity have different impact on the governance 
regime.  
The second possible explanation might be due to the fact that TCA only prescribes 
the effect of uncertainty under the presence of asset specificity; therefore, the 
variation in results might be due to the type and degree of asset specificity 
examined (David and Han 2004). Coles and Hesterly (1998) found that increasing 
levels of uncertainty, including complexity and technological change, have an 
important role in the decision to integrate transactions, but only with the presence 
of asset specificity. Anderson (1985) found that environmental uncertainty alone 
has no impact on decisions to vertically integrate. However, the decision to 
integrate depends upon the combination of transaction specific assets and 
environmental unpredictability. Joshi and Stump (1999) find that the main effect of 
asset specificity is strengthened under conditions of high uncertainty.  
In summary, it seems that the expected choice of governance depends upon 
various factors outside TCA variables. For example, agency theory focuses on the 
tradeoff between cost and control. Folta (1998) suggests vertical integration is 
appropriate in dealing with uncertainty in general. The increase in uncertainty will 
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increase the cost of drafting and monitoring to a point where vertical integration is a 
more efficient and less costly option. However, when it comes to a specific 
situation like technological uncertainty, firms will be better off using market 
governance as the cost of administrative control is less than the loss that will incur 
from investing in obsolete technology (Folta 1998). A more complete explanation of 
uncertainty will be provided in Chapter 3. 
2.6 Frequency 
Just like uncertainty, frequency only affects choice of governance in the presence 
of asset specificity. Transaction frequency which is the recurring of the transaction 
(Williamson 1999) has received far less attention in the empirical literature in 
comparison to asset specificity and uncertainty (Rindfleisch and Heide 1997). Due 
to the underlying assumption of opportunism, transactions involving asset 
specificity that occur frequently will generate higher administrative and monitoring 
cost. Therefore, vertical integration is preferred. Those that occur only occasionally 
need not be attended to continuously and do not require the bureaucratic costs of 
establishing a hierarchy (Klein 1989; David and Han 2004).  
The TCA review by Macher and Richman (2008) summarized that researchers 
have been unsuccessful confirming this hypothesis. Several empirical studies 
however reveal no positive relationship between transaction frequency and mode 
of governance (cf. Anderson and Schmittlein 1984; Anderson 1985). Some studies 
categorize transaction frequency into one-time versus recurring transactions and 
do find a significant relationship with governance mode (John and Weitz 1988; 
Klein, Frazier and Roth 1990).  
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2.7 Performance  
The studies about performance are extant and the conceptualizations are varied i.e. 
inventory turnover (cf.Noordewier, John and Nevin 1990), profitability and market 
performance (cf. Slater and Olson 2000), and firm survival chance (cf. Bigelow 
2006; Luo, Sivakumar and Liu 2005). Measurement of performance includes 
secondary measures i.e. return on assets (cf.Beckman, Haunschild and Phillips 
2004), unit sales and time to market (cf.Castañer, et al. 2014), and scale measures 
(cf.Slater and Olson 2000). Investigations relating to organizational study seem to 
focus on what drives the differences between high quality (effective) and poor 
quality (ineffective) performance which makes effectiveness the ultimate variable in 
research on organization (Cameron 1986). Therefore, the various 
conceptualization of ―performance‖ in empirical studies is actually a different facet 
of ―organizational effectiveness.‖ 
Although organizational theorists seem to agree that organizational effectiveness is 
multidimensional and the key concept in organizational study, the construct has not 
been well developed as there has been little agreement on the criteria to its 
definition. A variety of models have been employed. The debates about the 
superiority of each model can be found in the literature prior to 1980 (Angle and 
Perry 1981). The breakthrough on this topic came from Quinn and Rohrbaugh‘s 
(1981) framework of the three underlying dimensions in which individuals evaluate 
the effectiveness of organizations which are 1) concern for flexibility vs. control, 2) 
internal-external focus, and 3) concerns for ends vs. means. Based on these three 
dimensions, Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1981) came up with the Competing Value 
Framework Model (CVF) that identifies 8 objectives in which organizational 
effectiveness can be assessed (Quinn and Cameron 1983; Quinn and Rohrbaugh 
1983; Kumar, Stern and Achrol 1992). 
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2.7.1 Performance in governance theory  
TCA‘s discriminating alignment hypothesis which states that transactions that align 
mode of governance with transaction dimensions will minimize the total transaction 
cost, the sum of the two counterbalancing cost which are ex ante contracting and 
ex post transaction problem, in carry them out which can be translated into 
superior competitive performance relative to those who do not (Williamson 1985; 
Mooi and Ghosh 2010) shows that the focus of the theory on aligning transactions 
with the proper modes of governance is to economize cost rather than maximize 
profit. In particular, Williamson (1985) states that the way to organize transactions 
is to economize on bounded rationality and safeguard on opportunism (Slater and 
Spencer 2000). Therefore, transaction cost theory‘s prescription for superior 
financial performance emphasizes economizing rather than strategizing 
(Williamson 1991).  
Though supports for the central claim that transactions with highly asset-specific 
are more likely to be vertically integrated than using a third party are strong and 
numerous (Shelanski and Klein 1995; Rindfleisch and Heide 1997; Macher and 
Richman 2008), the empirical support for TCA predictions regarding the 
relationship between choices of governance and relative performance outcome is 
still underdeveloped (Leiblein, Reuer and Dalsace 2002, David and Han 2004, 
Bigelow 2006). The empirical assessment by David and Han (2004) found that 
there are only a small number of tests that have performance as the dependent 
variable and they could not find any tests that compare the performance of market 
and hierarchy when the degree of transactional dimensions is similar. The study 
also states that this insufficient empirical support is troubling because, while there 
is sufficient evidence that asset specificity favors to the choice of hierarchy over 
markets, there is no evidence to proof that that choice is efficient. Therefore, the 
central claim of the TCA prediction that vertical integration is the efficient choice 
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when transaction dimensions rise has not been fully validated (David and Han 
2004).  
There are two streams of thought regarding the effect of governance on 
performance, the equilibrium and disequilibrium views. The equilibrium view 
suggests that when a firm is at its equilibrium, cost advantages and disadvantages 
are balanced out. The choice of governance is an endogenous outcome of 
competitive selections. Performance is explained by other transaction dimensions 
according to TCA rather than choice of governance (Demsetz 1983). This is 
somewhat similar to the institutional environment which suggests ―some 
institutional sectors or fields contain environmental agents that are sufficiently 
powerful to impose structural forms and/or practices on subordinate organizational 
units‖(Scott 1987, p.501). However, the disequilibrium stream views that a firm is in 
disequilibrium meaning that the choice of governance is not endogenously derived 
from market conditions, but a managerial decision. The choice of governance will 
affect the level of the firm‘s resource deployment i.e. scale of operation and 
monitoring cost. Therefore, performance is the result of choice of governance 
because it shows whether that particular choice can maximize the firm‘s efficiency 
or not (Demsetz 1983). This view is consistent with TCA‘s discriminating alignment 
hypothesis which suggests that performance can be improved if the modes of 
governance and transaction dimensions are aligned. The study on alliance shows 
that the performance assessment of any collaborative ventures has to evaluate 
both advantages and disadvantages of collaboration relative to the autonomous 
alternative (Castañer, et al. 2014). 
Although the empirical investigations of performance in channel literature are 
extant and a number of relationships between performance and other variables 
have been explored, the theoretical rationale for the selection criteria seems to be 
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underdeveloped as the investigation is often done separately or in ad-hoc 
combinations which may raise issues about the generalizability of the findings 
(Kumar, Stern and Achrol 1992; Duarte and Davies 2003). In this regard, Kumar, 
Stern and Achrol (1992 ) offered a conceptual framework which is a systematic 
approach based on the CVF model discussed in the previous section for assessing 
a reseller‘s performance (table 2.3). The 8 objectives (table 2.3) which the 
suppliers can use to assess reseller‘s performance are profits, sales, competence, 
loyalty, compliance, growth, adaptability, and customer satisfaction (Kumar, Stern 
and Achrol 1992). Kumar, Stern and Achrol (1992) also summarize that three 
different approaches are commonly used to construct performance scales: uni-
dimensional, multiple dimensions-individually investigated and composite scale.  
Effectiveness  
Model 
Functional 
Imperative 
Suppliers‘ Objective 
Reseller's 
Contribution 
Relational goal 
model 
Goal attainment Efficiency Contribution to 
profits 
 
 
Human relations 
model 
Pattern 
maintenance 
Productivity Contribution to sales 
 
 
Internal Process 
model 
Integration Stability 
Control 
Reseller loyalty 
Reseller compliance 
 
Open systems 
model 
Adaptation Growth 
Adaptation 
External legitimacy 
Contribution to 
growth 
Reseller adaptability 
Customer 
satisfaction 
  
Source: Kumar, Stern, and Achrol, 1992 
 
Table 2.3: Conceptual framework for assessing reseller's performance from the supplier's perspective 
Although the above framework was inititially constructed for scale measures, the 
systematic approach from the model provides a good framework in understanding 
the multi-dimensional aspect of performance in general, specifically on what are 
the right performance measures for each research objective. 
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2.7.2 Empirical findings on performance 
The conceptualizations of performance and the linkage transaction dimensions in 
empirical investigations are varying. Based on the discriminating alignment 
hypotheses, most empirical works focus on examining if alignment does improve 
subsequent performance outcomes. Table 2.4 displays literature that investigate 
the relationship between governance and performance. For example, Bello and 
Gilliland (1997) examine if three nonmarket forms of governance, output control, 
process control, and flexiblity, can enhance performance. Three aspects of 
performance, strategic, selling, and economic, are of interest in this study and are 
operationalized using scale items. The result shows that output control and 
flexibility can enhance performance, but found no support for the relationship 
between process control and performance. Slater and Olson (2000) investigated 
the relationship between strategy type and performance. The study focuses on the 
most important indicators of financial performance, profitability and market 
performance, and measure them using scale measurement. The study found that 
different strategy type required different profiles of sales force management 
practice for optimal effectiveness. Mooi and Ghosh (2010) explore the performance 
implications of contract specificity. Instead of examining the direct relationship 
between governance and performance, the study addressed this linkage by 
investigating the relationship between both ex ante and ex post contracting costs 
and contract specificity. The result suggested that there is a trade-off between ex 
ante and ex post contracting costs and these two costs must be considered jointly 
when choosing a governance mode. Steenkamp and Geyskens‘ (2012) meta-
analysis tests of governance decisions shows strong support for TCA‘s normative 
direction which is associated with superior performance. The study found strong 
positive governance-choice performance relationship, for both hierarchical and 
relational governance, which indicates that selecting hierarchical or relational 
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governance in response to transaction hazards improves performance. Castañer, 
et al.‘s (2014) study on the relationship between governance mode and 
governance fit on firm performance measures performance using two variables, 
unit sales and time to market. The study found that there is a relationship between 
choice of governance and performance outcome. The study also shows that the 
alignment of choice of governance with surrounding conditions will increase 
performance. Mooi and Gilliland (2013) directly test TCA‘s discriminating alignment 
hypothesis by testing the subsequent performance of aligned and misaligned 
enforcement. The study conceptualizes performance as satisfaction with problem 
resolutions and finds support for TCA‘s discriminating alignment hypotheses that 
satisfaction of misaligned enforcement is worse than that of aligned 
enforcement.The study also concludes that misaligned enforcement has a greater 
impact on performance relative to transactions that enforcement is not expected. 
 
Author Year Topics Variables 
Measures 
P = Perceptual 
Measure 
O = Objective 
Measure 
Key Findings 
D'Aveni 
and 
Ravencraft 
1994 Economies of 
integration 
versus 
bureaucracy 
costs: does 
vertical 
integration 
improve 
performance? 
Vertical 
Integration  
 
 
 
Performance 
Degree of 
forward 
integration (O) 
 
 
Profit (O) 
Vertical 
integration 
allows firm to 
lower costs in 
certain areas, 
but has higher 
bureaucracy 
costs. Firms 
should try to 
keep benefits of 
vertical 
integration 
without incurring 
higher 
bureaucracy to 
achieve superior 
performance 
 
 
Table 2.4: Literature on performance 
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Author Year Topics Variables 
Measures 
P = Perceptual 
Measure 
O = Objective 
Measure 
Key Findings 
Bello and 
Gilliland 
1997 The effect of 
output controls, 
process 
controls, and 
flexibility on 
export channel 
performance 
Control  
 
 
 
Performance 
(strategic, 
Selling, and 
economic) 
Psychic 
distance (P) 
 
 
Operational 
performance 
(P) 
Strategic 
performance 
(P) 
Selling 
performance 
(P) 
 
Non-market 
governance, 
output control 
and flexibility, 
can enhance 
performance 
Slater 
and 
Olson 
2000 Strategy type 
and 
performance: 
the influence of 
sales force 
management 
Strategy 
Type  
 
 
Performance 
(market and 
profitability) 
Self-typing 
paragraph 
 
 
Sales (P) 
Market share 
(P) 
Profitability (P) 
 
Different strategy 
types require 
different 
individualized 
profiles of sales 
force 
management for 
optimal 
effectiveness 
 
Brouthers 2002 Institutional, 
cultural and 
transaction 
cost influences 
on entry mode 
choice and 
performance 
 
Mode choice 
 
Performance 
 
 
 
 
Institutional 
environment 
Entry mode (P) 
 
Financial 
measure (P) 
Mon-financial 
measure (P) 
 
Investment risk 
(P) 
Legal 
restriction (P) 
 
Firms that 
perceived higher 
mode of 
investment risks 
tend to use join-
venture as a 
mode of entry. 
Firms that 
utilized the entry 
mode predicted 
by the extended 
TCA model 
reported a higher 
performance 
 
Duarte 
and 
Davies 
2003 Testing the 
conflict-
performance 
assumption in 
business-to-
business 
relationship 
Conflict 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Performance 
(Effectivenes
s and 
efficiency) 
Latent conflict 
(P) 
Perceived 
conflict (P) 
Affective 
Conflict (P) 
 
Sales growth 
(O) 
Error (O) 
 
Effectiveness 
declines as 
perceived and 
affective conflicts 
increase. The 
relationship 
between conflict 
and efficiency 
follows U-shape. 
Manager should 
consider whether 
effectiveness or 
efficiency is 
more important 
 
Table 2.4: Literature on performance (Continued) 
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Author Year Topics Variables 
Measures 
P = Perceptual 
Measure 
O = Objective 
Measure 
Key Findings 
Olson, 
Stanley, 
Slater, and 
Hult 
2005 The 
performance 
implications of 
fit among 
business 
strategy, 
marketing 
organization 
structure, and 
strategic 
behavior 
 
Governance 
Alignment  
 
 
 
Performance 
Self-typing 
paragraph for 
each strategy 
type (P) 
 
Firm‘s 
objectives (P) 
Strategy (P) 
Market 
Structure (P) 
 
Firm 
performance is 
influenced by the 
marketing 
organization's 
structural 
characteristics, 
and strategic 
behavior 
Rothermel, 
Hitt, and 
Jobe 
2006 Balancing 
vertical 
integration and 
strategic 
outsourcing: 
effects on 
product 
portfolio, 
product 
success, and 
firm 
performance 
Vertical 
Integration 
 
 
Performance 
(Product 
success and 
Revenue) 
Degree of 
vertical 
integration (O) 
 
Revenue (O) 
New product 
success (O) 
Size of product 
portfolio (O) 
 
Using concurrent 
channels is 
beneficial to 
product 
development and 
the success of 
new products as 
it allows firms to 
access external 
knowledge and 
enjoy the benefit 
of vertical 
integration 
 
Lu and Tao 2008 Vertical 
integration and 
firm 
performance 
Vertical 
integration  
 
 
Performance 
Degree of 
vertical 
integration (O) 
 
Labor 
productivity (O) 
Sales (O) 
Market share 
(O) 
Price (O) 
 
Degree of 
vertical 
integration 
causes a 
negative impact 
on firm sales, 
market share 
and productivity 
but positive 
impact on 
product prices 
 
Mooi and 
Ghosh 
2010 Contract 
specificity and 
its 
performance 
implications 
Contract 
Specificity  
 
 
Performance  
 
Contract 
specificity (P) 
 
 
Ex ante costs 
(P) 
Ex post 
problems (P) 
 
Transaction 
partners should 
jointly consider 
the trade-off 
between ex ante 
and ex post 
contracting cost 
when 
determining the 
governance form 
 
 
Table 2.4: Literature on performance (Continued) 
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Author Year Topics Variables 
Measures 
P = Perceptual 
Measure 
O = Objective 
Measure 
Key Findings 
Castañer, 
Mulotte, 
Garrette, 
Dussage 
2013 Governance 
mode vs. 
governance fit: 
performance 
implications of 
make-or-ally 
choices for 
production 
innovation in 
the worldwide 
aircraft industry, 
1942-2000 
 
 
Governance 
Alignment  
 
 
Performance 
Governance 
choice (O) 
 
 
Unit sales (O) 
Time to market 
(O) 
 
Alignment 
enhances 
performance 
Mooi and 
Gilliland 
2013 How contracts 
and 
enforcement 
explain 
transaction 
outcomes 
Governance 
Alignment  
 
 
 
Performance  
Enforcement/ 
non-
enforcement (P) 
 
Satisfaction 
with problem 
resolution (P) 
 
Alignment of 
enforcement with 
transactional 
attributes and 
contractual 
components 
enhances 
satisfaction with 
problem 
resolution 
Heide, 
Kumar, and 
Wathne 
2014 Concurrent 
sourcing, 
governance 
mechanisms, 
and 
performance 
outcomes in 
industrial value 
chains 
Governance  
 
 
 
Performance  
Concurrent 
channel dummy 
(P) 
 
Contract‘s 
supply chain 
performance (P) 
The effect of 
governance 
mechanisms on 
relationship 
outcomes i.e. 
opportunism and 
performance is 
contextual 
Table 2.4: Literature on performance (Continued) 
2.8 Summary 
Although TCA has been developed for 40 years, the theory is still under criticism. 
Gathering views from major TCA reviews (cf. Shelanski and Klein 1995; David and 
Han 2004; Macher and Richman 2008), the criticisms of TCA are as follows.  
 First, transaction costs are difficult to measure because they present outcome of 
alternative decisions and this is why most of the studies focus on whether the 
choice of governance and transaction attributes follows the prediction of TCA‘s 
discriminating alignment hypothesis rather than attempting to measure transaction 
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cost directly (Klein, Frazier and Roth 1990). Second, ―the existence of this 
governance selection mechanism is usually assumed rather than explained‖ 
(Shelanski and Klein 1995, p.338). Third, most of the studies use cross-sectional 
data. Therefore, the effect of time i.e. lags structure that represent cause and effect 
cannot be measured. Finally, the operationalization of some key constructs is still 
diverse. Although there are common measures, it seems that these variables are 
unspecific and include a wide variety of transaction characteristics. While this may 
allow for flexible application of the theory, it also indicates the lack of agreement on 
how these variables should be operationalized and may contribute to the 
misinterpretation regarding its empirical standing (David and Han 2004; Macher 
and Richman 2008).  
This chapter has reviewed the literature in the area of governance, mainly on 
transaction cost analysis. The development of the theory was discussed in the 
beginning of the chapter. The next section provided the details of the definition and 
structure of transaction cost analysis together with its synergy with other 
governance theory. Each element of TCA; namely governance, transaction 
dimensions, and performance, respectively, was discussed in the following 
sections.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
ENVIRONMENTAL UNCERTAINTY IN GOVERNANCE 
THEORY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter will continue the discussion on the environmental uncertainty variable 
which is briefly discussed in chapter 2. The focus will be on its various 
conceptualizations. The discussion will start with defining uncertainty in section 3.2. 
Then, the classification criteria of environmental uncertainty will be discussed 
further in section 3.3. The classification focuses on 3 specific criteria: domain of 
environment, type, and measurements. Section 3.4 provides explanation on what 
might be the underlying conditions that differentiate the impact of uncertainty on 
other constructs, in particular governance and performance. Finally, section 3.5 
concludes this chapter. 
3.2 Overview about uncertainty in governance theory 
Uncertainty is one of the key concepts in organization behavior theory and is the 
key variable that impacts channel conflict, coordination, and power balances 
(Achrol and Stern 1988). Uncertainty arises because it is difficult to anticipate what 
is going to happen in the future and exists because of our inadequate ability to 
forecast (Shelly 1991). Generally, uncertainty is referred to as the difficulty firms 
have in predicting the future, which arises from inadequate knowledge (Beckman, 
Haunchild and Phillips 2004) and bounded rationality (March 1978). Organizations 
strive to reduce uncertainty because "certainty renders existence meaningful and 
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confers confidence in how to behave and what to expect from the physical and 
social environment" (Hogg and Terry 2000, p. 133). 
In TCA, it is a generally accepted premise that uncertainty is one of the primary 
exchanged characteristics that facilitates opportunism and this is why uncertainty is 
an important attribute in all aspects of marketing (John and Weitz 1989; Carson, 
Madhok and Wu 2006) as it can influence important marketing decisions i.e. the 
scope of the firm, mode of governance (Sutcliffe and Zaheer 1998). High 
uncertainty can lead to adaptation problems and difficulties in performance 
evaluation, both of which may motivate the firm to vertically integrate, since vertical 
integration can better enable coordination and monitoring, as well as protection 
against supplier opportunism (Rindfleisch and Heide 1997).  
The uncertainty construct is not without problems. Empirical findings related to 
uncertainty are diverse. The recent analysis from Carter and Hodgson (2006) 
reveals that uncertainty in the TCA framework should be operationalized with 
greater precision with regards to its role. The diversity in the findings is mainly due 
to 2 reasons. First, it is because of the multitude of uncertainty types examined 
(Rindfleisch and Heide 1997; Slater and Spencer 2000). Uncertainty consists of a 
number of distinct constructs, such as demand unpredictability, environmental 
volatility, and measurement difficulty, and different types of uncertainty may have 
opposite influences on governance mode (Sutcliffe and Zaheer 1998; Leiblein and 
Miller 2003; David and Han 2004). Recent studies tend to disaggregate uncertainty 
into different forms. This trend is also consistent with the development in closely 
related theories such as organizational theory (Williamson 1985; Sutcliffe and 
Zaheer 1998). Systematic reviews by David and Han (2004) and Carter and 
Hodgson (2006) also corroborate that the empirical inconsistency is due to its 
different form, definition, and operationalization of uncertainty variables.  
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Second, and specifically for TCA, uncertainty has to be examined in conjunction 
with asset specificity (Harrigan 1986). TCA predicts that high degree of uncertainty 
in conjunction with a non-trivial level of asset specificity will lead to increased 
vertical integration (Rindfleisch and Heide 1997). Absent asset specificity, TCA 
does not predict that uncertainty leads to vertical integration. In this case, market 
will be a more efficient choice of governance (Williamson 1985). However, since it 
is unlikely for firms to have zero asset specificity, especially with regard to human 
assets, it should be appropriate to say that the effect is unidirectional. The concept 
of zero asset specificity may only exist in the most basic commodity market (Klein 
1989). 
Generally, the term uncertainty refers to both behavioral and environmental 
uncertainty. Behavioral uncertainty, sometimes called internal uncertainty, is 
viewed by Williamson (1975) as is the key form of uncertainty relevant to the 
transaction context as it arises from the difficulty in predicting the actions and 
monitoring the contractual performance of transaction partners, particularly in view 
of the potential for opportunistic behavior (Sutcliffe and Zaheer 1998 
Behavioral uncertainty is the deliberate nondisclosure of information or the 
strategic misrepresentation of information by economic agents. It creates an 
evaluation problem in connection with contractual compliance (Alchian and 
Demsetz 1972). TCA predicts that behavioral uncertainty will be reduced once 
firms create contractual and governance safeguards suited to the risk they face. 
Firms tend to use more hierarchical governance to control higher levels of 
uncertainty about partners' intentions or capabilities (Williamson 1991; Santoro and 
McGill 2005) since it is difficult for firms to evaluate their agents‘ performance 
based on the available output measures. (Anderson and Gatignon 1986). Support 
is found for the idea that internal uncertainty reduces a firm‘s flexibility. Bello and 
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Gilliland (1997) define the internal environment as the domain in which the focal 
firm has a direct stake that is measured by psychic distances which are the 
manufacturer‘s perception of the differences in culture, language, customers and 
value of the targeted export country is from the firm‘s home country. The study 
shows that internal environment (psychic distances) reduces output controls 
because different language and value make it difficult to process the performance 
document to verify the outcomes. Studies that also found support for this prediction 
are John and Weitz(1988), Santoro and McGill(2005).  
The second form of uncertainty which is of interest in this chapter is environmental 
or external uncertainty. It is generally referred to as unanticipated changes in the 
environment (Anderson 1985; Noordewier, John and Nevin 1990) or changes that 
result from exogenous sources outside the scope of the firm, which are beyond 
their control and hard to anticipate (Krishnan, Martin and Noorderhaven 2006). 
This form of uncertainty creates adaptation problems because there are too many 
possible incidents to be specified pre-contractually (Heide 1994) and produces 
inconsistency in information that is necessary to identify and understand cause-
and-effect relationships (Keats and Hitt 1988; Sirmon, Hitt and Ireland 2007). 
Environmental uncertainty itself is a very broad concept which can be 
disaggregated into different dimensions i.e. technological, complexity, volume, etc., 
and, as previously discussed; empirical evidence shows that different dimensions 
will have different impact on other variables. For example, Leblebici and Salancik 
(1981) posit that different dimensions of environmental uncertainty have opposing 
effects on routinization and formalization of decision-making. Balakrishnan and 
Wernerfelt (1986) show that while uncertainty in general makes vertical integration 
more effective, the possibility of technological obsolescence has the opposite 
effect. Klein (1989) finds a positive effect of complexity on vertical control, but the 
effect of dynamism is negative.  
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In summary, uncertainty is a broad concept that has various conceptualizations. 
Different facets of it will impact other constructs in different ways. The effects of 
uncertainty are diverse and it is necessary to break it up into components (Klein 
1989). Sutcliffe and Zaheer (1998) disaggregate uncertainty into primary, supplier, 
and global and found that their effects on vertical integration are independent. The 
results from Sutcliffe and Zaheer (1998) are important as they pinpoint the 
necessity to treat uncertainty as a distinct set of constructs, rather than as an 
general concept. Therefore, it is important to make a conclusion about the impact 
of uncertainty based on a specific facet of interest, not as a general concept.  
The in-depth discussion about the different ways environment uncertainty is 
conceptualized in literature will be in the next section. This will include 
classification criteria, specifically the development of a common definition under 
different classification. 
3.3 Conceptualization of environmental uncertainty 
The review of literature in in governance and organization area reveals that 
uncertainty is usually classified based on these three criteria: 1) domain of 
environment, 2) type, and 3) measurement. 
Some may focus on the same type of uncertainty, but different domains of 
environment i.e. demand, economic, competitive, etc. Some studies assess the 
overall rather than a specific domain of environment, but focus their examination 
on different types of overall environment i.e. dynamism, complexity, etc. Last but 
not least, the effect of a particular domain of environment and a specific type of 
uncertainty also differ based on how it is measured. The operationalization of this 
construct contains both perceptive and objective measures. Therefore, it is 
important to choose the measurement that matches the research question. If the 
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study intends to determine if uncertainty will lead to a particular decision, for 
example, a management decision to use market or hierarchy, then a perceptual 
scale would be more appropriate. However, if the study wants to measure a 
characteristic of the market and its impact on other market characteristics, an 
objective measure would be a better proxy as it is the measure of the states of the 
environment at that time. 
Although uncertainty is usually named to reflect the main interest of the study, 
which may seem like it is classified based on only a particular criterion, it is 
important to mention that, explicitly or not, it is operationalized using all these 
criteria. The original definition of primary uncertainty by Koopman (1957) provides 
a good example. Koopman (1957) defines primary uncertainty as ―a lack of 
knowledge about states of nature, such as the uncertainty regarding natural events‖ 
(Sutcliffe and Zaheer 1998, p.3). The term primary may suggest that this 
uncertainty is classified based on the domain of environment, but the inclusion of 
―lack of knowledge‖ suggests that the type of this uncertainty arises from the 
ambiguity/unknown aspect of information and that it is measured by using a 
perceptual scale which reflects the perception of the focal firm‘s manager toward 
the environment, not the actual states of the environment. 
Thus, the fact that the uncertainty construct can be operationalized based on 
multiple criteria means it is important that one truly understand not just the term or 
definition, but its operationalization to understand the logic behind the empirical 
result. Table 3.1 presents key literature on uncertainty, including its classification 
and key findings. 
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Author Year Topics Uncertainty 
Classification 
 
Key Findings 
Anderson 
Schmittlein 
1984 Integration of the 
sales force: an 
empirical 
examination 
Internal 
Uncertainty 
 
Environmental  
unpredictability 
Internal uncertainty is the 
most important 
determinant of vertical 
integration.  
Levy 1985 The transaction 
cost approach to 
vertical integration: 
an empirical 
investigation 
Unanticipated 
event  
Strong positive 
relationship between 
unanticipated event and 
vertical relationship 
Balakkrish-
nan 
Wernerfelt 
1986 Technical change, 
competition and 
vertical integration 
Technological 
uncertainty 
 
Competitive 
Intensity 
Technological uncertainty 
reduces the positive 
relationship (less 
vertically integrated) 
between competitive 
intensity and vertical 
integration 
Harrigan 1986 Matching vertical 
integration 
strategies to 
competitive 
conditions 
Demand and 
infrastructure 
uncertainty 
 
Competitive/ 
Industry volatility 
No pattern of the vertical 
integration strategy 
dimensions that can be 
distinguished among the 
successful and 
unsuccessful firms under 
all circumstances 
Keats  
Hitt 
1988 A causal model of 
linkages among 
environmental 
dimensions, macro 
organizational 
characteristics, and 
performance 
Munificence 
 
Instability 
Firms that have unstable 
environments reacted by 
creating a simpler 
organization. Instability 
has significant effects on 
both performance 
dimensions 
Anderson 1988 Transaction costs 
as determinants of 
opportunism in 
integrated and 
independent sales 
forces 
Instability  
 
Unknown 
Environmental 
unpredictability has no 
effect on opportunism. 
Integrated sales force 
shows less opportunism 
than outside sales force 
Eisenhardt 1988 Agency - and 
institutional - theory 
explanations: the 
case of retail sales 
compensation 
Outcome 
uncertainty  
(volatility) 
Outcome uncertainty is 
the significant predictor of 
compensation in agency 
theory but not in 
institutional theory 
Klein 1989 A transaction cost 
explanation of 
vertical control in 
international 
markets 
Complexity  
 
Dynamism 
Complexity has positive 
effect on vertical 
integration while the result 
for dynamism is opposite. 
John  
Weitz 
1989 Sales force 
compensation: an 
empirical 
investigation of 
factors related to 
use of salary vs. 
incentive 
compensation 
Environmental 
Uncertainty 
Uncertainty has no main 
effect on the likelihood to 
use salary 
Table 3.1: Literature on uncertainty 
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Author Year Topics Uncertainty 
Classification 
 
Key Findings 
Klein  
Frazier 
Roth 
1990 A Transaction cost 
analysis model of 
channel integration 
in international 
markets 
Volatility  
 
Diversity 
Volatility increases the 
probability of using 
hierarchy-subsidiary while 
dynamism inversely 
related to the use of 
hierarchy-subsidiary 
option 
Hu 
Chen 
1993 Foreign ownership 
in Chinese joint 
ventures: a 
transaction cost 
analysis 
Economic risks Sociocultural factors and 
economic risk are the 
factors that influence the 
percent of foreign 
ownership 
D'Aveni 
Ravencraft 
1994 Economies of 
integration versus 
bureaucracy costs: 
does vertical 
integration improve 
performance 
Demand 
Uncertainty 
In time of demand 
uncertainty, the potential 
for reducing overhead via 
vertical integration may 
differ from industry to 
industry 
Bello 
Gilliland 
1997 The effect of output 
controls, process 
controls, and 
flexibility on export 
channel 
performance 
Internal - Psychic 
Distance 
 
External - Market 
Volatility 
Psychic distance reduces 
the use of output controls. 
Market volatility reduced 
flexibility. 
Coles 
Hesterly 
1998 
 
The impact of firm-
specific assets and 
the interaction of 
uncertainty: an 
examination of 
make or buy 
decisions in public 
and private 
hospitals 
Complexity  
Technological 
change 
In the presence of asset 
specificity, increased 
uncertainty will increase 
integration. TCE are 
contextual factors i.e. 
efficiency is the moderator 
Haunschild 
Miner 
1997 Modes of 
interogranizational 
imitation: the 
effects of outcome 
salience and 
uncertainty 
Transaction 
uncertainty  
 
Partner 
uncertainty 
Transaction and partner 
uncertainty have similar 
effects for social imitation, 
but different effects for 
outcome imitation 
Folta 1998 Governance and 
uncertainty: the 
trade-off between 
administrative 
control and 
commitment 
Endogenous  
 
Exogenous 
Tradeoff between 
commitment cost and 
control. Under some 
conditions, i.e. high 
technological uncertainty, 
firms may choose hybrid 
mode of governance 
rather than full 
administrative control 
Table 3.1: Literature on uncertainty (Continued) 
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Author Year Topics Uncertainty 
Classification 
 
Key Findings 
Brouthers 2002 Institutional, 
cultural and 
transaction cost 
influences on entry 
mode choice and 
performance 
Investment risks Firms that perceived 
higher mode of 
investment risks tend to 
use join-venture as a 
mode of entry. Firms that 
utilized the entry mode 
predicted by the extended 
transaction cost model 
reported a higher 
performance 
Beckman, 
Haunschild 
Phillips 
2004 Friends or 
strangers? Firm-
specific uncertainty, 
market uncertainty, 
and network 
partner selection 
Firm-Specific 
Uncertainty 
 
Market 
Uncertainty  
Firms reinforce with their 
current partners in times 
of market uncertainty and 
broaden their alliance net 
when faced with firm-
specific uncertainty.  
Harrington 2004 The environment 
involvement, and 
performance: 
implications for the 
strategic process of 
food service firms 
Complexity 
 
Munificence 
 
Dynamism 
A fit between a complexity 
and involvement leads to 
higher performance. 
Three types of uncertainty 
have different effects on 
performance 
Gulati, 
Lawrence 
Puranam 
2005 Adaptation in 
vertical 
relationship: 
beyond incentive 
conflict 
Volume 
uncertainty 
 
Technological 
uncertainty  
The observed levels of 
differentiation and 
integration vary 
systematically with the 
type of procurement 
mode. 
Santoro 
McGill 
2005 The effect of 
uncertainty and 
asset co-
specialization on 
governance in 
biotechnology 
alliances 
Partner 
uncertainty  
 
Task uncertainty  
 
Technological 
uncertainty 
Partner and task 
uncertainty increase the 
likelihood of hierarchical 
governance when asset 
co-specialization is 
present 
Santos 
Eisenhardt 
2005 Organizational 
boundaries and 
theories of 
organization 
Market Dynamism More dynamic 
environments suggest the 
need for smaller and less 
coupled business units in 
order to enhance 
adaptability 
Geyskens  
Steenkamp 
Kumar 
2006 Make, buy, or ally: 
a transaction cost 
theory meta-
analysis 
Volume 
uncertainty 
 
Technological 
uncertainty 
 
Behavioral 
uncertainty  
All types of uncertainty 
lead to hierarchical 
governance. Choosing 
hierarchical or relational 
governance in response 
to transaction hazards 
increases performance. 
Carter and 
Hodgson 
2006 The impact of 
empirical tests of 
transaction cost 
economics on the 
debate on nature of 
the firm 
Reviews from 
previous literature 
Empirical evidence does 
not decisively support 
Williamson's TCE 
Table 3.1: Literature on uncertainty (Continued)  
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Author Year Topics Uncertainty 
Classification 
 
Key Findings 
Carson 
Madhok 
Wu 
2006 Uncertainty, 
Opportunism, and 
Governance: The 
Effect of Volatility 
and Ambiguity on 
Formal and 
Relational 
Contracting 
Volatility  
 
Ambiguity  
Formal and relational 
contracts are 
advantageous under 
different situations 
Parmigiani 2007 Why do firms both 
make and buy? An 
Investigation of 
Concurrent 
Sourcing 
Volume 
uncertainty 
 
Technological 
uncertainty 
 
Performance 
Uncertainty 
TCA's logic was 
supported. Firms were 
less likely to buy if 
markets were thin and 
more likely to make if 
performance uncertainty 
was great 
Palmatier 
Dant 
Grewal 
2007 A comparative 
longitudinal 
analysis of 
theoretical 
perspectives of 
interorganizational 
relationship 
performance 
Environmental 
Dynamism  
Market Diversity 
Mixed findings on the 
effect on uncertainty 
Shervani 
Frazier 
Challagalla 
2007 The moderating 
influence of firm 
market power on 
the transaction cost 
economies model: 
an empirical test in 
a forward channel 
integration context 
Internal 
uncertainty 
 
External 
uncertainty 
External uncertainty is 
negatively related to 
channel integration which 
is contradictory to TCA's 
prediction. TCA's 
prediction may hold only 
in certainty channel 
contexts 
Kor 
Mahoney 
Watson 
2008 The effects of 
demand, 
competitive, and 
technological 
uncertainty on 
board monitoring 
and institutional 
ownership of IPO 
firms 
Demand 
uncertainty 
 
Competitive 
uncertainty 
 
Technological 
uncertainty 
Empirical result varies 
based on the type of 
uncertainty 
Gilliland 
Kim 
2013 When do incentives 
work in channels of 
distributions 
Industry volatility Industry volatility 
mitigates the positive 
relationship between 
congruence evaluation 
and compliance but not 
that of congruence 
evaluation and 
representation 
Table 3.1: Literature on uncertainty (Continued) 
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3.3.1 Domain of environment 
The domain of the environment is the aspect of the environment that each study 
focuses on. Some studies take broader perspectives by disaggregating uncertainty 
in a way that it covers the entire transaction environment or major parts of it such 
as firm-specific vs. market uncertainty. Some are quite specific by choosing only 
the specific domain of their interest such as political or economic uncertainty. 
The origin of this classification scheme in governance theory comes from 
Koopmans (1957) who disaggregates uncertainty into primary and secondary 
uncertainty based on which sectors of the environment give rise to it and the 
importance of their impact on firm decisions (Sutcliffe and Zaheer 1998). Primary 
uncertainty is the uncertainty arising from exogenous factors i.e. natural events or 
regulatory and policy changes. While secondary uncertainty refers to the 
insufficient knowledge about the actions of other relevant economic actors. 
Koopmans argues that both forms of uncertainty impact a firm‘s investment 
decisions (Sutcliffe and Zaheer 1998). 
Sutcliffe and Zaheer‘s (1998) study on the relationship between uncertainty and 
decision to vertically integrate follow Williamson (1985)‘s approach by 
disaggregating uncertainty into primary, competitive, and supplier. Primary 
uncertainty refers to uncertainty associated with exogenous sources (1985). 
Competitive uncertainty is defined as the uncertainty developing from the actions of 
potential or actual competitors which can be either innocent or strategic. Supplier 
uncertainty is the behavioral uncertainty emerging from the strategic actions of the 
transaction partners. These three types of uncertainty are measured using 
perceptive measures (Sutcliffe and Zaheer 1998). 
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Besides the classification based on Williamson‘s typology, another common 
classification is to use relevancy to the focal firm. The first set is endogenous and 
exogenous uncertainty which classify uncertainty based on whether it can be 
changed by actions of the firm or not (Folta 1998). Endogenous uncertainty is the 
uncertainty that can be decreased by actions of the firm through learning from 
undertaking the project. Exogenous uncertainty is the uncertainty that is unaffected 
by firm actions and can be resolved over time. Comparing between these two, 
project which has a greater degree of endogenous uncertainty is relatively more 
attractive as this uncertainty can be reduced once investors have more information 
about this uncertainty after undertaking the project. Project which has greater 
degree of exogenous uncertainty, on the other hand, would influence firm to delay 
commitment to ―wait and see‖ if the uncertainty can be resolved over time (Folta 
1998). 
The second set, which is slightly different, is offered by Beckman, Haunschild and 
Phillips (2004). This study classifies uncertainty into firm-specific and market based 
on whether that uncertainty affects only the focal firm or the entire market. Firm-
specific uncertainty is mainly internal, manageable, and unique. Although, firm-
specific uncertainty is unique to that firm, it is not always the case that a firm can 
always control its firm-specific uncertainty. However, it is more likely to be 
manageable than market uncertainty. Market uncertainty, on the other hand, is 
external and common across a set of firms. Both uncertainties act independently. 
Firms experiencing high firm-specific uncertainty may operate in the market in 
which market uncertainty is low. The result of the study shows that these two types 
of uncertainty require different adaptation strategies (Beckman, Haunschild and 
Phillips 2004).  
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Consistent with the firm-specific and market based classification, Miller (1992) 
offers more detailed uncertainty classification based on the treatments of risk in 
international businesses. He classifies a number of interrelated uncertainties into 3 
levels based on their relevancy to the focal firm: 1) firm-specific, 2) industry, and 3) 
general environment. Firm-specific uncertainties apply to a set of uncertainties that 
is specific to that firm which include operating, liability, and behavioral uncertainties. 
Industry uncertainties refer to the uncertainties that are relevant to all firms within 
the same industry which are demand, product-market and competitive 
uncertainties. The general environment uncertainties denote the uncertainties that 
affect the business across industries which cover political, macro-economic, policy, 
social development, and natural uncertainties (Miller 1992).  
In addition to the relevancy to the firm criterion, uncertainty is sometimes viewed as 
a general concept. For example, Anderson and Gatignon (1986) view external 
uncertainty as the unpredictability of the firm‘s external environment and uses 
country risk which is an aggregated concept based on a number of factors as a 
proxy for environmental uncertainty. The study sorted countries into three groups, 
low, moderate, and high, based on their risk levels using cluster analysis 
(Anderson and Gatignon 1986). Hu and Chen‘s (1993) study on foreign ownership 
in Chinese joint ventures extends Gatignon and Anderson‘s (1988) study by using 
the percentage ownership instead of wholly owned or joint ventures and focuses 
on only one country. This study conceptualizes uncertainty very specifically. It 
views uncertainty as economic risk involved in doing business in a foreign country 
and then disaggregates economic risk into three types 1) geographic area, 2) 
duration of joint venture, and 3) amount of investment in the joint venture. The 
study found support for transaction cost economics in that the higher the economic 
risks, the higher the percent ownership (Hu and Chen 1993). 
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However, the review of literature shows that recent studies tend to be specific 
about the domain of environment they aim to investigate. The common concepts 
that frequently appeared in the literature are: volume uncertainty (Gulati, Lawrence, 
Puranam 2005; Geyskens, Steenkampt, Kumar 2006; Parmigiani 2007), and 
technological uncertainty (Gulati, Lawrence, Puranam 2005; Olson, Slater, Hult 
2005; Parmigiani 2007). Volume uncertainty refers to the unpredictability of 
demand and inability to accurately forecast and schedule production. 
Technological uncertainty means the uncertainty in the future of technology 
(Parmigiani 2007). For example, Balakrishnan and Wernerfelt (1986) found a 
negative relationship between technological uncertainty and vertical integration 
which is in contrast to that of TCA. Folta (1998) found that the amount of 
technological uncertainty increases the likelihood of choosing equity collaboration 
(joint venture or minority investment) because it gives firms an option to defer 
internal development that might become obsolete or have little value. This option 
gives management more flexibility to adapt future action when there is more 
information about new technology. Also, this option economizes on the cost 
associated with investment. However, without the condition of uncertainty, firms 
prefer acquisition (vertical integration) as the degree of asset specificity rises. 
Others uncertainty constructs such as performance uncertainty (cf. Parmigiani 
2007), political uncertainty (cf. Henisz 2000), competitive uncertainty (cf. Kor, 
Mahoney and Watson 2008), are usually specific to the topic of the study.  
Some studies may name uncertainty in a different fashion. For example, market 
turbulence, which is similar to the construct competitive uncertainty, is used as a 
control variable in Slater and Olson (2000). The result shows that this type of 
uncertainty has a significant impact on market and profitability performance of two 
of Miles and Snow‘s (1978) strategy types, analyzers and differentiated defenders 
(Slater and Olson 2000). Henisz (2000) investigates the effect of institution 
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environment, and contractual and political hazards, on the choice of market entry 
mode and found support for the hypotheses that firms are more likely to be 
vertically integrated (choose majority-owned plant) when facing the contractual 
hazards. However, on the event of political hazards, which is operationalized as 
policy change and corruption, firms are more likely to use market (minority-owned 
joint venture) as the market entry mode. The rationale is that as political hazards 
increase, firms will face increasing threat of opportunistic acts from governments 
i.e. tax change and regulations change. Partnering with a local firm will provide 
more advantage in interactions with local government which acts as a safeguard 
for this hazard. The interaction effect between political and contractual hazards are 
also investigated, the result shows that the interaction promotes market as the 
local partner may manipulate the political uncertainty for their own interest. The 
result of this interaction effect emphasizes that, in addition to the transaction 
factors, institutional environments also affect governance (Henisz 2000). 
3.3.2 Type 
Type refers the nature of uncertainty defined in the study. This seems to be a 
source of confusion because, unlike the domain of environment which connects the 
name of the domain to the word uncertainty, some studies do not explicitly specify 
the type of uncertainty they are discussing until the operationalization section.  
Based on the literature in governance and organization behavior, common 
definitions of uncertainty usually include the following types: 1) ambiguity/unknown, 
2) complexity, 3) volatility/dynamism/change, 4) others such as diversity or 
munificence. Although these types are different in terms of definitions and 
operationalization, they all are the proxy of uncertainty in the way that they provide 
the reasons why the state of environments is unknown. Is it because there is no 
clarity of the current situation? Or is it because the situation is too complex to 
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predict? Some studies use combined and overlapped definitions which make it 
difficult to pinpoint the exact type of uncertainty. For example, although the terms 
dynamism, volatility, and unpredictability seem to share similar properties, they are 
not entirely identical in nature. Carson, Madhok and Wu (2006), based on 
Williamson‘s (1985) conceptualization, clearly distinguish uncertainty into two 
aspects, ambiguity and volatility, based on whether it reflects present or future 
states of an environment. Ambiguity refers to the degree of uncertainty inherent in 
perceptions of the environmental state irrespective of its change over time and is 
less about an uncertain future than about uncertainty regarding present and past 
experience. Volatility refers to the rate and unpredictability of change in an 
environment over time, which creates uncertainty about future conditions (Carson, 
Madhok and Wu 2006). The result from the study shows ambiguity and volatility 
have different impacts on governance regime.  
Ambiguity/Unknown 
The conceptualization of this type dates back to the two original ones by Knight 
(1921) and Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) and is, therefore, the early 
conceptualization of uncertainty. Knight (1921) conceptualizes uncertainty into 
known, unknown, and unknowable distributions. He also suggests that uncertainty 
removes the assumption that phenomena can be modeled and predictions can be 
accurately made based on historical data (Foss 1993). Pfeffer and Salancik (1978, 
p.67) state that ―uncertainty is the degree to which future states of the world cannot 
be anticipated and accurately predicted.‖  
More recently, Milliken (1987) defines uncertainty as ignorance about the three 
stages of the cause-effect chain. It is interesting because Milliken (1987) not only 
grouped the common definitions cited by organizations theorists under the 
umbrella of inability to predict the future or unknown; he also systematizes this 
definition along the continuum of cause and effect; state, effect, and response 
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uncertainty. State uncertainty refers uncertainty regarding the state of environment 
and is the type that is the closest to Williamson‘s primary uncertainty as both refer 
to the lack of knowledge about the state of environment when a transaction takes 
place. This type of uncertainty principally reflects the definitions given by early 
organization theorists (cf. Duncan 1972; Pennings 1981) who view uncertainty as 
‗the inability to assign probability to the likelihood of future events.‘ Effect 
uncertainty is a lack of information about cause-effect relationships. It is an 
absence of information concerning what would be the impact specific phenomenon 
on other variables. Therefore, it is an inability to predict accurately what the 
outcomes of a decision might be. Response Uncertainty means an inability to 
determine the appropriate response to uncertainty (Milliken 1987).  
Complexity and Dynamism 
When assessing the level of environmental uncertainty between industries, the two 
main dimensions that are often mentioned together, despite their differences, are 
complexity and dynamism. These dimensions come from Dess and Beard‘s (1984) 
exploratory work that combines previous theoretical models. These variables 
provide reasonably good proxies when used to compare the differences between 
industries, but seem not to be a good indicator in determining differences of 
environmental uncertainty between segments within the same industry (Harrington 
2001). 
The theoretical model that Dess and Beard (1984) base their dimension on is that of 
Duncan (1972) who dimensionalized his uncertainty based on the three early 
concepts of uncertainty. The first concept is that of Knight (1921) who defines 
uncertainty as those situations where the probability of the outcome of events is 
unknown as opposed to risk situations where each outcome has a known probability. 
The second concept belongs to Attneave (1959) and Garner (1962, p.19) who 
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defines the concept in a narrow fashion – ―The logarithm of the number of possible 
outcomes the event can have.‖ The last concept is from Lawrence and Lorsch (1967, 
p.27) who state that ―uncertainty consists of three components: 1) The lack of clarity 
of information, 2) the long timespan of definitive feedback, 3) the general uncertainty 
of causal relationship‖, and grouped these concepts as perceived uncertainty). 
However, early scholars (cf.Duncan 1972; Miles and Snow, 1978; Tosi and Slocum 
consider them to be too broad and might create operationalization difficulty, hence, 
they might not be useful ones. The suggestion is that uncertainty should be studied 
based on the environmental domain of interest (Milliken 1987). Based on those 
concepts, Dess and Beard (1984) categorized the state of environment into 2 
dimensions along the continuum of static-dynamic and simple-complex resulting in 4 
typologies of the states of environment. The findings from their study show that the 
decision unit in more extreme environments, complex-dynamic, will have the highest 
level of perceived uncertainty. Decision units with dynamic environments always 
experience significantly more uncertainty in decision making regardless whether 
their environment is simple or complex (Dess and Beard 1984). Dess and Beard 
(1984) is regarded as the first systematic conceptualization and empirical analysis of 
the environment that leads to different degrees of perceived uncertainty (Milliken 
1987). As complexity and dynamism are different in terms of concept and 
operationalization, they will be discussed separately in the next section. 
Complexity 
Environmental complexity has been defined using two different dimensions: 1) the 
variety of an organization‘s activities and 2) the concentration-dispersion level of 
firms within an industry or segment (Duncan 1972; Dess and Beard 1984)). The 
second dimension of a complex environment is concerned with the number, size, 
and distribution of firms within an industry or segment. Typically, firms that operate 
in a complex environment have low monopoly power and are ―infused with 
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entrepreneurial newcomers‖ (Keats and Hitt 1988, p. 579). Measures of complexity 
in the operations dimension include amount of diversification, breadth of product or 
service line, and geographical dispersion. Measures of complexity in the 
concentration-dispersion dimension include movement to or from higher levels of 
concentration of firms within an industry segment, the number of firms within a 
segment, the diversity of firms within a segment, and their distribution (Keat and 
Hitt 1988).  
Dynamism/Volatility 
The essence of this type of uncertainty is the ‗change which leads to 
unpredictability.‘ This unpredictability is troublesome because it is too obscure for 
the manager to plan for (Keat and Hitt 1988) which may result in inefficiency. 
Achrol and Stern (1988. p.38) define environmental dynamism as ―environments 
that are dynamic or shifting and which present greater contingencies to the 
organization.‖ Generally, environmental dynamism is defined as unexpected 
change that is hard to predict. Firms that operate in this type of environment face 
increased risk because change is hard to predict (Achrol and Stern 1988). 
Dynamism is usually operationalized as volatility and, often, these two terms are 
substitutable (Keat and Hitt 1988). The exact definitions of these terms largely 
depend on how they are operationalized, specifically if it is measured using 
perceptual scale items or objective measures. Typical measures of dynamism 
using secondary or objective data include the volatility of the variable of interest i.e. 
operating income of the focal firm, net sales of the industry, R&D budget, etc. 
(Keats and Hitt, 1988; Harrington 2001).  
Dess and Beard (1984) review key characterizations of the environment by 
organizational theorists and note a principal feature in uncertainty, commonly 
conceptualized as a combination of instability and turbulence. Klein (1989) found 
92 
 
that uncertainty related to environment turbulence, which can include both 
complexity and volatility, will result in more integrated governance structures, while 
uncertainty related to unpredictability – such as new technologies and volume will 
result in more market-like governance structures (Klein 1989). Bello and Gilliland 
(1997) conceptualize uncertainty as psychic distance and market volatility in their 
study on the impact of control and flexibility on performance. The result shows that 
firms will try to be less flexible when the market is highly volatile because the 
unpredictability circumstance provides an opportunity for transaction partners to 
act opportunistically since each partner may interpret this obscure situation in their 
own favors (Klein, Frazier and Roth 1990, Bello and Gilliland 1997). Gilliland and 
Kim (2014) examine if the volatility condition affects the relationship between 
evaluation and agent‘s response. The study used industry volatility to represent 
uncertainty and measured it by using industry stock beta. The result shows that 
industry volatility can moderate the relationship between evaluation and agent‘s 
response. 
However, it is important to emphasize that it is not ―change‖ or ―fast rate of change‖, 
that makes the environment become uncertain; rather, it is the unpredictable 
aspect of change that creates uncertainty (Milliken 1987). Also, it is important to 
point out, as suggested by early scholars (cf. Lawrence and Lorsch, 1973; Miles, 
Snow and Pfeffer 1974; Salancik and Pfeffer 1978) that dynamism or volatility is 
not always unpredictable; the highly volatile but predictable environment is not 
regarded as uncertainty (Milliken 1987). For example, Harrington (2001) adopts 
this notion by elaborating that if a particular industry experiences a higher level of 
dynamism as a result of past levels of volatility, then the change being measured is 
not an unexpected but rather an expected change.  
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Other types 
Besides the frequently examined concepts discussed above, there are a few other 
concepts i.e. munificence, diversity, turbulence, etc. For example, Klein, Frazier 
and Roth (1990) divide environmental uncertainty into two types: volatility and 
diversity and define diversity as the extent to which there are multiple sources of 
uncertainty. The study discovered that each type has different effects on the 
degree of integration (Klein, Frazier and Roth 1990). The munificence construct or 
the availability or scarcity of critical resources within the environment to support 
sustained growth (Dess and Origer 1987; Sirmon, Hitt and Ireland 2007) is usually 
seen together with complexity and instability. Keats and Hitt‘s (1988) study on the 
linkages among environmental dimensions, organization characteristics, and 
performance using the framework of organization theory conceptualizes 
uncertainty into 3 constructs; munificence, complexity, and instability. The result 
shows that instability has significant negative effects on both performance 
dimensions, but neither munificence nor complexity has a significant relationship 
with both performance outcomes. 
3.3.3 Measurement 
While it is common to mainly define uncertainty by domain of environment and type, 
early scholars tend to define uncertainty as an overall concept by its measurement. 
For example, Knight (1921) defines uncertainty as those situations where the 
probability of outcome of events is unknown as opposed to risk situations where 
each outcome has a known probability. Attneave (1959) and Garner (1962, p.62) 
have defined the concept in a narrow fashion as ―The logarithm of the number of 
possible outcomes the event can have‖ (Duncan 1972). Eisenhardt (1988) defined 
outcome uncertainty as volatility, as it is most germane to the risk dimension in 
agency theory and is measured by failure rate and competition, to determine its 
level. 
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Careful consideration must be made in choosing the appropriate measurement of 
uncertainty. First, although both perceptual scale and objective measurement can 
be used as proxies for uncertainty, the objective and interpretation of these 
measures is different. Perceptual scale measurement (i.e. subjective reporting by 
key informants) is an executive interpretation of the environment, and is normally 
used if the uncertainty can influence the manager‘s decisions toward any particular 
dimension. Conversely, objective measurement is generally secondary data, such 
as net sales, expenditures, and the like. Such information indicates the current 
state of the environment of interest, which is used to measure the impact of 
uncertainty on other variables. Importantly, although perceptual measures are the 
most commonly deployed, it has been well documented that such perceptual 
scales could be biased. For example, there is evidence in the literature (cf. 
Harrington 2001; Harrington and Kendall 2005) which indicates that archival 
measures are more useful as they have the benefit of greater precision in 
measurement and reduced threat of bias. As such, it has been suggested that 
uncertainty should be operationalized using objective measures, and / or to use 
such measures to validate perceptual measures. 
Therefore, the appropriateness of both perceptual scale and objective measures 
depends on the objective of the research. If the intention is to measure whether 
uncertainty will lead to particular decisions i.e. integration decision, managers‘ 
perceptions measured by perceptual scale might be a suitable measure. If the 
study‘s objective is to understand the effect of uncertainty on other constructs i.e. 
performance or failure rate, the objective measures are likely the better proxy as 
they reflect the state of the environment. 
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3.4 Underlying conditions 
TCA-based studies seem to agree that the diverse effects of uncertainty are mainly 
due to two reasons: 1) its various conceptualizations and 2) its conjunction with 
asset specificity (Harrigan 1986; Rindfleisch and Heide 1997; Carter and Hodgson 
2006). Empirical evidence that shows substantial variation in conceptualizations is 
extant. For example, Klein (1989) discovers the effect of dynamism is not as strong 
as other types of uncertainty, which supports the view to disaggregate uncertainty 
into components. Klein, Frazier and Roth (1990) find mixed support for complexity 
and diversity. Firms are likely to integrate in a highly volatile environment and tend to 
use markets in highly diversified environments. However, the support does not hold 
for all channel types investigated in Klein, Frazier and Roth‘s (1990) study. Sutcliffe 
and Zaheer (1998) state that the three sources of uncertainty; primary, competitive, 
and supplier, act independently and emphasize the need to treat them differently. 
Empirical evidence from Kor, Mahoney and Watson (2008) finds strong support that 
the impact of demand, competitive, and technological uncertainty on the percentage 
of outsiders on IPO firm‘s boards differ dramatically based on different uncertainty. 
 In addition to the different findings due to the different way uncertainty is 
operationalized, the impact of uncertainty is also contingent upon asset specificity. 
Anderson and Gatignon (1986) find that the effect of external uncertainty (measured 
by country risk) on entering a new country as a wholly owned subsidiary varies 
according to level of asset-specificity. When asset specificity is high, the effect of 
external uncertainty on entering a new country as a whole owned subsidiary is 
positive, and vice versa when asset specificity is low (Gatignon and Gatignon 2010). 
The panel study by Coles and Hesterly (1998), assesses the interaction of asset 
specificity and uncertainty, supports TCA‘s prediction that with the presence of asset 
specificity, increased uncertainty will lead to the decision to integrate. However, the 
study also discovers that TCA‘s explanation is subject to context. While TCA‘s 
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prediction holds in private hospitals where there is a high efficiency pressure, its 
explanatory power is low in public hospitals where efficiency pressures are low. 
Parmigiani (2007) found no evidence that volume and performance uncertainty 
leads to the decision to vertically integrate when a multinomial logit model is used 
and only found support for performance uncertainty when an ordered logit model is 
deployed. Besides the two notions stated above, strategy, risk, and uncertainty 
literature are also criticized for their approach in investigating uncertainty in isolation 
rather than interrelated constructs that jointly form the context that shapes 
organizational structure and strategy (Miller 1992).  
Although the reasons for uncertainty‘s diverse empirical results are established, the 
underlying conditions that are responsible for the direction of uncertainty‘s impact on 
other constructs, specifically mode of governance, are still missing. As there seem to 
be too many uncontrollable factors, there is insufficient evidence to make specific 
predictions about uncertainty on governance based on the current literature. The 
plausible explanation for the underlying conditions that determine the effect of 
uncertainty on governance might depend upon the strategic trade-off between cost 
and benefit. This is consistent with agency theory which proposes that the most 
appropriate mode of governance is a function of tradeoff between control and cost of 
resource commitment which covers all the possible costs incurred if a firm decided 
to use hierachical governance, namely cost of opportunism, cost of obligation, 
opportunity cost (Anderson and Gatignon 1986). This is supported by Folta (1998) 
who suggests that vertical integration might be appropriate in dealing with 
uncertainty as the increase in uncertainty will increase the cost of drafting and 
monitoring to a point where vertical integration is a more efficient and less costly 
option (Folta 1998). Brown and Potoski (2003) studied how government agencies 
make their decisions on how to commission their service and found that the 
selection is the tradeoff between the cost and benefit of risks and controls. The 
97 
 
factors that are incorporated into the decision process vary across type of services, 
market factors and institutional environments (Brown and Potoski 2003). Novak and 
Stern (2008) suggest that vertical integration will have differential impacts on 
different performance margins that are realized over the product lifecycle. Using 
indirect channels will facilitate access to cutting-edge technology and the use of 
high-powered performance contracts. On the other hand, vertical integration allows 
firms to adapt to unforeseen contingencies and customer feedback, to maintain 
more balanced incentives, and to develop firm-specific capabilities (Novak and Stern 
2008). Overall, the findings highlight a strategic governance tradeoff between short-
term performance and the evolution of firm‘s capability. 
Based on the review of uncertainty literature and the plausible explanation of 
strategic trade-off discussed in the above paragraph, the possible governance 
structures under different cost- uncertainty level are proposed below in figure 3.11. 
The x-axis represents the uncertainty and the y-axis shows the cost of resource 
commitment2.  
The framework adopts the broad and traditional conceptualization of uncertainty by 
Knight (1921) and Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) in which uncertainty is based on 
known/predictability aspect as ―the degree to which future states of the world cannot 
be anticipated or accurately predicted‖ (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978, p.67). Therefore, 
uncertainty (the x-axis) represents degree of unpredictability from low to high. The 
low degree of unpredictability on the left means that uncertainty situation is known to 
firms. Therefore, firms should be relatively familiar with the situations and are likely 
                                                          
1
 Evidence from previous literature suggest that the impacts of uncertainty on vertical integration are mixed and 
contextual and its effect might depend upon a number of uncontrollable factors (cf. Harrigan 1986;Coles and 
Hesterly 1998; Carter and Hodgeson 2006; Palmatier, Dant, Grewal 2007). However, this framework represents the 
plausible key assessment in which firms use to evaluate the governance choices in light of uncertainty situation 
based on the notion of strategic-trade off 
 
2
 Although TCA prescribes that uncertainty favors hierarchy only in the presence of asset specificity, this figure 
focuses only on the framework of trade-off between cost and uncertainty. Any cost incurred as a result of asset 
specificity should be considered as part of the cost of resource commitment. 
98 
 
to be able to identify the root cause, impact, and mitigation of that particular 
uncertainty situation. If the uncertainty situation is regarded as high degree of 
unpredictability, it means that it is unclear which would make it difficult for firms to 
have a vivid perspective about it.  
The rationale for favoring the unpredictability aspect of uncertainty is that it is the 
general definition. What is interesting about this known/predictability aspect of 
uncertainty as emphasized by Milliken (1987) is that ―it is not the change or fast rate 
of change that makes the environment become uncertainty, but it is the 
unpredictability aspect of change that creates uncertainty‖ (Milliken 1987, p135). For 
example, if demand is highly volatile in an expecting pattern i.e. due to special 
events in a certain period, should not be regarded as high uncertainty because this 
volatility is predictable. This unpredictability aspect is the key component of 
―uncertainty‖ regardless of the categorization or operationalization of uncertainty. In 
other words, all kinds of uncertainty can be placed on this unpredictability continuum. 
For example, if uncertainty were to be classified based on its domain of environment, 
the market factors such as demand and competitor, which firms are more likely to 
have market capability on the situation are likely to be more predictable relative to 
the non-market uncertainty such as political, natural disasters, or technological 
changes, which are ad-hoc and highly unpredictable. If the volatility/dynamism 
aspect is considered, higher volatility implies that the circumstances are more 
unknown than in the case of low volatility. Similar logic applies to other 
categorizations i.e. complexity. High complexity suggests that the diversification of 
competition is too dispersed and beyond the firm‘s ability to predict the situation with 
confidence. If uncertainty were to be considered based on both domain of 
environment and types, firms would have to assess whether the overall situation is 
rather known or unknown. This rationale is consistent with the approach taken by 
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Achrol and Stern (1992) in which seven types of uncertainty are operationalized 
according to this general definition of unpredictability (Achrol and Stern 1992). 
The cost of resource commitment represented by the y-axis follows Anderson and 
Gatignon(1986) and Folta (1998) which propose that the governance mode is the 
function of strategic trade-off between control and the cost of resource commitment, 
which is all the possible costs incurred i.e. opportunism, obligation, and opportunity 
cost, if the firm decided to use hierarchical governance (Anderson and Gatignon 
1986; Folta 1998; Brouthers 2002). Fundamentally, the cost of commitment is the 
cost that firms have to pay in order to have full administrative control, which is the 
purpose of hierarchical governance. This cost of commitment can include high 
overhead cost from having full-time employees that can result in high switching 
costs to other modes of governance and possible exposures to other risks 
(Anderson and Gatignon 1986; Brouthers 2002). The scope of cost of resource 
commitment depends upon the business objective of each firm. If a firm were to 
decide on the choice of governance on its backward integration, the cost of resource 
commitment would include the relevant production costs. If a firm were to decide on 
its forward integration only, the cost of resource commitment would include the 
relevant cost of administrative controls as well as opportunity and opportunism cost 
for its sales force management. 
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Figure 3.1: Uncertainty-cost-governance framework 
When both unpredictability and cost dimensions are considered, we propose that the 
choice of governance will progress diagonally upward from hierarchy to market 
(Figure 3.1). In Cell 3, where the degree of unpredictability is low (the uncertainty is 
rather known) and the cost of resource commitment is low, firms are likely to use a 
hierarchical mode of governance as they can enjoy the benefit of a high level of 
administrative control at low cost. For example, in the situation of market uncertainty, 
demand and competitive, which is regarded as having a low degree of 
unpredictability, firms may feel more confident in handling the situation as they have 
market intelligence even if the costs of resource commitment are not considered. 
The low cost of resource commitment i.e. likelihood of opportunism, and low cost of 
drafting and monitoring contracts, provides justification for using hierarchy. In this 
case, the strategic trade-off between cost and control will be in favor of hierarchical 
governance. Opposite to Cell 1 is Cell 2 which presents the situation in which the 
degree of unpredictability is high and cost of resource commitment is high. The 
situation is unknown to the firm, so it would be very difficult to assess the magnitude 
of the issue. The high cost of resource commitment will increase the firm‘s exposure 
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to risk i.e. create high switching cost and reduce flexibility (Anderson and Gatignon 
1986). Having administrative control comes with a high cost of commitment in the 
situation where management may not feel completely confident.  
Therefore, the market governance i.e. third party is a justified choice, as it would 
allow firms to avoid making risky commitments. For example, when a firm 
encounters technological uncertainty, which is a non-market factor and mostly 
unfamiliar to the firm, the firm will tend to choose a third party to handle the situation 
to avoid making a commitment to technology that might become obsolete (Folta 
1998). Along the diagonal line from hierarchy to market where the degree of 
unpredictability and cost are not extreme, a firm may choose different hybrid modes 
or shift its degree of vertical integration.  
The other areas which are not discussed above i.e. cell 1 and 4 represent the 
unclear situation in which the benefit of particular governance is difficult to assess as 
it may depend on other non-controllable factors which are excluded.  
3.5 Summary 
This chapter emphasizes that uncertainty should be treated as a disaggregated 
construct. The effect of any particular uncertainty on other constructs should not be 
generalized for all uncertainties. The following example of empirical works related 
to uncertainty which focus on its impact on choice of governance below will provide 
a good basis for the above disaggregated notion. Anderson (1985) found that 
unpredictability is unrelated to integration. Therefore, it is important not only to 
understand what the particular source of environmental uncertainty is, but also its 
type. While specifying the source of uncertainty identifies the domain of the 
environment (i.e. competitors or suppliers), specifying the type of uncertainty 
focuses on delineating the nature of the uncertainty being experienced (Milliken 
1987). Last but not least, it is important to understand how it is measured to help 
improve understanding and result interpretation.  
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CHAPTER 4  
 
HYPOTHESES 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In the preceding chapters we discussed governance theory, the adopted 
theoretical framework for this study. Chapter 2 reviewed the relevant literature in 
the area of governance while chapter 3 focused on uncertainty. The aim of this 
chapter is to develop a conceptual framework, research questions, and hypotheses 
to answer the research questions introduced in chapter 1. This chapter is 
organized in the following way. First, section 4.2 restates research objectives and 
research questions of this study. Our research questions represent 3 main 
relationships. The first relationship discusses the relationship between uncertainty 
and governance. The second relationship emphasizes the relationship between 
uncertainty and performance. The third relationship explores if the degree of 
vertical integration can moderate the impact of uncertainty on performance. Next, 
the conceptual model is presented in section 4.3 to provide the overall background 
of the study and display the relationship among our key constructs. Section 4.4 
provides justification for choice of hotel variables. The 13 hypotheses of this study 
are discussed in section 4.5 with 3 sub-sections for each main relationship. Finally, 
section 4.6 summarizes the chapter.  
4.2 Research objectives and questions  
As stated in chapter 1, there are three primary objectives of this study. The first 
objective is to validate the role of TCA‘s proposition in concurrent channel context. 
The second one is to examine the impact of governance on performance. The last 
objective is to deepen understanding on various types of uncertainty, especially the 
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institutional variable, and their impacts of governance and performance. Based on 
these objectives, the central question in this dissertation investigates a 
discriminating alignment hypothesis which predicts that firms that align their mode 
of governance with transaction dimensions will result in superior performance 
(Williamson 1985; Mooi and Ghosh 2010). Specifically, there are 3 research 
questions. The first question focuses on the impact of each uncertainty on 
governance. The second question looks into the direct effect of each uncertainty on 
performance. The last and crucial question explores the role of vertical integration 
and whether or not it can buffer the impact of uncertainty on performance. The 
hypotheses in this study are based on governance theory, which is a broad term 
that includes TCA, agency theory, and institutional environment. The hypotheses 
are constructed based on TCA‘s prediction on how a firm responds to uncertainty 
with supporting rationale from other governance theories as stated above.  
The first research question which corresponds to the first objective considers the 
impact of uncertainty in the context of deployment of the direct and indirect 
channels to extend the traditional TCA which only focuses on the governance 
choice between make or buy (market vs. hierarchy), rather than both making and 
buying. Although TCA does consider the possibility of using multiple channels 
concurrently, this form has often fallen under a hybrid mode of governance which is 
the middle range between market and hierarchy (Dutta, et al. 1995). However, 
studies on hybrid governance often do not address the case of why the balance of 
using both channels for the same product shifts (Parmigiani 2007). Recent 
research has paid more attention to the simultaneous reliance on both direct and 
indirect channels ―concurrently‖ (Sa Vinhas and Anderson 2005; Parmigiani 2007) 
as it has become more common in practice for firms to use both direct and indirect 
channels to conduct their business in the same area for different market segments 
or even to compete for similar customer segments (Cespedes and Corey 1990). 
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Concurrent channels are also better for customers because customers can select 
the channel that fits with their buying behavior, and better for firms because they 
can increase coverage and performance (Sa Vinhas and Anderson 2005).  
Research questions 2 and 3, which correspond to the second objective, focus on 
examining the impact of uncertainty variables on performance. Question 2 explores 
the direct effects of uncertainty on performance. Question 3 asks about the 
subsequent performance effect of governance choices which is central to this study 
as it is the direct investigation of TCA‘s discriminating alignment hypothesis. 
By disaggregating the uncertainty construct into demand, competitive and political 
when examining their relationship with governance and performance, the last 
objective in deepening the understanding on various types of uncertainty of this 
study is achieved. The disaggreation is crucial as previous empirical evidence 
shows that uncertainty‘s effect on governance can be both congruent and 
contradictory to TCA‘s prediction. For example, the effect of complexity on vertical 
integration is positive, while that of dynamism is negative (Klein 1989). The view that 
agrees with TCA‘s position suggests that vertical integration, a direct sales force, 
should result in lower transaction cost, and subsequently, better performance 
outcome. The opposite proposition to TCA is that the flexible organization can better 
adapt itself with the situation. Therefore, an indirect sales force should be able to 
respond to the situation more quickly since this type of sales force works 
independently and can reach a larger customer base (Klein, Frazier and Roth 1990). 
For example, a travel agency can easily create or adjust the offer without having to 
get approval from the hotel. These different positions are the reason for our research 
question concerning the investigation of different types of uncertainty and 
hypotheses. The reason why the study has to treat uncertainty as a disaggregated 
concept is important because if the effect of each uncertanty on vertical integration is 
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different, its subsequent performance should be different. Although TCA prescribes 
that vertical integration is the preferred mode of governance when transaction 
complexity increases only if there is a presence of asset specificity in the 
relationship, due to data availability, this variable is not included in this study.  
However, we view that the absence of this variable should not compromise the 
findings for two reasons.  First, the degree of asset specificity is assumed to be 
stable through the period of study as data is drawn from the same hotels over time.  
Second, the effect of asset specificity on the choice of governance is still 
inconclusive.  Among empirical studies reviewed by David and Han (2004), only 
approximately 50% of the studies on effect of asset specificity and its interaction on 
uncertainty align with TCA‘s prediction that hierarchical governance is preferred 
when transaction complexity increases.  For example Anderson and Schmittlein 
(1984) found no effect of the interaction between uncertainty and asset specificity on 
the decision to vertically integrate. Dyer (1997) suggested that there are situations in 
which same level of asset specificity will result in different transaction costs because 
other transaction factors i.e. commitment, mix of safeguard, are also play in an 
important role.  Recent studies in TCA tend to favor the view that firms choose their 
mode of governance based on the weighting of direct and opportunity costs (Ghosh 
and John 2005).  As a consequence, it is not unusual for empirical works in this area 
to exclude this variable when investigating other transaction dimensions – 
governance –performance relationships (cf. Sa Vinhas and Anderson 2005; Kim, et 
al. 2011).   
4.3 Conceptual model 
The conceptual model is based on governance theory, which prescribes that firms 
that align their mode of governance with transaction dimensions will economize on 
transaction cost. This alignment is expected to result in superior performance 
relative to firms who do not organize their governance as prescribed (Williamson 
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1985; Klein 1989; Geysken, Steenkamp, Kurmar 2006). Figure 4.1 presents the 
conceptual model which illustrates the relationship between uncertainty, 
governance, and performance. Three key relationships can be drawn from the 
model: 1) the impact of uncertainty on governance, 2) the impact of uncertainty on 
performance, and 3) the moderating impact of governance on performance.  
 
Figure 4.1: Conceptual model 
4.4 Justification for choice of model variables 
The study‘s choice of dependent variables, governance and performance, was 
driven by the interest in linking TCA with a more current practice. As for 
governance which is discussed in section 4.2, the study extends the traditional 
focus of TCA which only emphasizes the discrete choice of ―make, buy, or hybrid‖, 
by bringing ―concurrent‖ channels which is usually addressed in neoclassical and 
organizational capabilities literature into consideration. Concurrent channels refer 
to the use of two or more forms of governances simultaneously (Bradach and 
Eccles 1989). The study‘s interest is not on the choice of governance that the focal 
firm chooses to employ under different uncertainty levels, but the simultaneous 
deployment of these channels as the level of uncertainty changes or channel 
deployment. Specifically, our interest is to investigate if the focal firm tries to use 
more or less of its direct sales force when each of the uncertainty rises.  While it 
might be argued that the choice of governance is partially determined by the 
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consumer themselves and is not fully controlled by the management, the choice of 
governance is viewed as, to some extent, a managerially choice in this study.  The 
rationale is that consumer‘s channel selection is a result of the firm‘s marketing 
efforts i.e. promotional emails, price reduction (Neslin, et al. 2006) which is driven 
by the firm‘s channel strategy on which channels it would like to focus on. The firm 
will then allocate its resources accordingly (Mallapragada, et al. 2014).  For 
example, based on our discussion with management, the hotel may choose to 
have a secret deal promotion with online travel agent if the sales in direct channels 
might go below budget. The hotel will usually allocate higher marketing 
expenditure with its direct channels during the beginning to get more group 
bookings from company‘s incentive trip or annual plan meeting. Management 
allocates and adjusts its marketing expenditures based on which channels it would 
like to generate sales in particular period.  Degree of vertical integration which 
refers to the continuum degree of proportion of sales placed through direct 
channels to total sales to represent the shift of governance within concurrent 
channels is employed as the measure for this variable. 
In regards to performance, what brings the study‘s interest into the area is the 
notion of scarcity of empirical evidence that link the selected choices of 
governance with relative performance outcomes (Leiblein, Reuer and Dalsace 
2002, David and Han 2004, Bigelow 2006). The study chooses to focus on the 
financial aspect of the performance as it is the utmost objective of all firms. Monthly 
revenue is chosen as our measure as it directly links to a firm‘s success in the 
marketplace and is more accessible than other financial measures such as net 
profit or return on investment (Rothaermel, Hitt and Jobe 2006). In addition, 
revenue is not affected by accounting practices i.e. different methods of valuations 
and does not take other non-sales factors such as depreciation, tax, and interest 
into consideration (Demsetz and Villalonga 2001).  
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Our focus is on how different uncertainties affect the dependent variables, 
governance and performance. In this regard, previous literature in the area of 
governance (Chapter 2) and uncertainty (Chapter 3) were reviewed. The study 
agrees with those literature that it is crucial to disaggregate uncertainty into 
different facets for the reason that different facets of uncertainty lead to different 
conclusions. The disaggregation is consistent with the study‘s third objective in 
testing whether or not TCA‘s prediction that vertical integration is the preferred 
mode of governance when uncertainty rises can be applied to all uncertainty. 
Based on the uncertainty literature review in chapter 3, the study disaggregates 
uncertainty based on its domain of environment. The study follows Miller (1992) 
which categorizes the domain of environment along a continuum of relevancy to 
the firm from 1) firm specific, 2) industry, and 3) general environment and focuses 
its attention on industry-level market uncertainty and general non-market 
uncertainty (institutional variable) based on the objective in applying TCA‘s 
prediction to include institutional variables. As the interest of this study is how the 
change in environmental factors affects governance and performance, the 
dynamism/volatility aspect of uncertainty will be the focus. Hence, each uncertainty 
is conceptualized as the dynamism/volatility of the domain of environment of 
interest. 
As for market industry-level uncertainty, Miller (1992) identifies that there are three 
major classes of firm-specific uncertainties: input (demand), product market, and 
competitive uncertainty. The study selects demand and competitive uncertainty for 
the reason that they are the key determinants of performance in any industry in 
general. The higher the degree of these uncertainties, the higher the challenges for 
a firm to evaluate whether poor performance is due to the industry instabilty, 
managerial incompetency or opportunism (Kor, Mahoney and Watson 2008). For 
example, hotels in Dubai have suffered from a weak economy in Russia and 
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Europe which cause the number of in-bound Russian and European tourists to be 
significantly lower than the forecast number. In order to make up for this loss, travel 
agents may suggest hotels to come up with promotions such as lowering room 
rates or offering free breakfast to get more business and to match offers from 
competitors. However, some of this might be unnecessary or the travel agents may 
act opportunistically by only passing on the free breakfast to the tourists and 
charging them for the same room rate. Therefore, the agents enjoy extra benefit 
from the uncertainty situation. Under this scenario, it would be difficult to assess 
whether the real problem is from the weak Russian and European economy, 
competitor‘s actions, opportunistic travel agents, or incompetent managers who 
follow the agent‘s advice. A firm might be in a better position using more of its 
direct sales force under this situation because firms are knowledgeable about the 
industry and emphasizing direct sales would allow them to have a better access to 
the information. 
When assessing demand in the tourism industry, the number of tourist arrivals or 
receipts from tourism are usually considered. Therefore, demand uncertainty can 
either be the volatility of number of tourists (Neumayer 2004) or the instability of 
overall industry sales which makes it hard for firms to evaluate the situation with 
confidence (Kor, Mahoney and Watson 2008). In this study, we prefer Neumayer‘s 
(2004) conceptualization of demand uncertainty as the volatility of number of 
tourists (Neumayer 2004) as tourism receipts are typically taken from the balance-
of-payment statistics, are known to be inaccurate (Sinclair 1998), and are varied 
according to other economic factors.  
―Competitive uncertainty is a broad category covering the uncertainty associated 
with the rivalry among existing firms and potential entrants into the industry which 
covers the inability to predict the amount of goods in the market‖ (Miller 1992, 
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p.317), the intensity of the competition, and innovations. In the context of this study, 
competitive uncertainty can include new direct competitors which usually come 
with interesting price point and position. For example, a newly built hotel which 
focuses on the meeting and convention business may offer lower room rates than 
existing hotels in the same area. The uncertainty of a competitive situation makes it 
more difficult for firms to formulate the right strategic action, which can weaken the 
firm‘s economic performance (Kor, Mahoney and Watson 2008). In the context of 
our study, the most appropriate conceptualization of competitive uncertainty is the 
unpredictability of competitive intensity which is defined as the volatility of the 
degree of competition that our focal firm is facing (Grewal and Tansuhaj 2001) and 
is one of the factors that is predicted to directly affect the firm‘s operations and 
performance.  
General environment or external uncertainty which represents non-market 
uncertainty is often labeled ―country risk‖ which can take the form of political 
uncertainty, economic fluctuation, social norms, or natural disasters (Anderson and 
Gatignon 1986; Miller 1992). Political uncertainty is chosen as it is an important 
dimension of institutional environments that captures the political system and set of 
regulations in each particular locations (Demirbag, Glaister and Tatoglu 2007) 
which are the non-economic circumstances that are relevant and crucial for any 
business to take into consideration in addition to those market factors. ―Political 
uncertainty refers to the stability or instability in government policies that impact the 
business community‖ (Miller 1992, p.314). In this study, political uncertainty 
includes both uncertainties in the political situation and policy changes as the 
changes in policy can be impactful to business even though the political situation is 
stable. The construct represents overall political events that may have major 
impact on other constructs. Unlike the demand and competitive uncertainty which 
refers to the volatility of industry-related situations, political uncertainty refers to the 
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change in circumstances in the general environment which firms may not be 
familiar with. Therefore, firms may need to be more dependent on an indirect sales 
force to maintain their flexibility in accessing the market.  
In summary, three uncertainties in three domains of environment; demand, 
competitive, and political uncertainty are chosen for their commonality and 
inevitability in any business operations regardless of industry or geography. 
Demand and competitive uncertainty are two key usual and on-going industry-level 
uncertainties (Miller 1992) while political uncertainty characterizes the more 
infrequent and extreme type of general environment uncertainty.  
4.5 Hypotheses3 
4.5.1 The impact of uncertainty on governance 
Following the first objective, the first research question focuses on governance 
which is addressed through the deployment of different channels in a concurrent 
channels context. Channel deployment refers to a continuum degree of a 
proportion of sales generated by direct or indirect sales by total sales and is 
measured by degree of vertical integration. The study aims to answer this question 
using 5 hypotheses which test the effect of three different uncertainties and their 
interaction effects on the degree of vertical integration. Besides the main effect of 
uncertainty variables, the study also aims to investigate if one uncertainty can 
moderate the effect of another, specifically on how the non-market uncertainty 
such as political uncertainty moderates the industry-level market uncertainty by 
interacting with demand uncertainty and competitive uncertainty.  
Hypothesis 1 
                                                          
3
 All of the hypotheses follow ceteris paribus law which refers to ― all else being equal‖ (Schiffer 1991) 
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As for the effects of demand uncertainty on channel deployment, the study 
suggests, consistent with TCA‘s predictions, that when uncertainty rises, vertical 
integration is the preferred mode of governance. If demand uncertainty is low, TCA 
assumes that market governance is a more efficient mode because of the benefits 
of competition. Firms will be in a better position to use market (indirect or third 
party sales force) which is the more economizing mode of governance to recruit 
customers. Opportunism will not pose problems since it is not difficult to verify 
performance. 
When demand uncertainty, which is the uncertainty of overall industry demand and 
is exogenous to governance choice, is high, firms can either have unusually low or 
high business. In both cases, firms may feel insecure to rely on a third party since 
they also serve competitors. Third parties will be more opportunistic since the 
performance is difficult to verify. A third party can use the demand uncertainty as 
an excuse for not delivering the target even though the performance shortfalls are 
caused from their opportunistic acts or inefficiency. If relying on third parties, the 
focal firm may face opportunity losses when business is high and will be in a riskier 
situation when business is low. As summarized by John and Weitz (1988), TCA 
prescribes that an appropriate response to increased environmental uncertainty is 
to adopt vertical integration. First, vertically integrated structures permit sequential, 
adaptive decision making to proceed more smoothly because of administrative 
mechanisms. Authority structures allow firms to have a better information flow, thus 
they can better respond to the uncertainty (John and Weitz 1988). Firms tend to 
use their own sales force under this situation as it is the type of channel firms can 
directly put their emphasis on. Using the firm‘s own sales force allows manager to 
decide on marketing schemes to cope with the situation and act spontaneously. 
Firms may perceive that third parties may act opportunistically to protect their own 
interest. For example, a third party may convince its customers to stay at a 
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competitor‘s hotel or may delay payments to the focal firm. Under these 
circumstances, the focal firm may view a direct sales force to be a safer choice. 
Therefore, in the context of concurrent channels, the study hypothesizes that when 
demand uncertainty is high, the degree of vertical integration will be higher.  
H1: The higher the demand uncertainty, the higher the degree of vertical 
integration, ceteris paribus 
Hypothesis 2 
High competitive uncertainty means the intensity of competition is highly volatile. In 
this situation, response to the market situation will change swiftly to cope with this 
volatility. Therefore, it is difficult for the focal firm to formulate a solid plan to deal 
with the changing competitive situation. Firms will have to work harder either to 
secure their own business or to gain from competitors. For example, third party 
agents who serve both the focal firm and competitors may feel that the focal firm‘s 
credit terms or commissions are not flexible enough relative to those of competitors. 
This may allow a third party to act opportunistically (a passive form of opportunism, 
defined as the refusal to adapt) (Wathne and Heide 2000). Third parties may give 
the business to competitors, who offer higher incentives, have flexible cancellation 
policy or flexible credit terms. Thus, firms cannot fully rely on a third party under 
these circumstances. Focal firms will suffer from forgone revenue due to 
maladaptation. As there is a potential likelihood of opportunistic behavior from a 
third party, the study hypothesizes that when competitive uncertainty is high, focal 
firms should rely on their own sales force to secure the business.  
H2: The higher the competitive uncertainty, the higher the degree of vertical 
integration, ceteris paribus 
Hypothesis 3 
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Unlike demand and competitive uncertainty which are industry-level market 
uncertainties that a firm has its market orientation capability to handle, political 
uncertainty addresses circumstantial changes in the political environment and 
reflects the threats and opportunity associated with potential or actual changes in 
the political system which can range from regular policy change to general election, 
war, revolution, coup d‘état or other political incident (Miller 1992). The higher 
political uncertainty often signals negative effects to the general environment, not 
just the volatility of the situation, even though those changes are non-violent.  
The generalizability of much published research on political uncertainty is still 
unclear. The TCA framework suggests that when political uncertainty is high firms 
should maintain their flexibility to avoid resource commitment. Relying more on 
market will allow firms to benefit from market mechanisms which are cost 
advantage, wider customer base, and distribution of risk. This suggestion is valid 
only when there is no presence of asset specificity. If asset specificity is present, a 
firm needs to exert control for that specificity to manage the uncertainty and 
resolve disputes (Anderson and Gatignon 1986) and, to the extent possible, avoid 
opportunism such as free riding on the focal firm‘s reputation.  
However, whether or not asset specificity is taken into consideration, empirical 
evidence that is contradictory to TCA‘s prediction exists. For example, Anderson 
and Gatignon (1986) shows that firms are more likely to use partnership than 
vertical integration as a mode of entry into high political risk foreign markets. 
Henisz and Williamson (1999) found that in time of political uncertainty, firms may 
prefer a less hierarchical governance structure to reduce the hazard of political 
expropriation. Oxley (1999) states that in the case of organization of inter-firm 
alliances, political uncertainty increases the risk of public appropriation; therefore, 
firms should try to be less vertically integrated to avoid the risk i.e. subsequent 
incremental cost. Though, the security of contracts with local firms is also likely to 
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be negatively affected by increased political risk due to lack of confidence in the 
enforcement powers of the courts which will make vertical integration a more 
attractive option. Nickerson, Hamilton, Wada (2001) suggests that firms operate in 
highly uncertainty environment are less likely to make specific investments for fear 
of public expropriation and the result shows that a weak institutional environment 
discourages vertical integration. Demirbag, Glaister and Tatoglu (2007) find that 
firms prefer joint-venture to wholly owned subsidiaries in high political risk 
countries to avoid the risk of intervention or expropriation. 
The volatility of the political situation will also result in customers ‗demand for 
flexibility to counter lock-in. Booking through a third party will allow them to change 
their choice of hotels or completely change their destinations to other cities or 
countries. This is the kind of flexibility that they will not have if the customer books 
direct with the focal firm. The awareness of customers ‗demand for flexibility 
together with insufficient capability to handle the situation leave firms no choice but 
to depend more on third party to reach out to a wider customer base even though 
this may result in a lower margin.  For example, an exclusive promotional price 
through the hotel‘s website or group booking in which firms can be more selective 
and spontaneous at a higher profit margin may not generate sufficient volume for 
the business. In this regards, to generate a satisfactory number of bookings, firms 
may have to allocate higher than usual marketing expenditures to create stronger 
promotional activities with travel agent, which will result in lower profit margin and 
higher potential costs of opportunism i.e. the agents will take these higher than 
usual promotional budget as reference points for future collaboration.  Therefore, 
the study hypothesizes the effect of political uncertainty on governance differently 
from those of demand and competitive uncertainty. The study views that the focal 
firm will have to maintain its flexibility in time of political uncertainty. 
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H3: The higher the political uncertainty, the lower the degree of vertical integration, 
ceteris paribus 
Hypothesis 4 
For the interaction effect between uncertainty variables, our objective is to explore 
whether political uncertainty, which is extreme and infrequent, can moderate the 
effect of a more general uncertainty. As hypothesis 3 indicates that a focal firm 
should try to maintain its flexibility in times of political uncertainty, political 
uncertainty should lessen the positive relationship between the industry-level 
uncertainty and the degree of vertical integration. 
H4 examines whether political uncertainty moderates the impact of demand 
uncertainty on the degree of vertical integration. The study expects that the 
relationship between demand uncertainty and the degree of vertical integration will 
vary according the level of political uncertainty.  
In the case of low political uncertainty, a focal firm does not have to consider the 
effect of political uncertainty on demand uncertainty. The focal firm will opt for the 
best possible performance outcome by trying to be more vertically integrated since 
the risk of opportunism should be lower than when relying more on a third party. 
However, when political uncertainty is high, the focal firm faces both lower demand 
and higher demand uncertainty which causes the business opportunity to become 
smaller and highly volatile. This volatility can be caused by last minute decisions 
and cancellations. In addition, as indicated in H3, the focal firm‘s customers may 
want to maintain flexibility in time of high political uncertainty and start to rely more 
on third party channels. In order to maintain the business, the focal firm must 
consider the tradeoffs between cost of opportunism and business gains from using 
third party channel, which might be necessary since political uncertainty alters the 
effect of demand uncertainty to be more complex. In this case, the business gains 
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from relying more on third party channels are expected to offset the cost of 
opportunism which is an immediate efficiency gain required under this 
circumstance. Therefore, high political uncertainty will lessen the positive 
relationship between demand uncertainty and degree of vertical integration. 
H4: The higher the political uncertainty, the weaker the positive effect (less positive) 
of demand uncertainty on degree of vertical integration, ceteris paribus 
Hypothesis 5 
H5 investigates the moderating impact of political uncertainty on the relationship 
between competitive uncertainty and degree of vertical integration. If political 
uncertainty is low, a firm may want to become more vertically integrated in 
response to competitive uncertainty since it is the most economizing choice and 
one which will lead to subsequent superior performance. However, when political 
uncertainty is high, players in the market may want to become more flexible and 
start using more of a third party in response to customer‘s demand for flexibility. 
Similar to that of H4, although the focal firm may suffer from a third party‘s 
opportunism, the business gains that result from relying more on third party 
channels should offset the cost of opportunism. The focal firm will lose business 
from customers who prefer booking through a third party to competitors if the focal 
firm only focuses on its own sales force (vertical integration). Therefore, the study 
hypothesizes that high political uncertainty will lessen the positive relationship 
between competitive uncertainty and the degree of vertical integration 
H5: The higher the political uncertainty, the weaker the positive effect (less positive) 
of competitive uncertainty on degree of vertical integration, ceteris paribus 
4.5.2 The impact of uncertainty on performance 
Based on the second objective, a set of hypotheses is constructed to answer 
whether or not different types of uncertainty have a different impact on 
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performance. TCA predicts that an increase in any of the transaction dimensions, 
asset specificity, uncertainty, or frequency, will result in a higher transaction cost; 
hence, the subsequent performance should be lower (Williamson 1985). Besides 
TCA, another popular theoretical lens that is used to explore this direct vs. indirect 
sales force phenomenon is agency theory which focuses on the principal-agent 
relationship. However, both theories address this linkage indirectly. TCA states that 
uncertainty will increase cost, resulting in lower performance, while agency theory 
addresses this linkage through opportunism; uncertainty will increase opportunism 
cost which will result in a lower performance outcome (Eisenhardt 1989; Dutta, et 
al. 1995; Kraft, Albers and Lal 2004).  
According to the above governance theories, this study expects that performance 
should be lower when uncertainty rises and expects that all types of uncertainty 
should have the same effect on performance. Similar to section 4.3.1, the study 
intends to provide empirical evidence in this area by testing the impact of three 
uncertainties and their interactions on performance. The study focuses on financial 
performance. Performance refers to revenue generated by the room department 
only as the measure since it is the direct performance measurement that excludes 
the effect of other factors that are irrelevant to sales effort. 
Hypothesis 6 
H6 tests the main effect of demand uncertainty on performance. The impact of 
demand uncertainty on performance is not necessarily negative to performance. It 
could be the case that the demand (number of tourists) is unusually high. However, 
the study expects that high demand uncertainty should have negative effects on 
performance as it causes difficulty in business operation. Although demand is high, 
the focal firm may not properly prepare itself to cope with it. Also, high demand 
uncertainty is likely to increase the chance of opportunism from a third party. On 
119 
 
the contrary, if demand uncertainty is low and predictable, the firm can plan out the 
right marketing scheme and resources that will result in optimal performance. 
Therefore, the study hypothesizes that:  
H6: The higher the demand uncertainty, the lower the performance, ceteris paribus 
Hypothesis 7 
Similar to H6, competitive uncertainty is not necessarily negative. When 
competitive uncertainty is low, firms can fully benefit from their market orientation 
capability or knowledge in which has been captured from the operating 
environment such as competitors and customers in their business operation 
(Grewal and Tansuhaj 2001). However, in a highly volatile market, the market 
situation is unique, unclear, shifting, and cannot be modeled in advance; therefore, 
firms are less likely to have market orientation capability under this high uncertainty 
condition (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000; Grewal and Tansuhaj 2001). As a result, 
the firm has to adjust the strategy and operation on an ongoing basis, which may 
disrupt the operations and incur unforeseen cost. High competitive uncertainty will 
also increase the chance of opportunism from a third party which the firm may have 
to put a considerable amount of resources in for control and monitoring, resources 
that could be used for other productive purposes (Calfee and Rubin 1993). 
Therefore, the study hypothesizes that when competitive uncertainty is high, the 
performance of the firm should be less than when competitive uncertainty is low. 
H7: The higher the competitive uncertainty, the lower the performance, ceteris 
paribus 
Hypothesis 8 
As previously discussed, political uncertainty signals a negative notion as the 
factors that drive the change in the political situation affect stability, and produce 
conflicts and tension. The focal firm‘s customers who are often regarded as 
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relaxing holiday makers are, therefore, sensitive to the political situation and will 
easily switch to another destination that has similar characteristics since tourists 
select their destination based upon certain characteristics rather than a particular 
destination (Neumayer 2004). In addition, unlike the uncertainty in demand and 
competition which are part of the market dynamic, the uncertainty in politics can be 
much more circumstantial. For example, the lifting of martial law in Thailand in May 
2014 signaled to travellers that there might be violence in the country, even though 
there was none. In addition to the perception of violence, the lifting of martial law 
also triggered the exclusion clause in the travel insurance policy of certain 
companies (www.wttc.org) which might have prevented both holiday makers and 
business travellers from coming to the country due to fears of insecurity. Firms will 
suffer the revenue loss from cancellations and may also have to reduce their price 
to make their products look more competitive. As third parties will also get affected 
by the situation, they may incline to be more opportunistic as transaction partners 
who are faced with political hazards are likely to recourse to illegitimate behaviors 
(Henisz and Williamson 1999) which will also post a threat to the firm‘s 
performance. A third party may suffer from a shortage of revenue or have 
insufficient cash flow to make the payment. The obscurity of the situation makes it 
difficult to evaluate whether the shortfalls are due to the political situation, 
inefficiency of management or opportunistic behavior of third parties. Therefore, 
when political uncertainty is high, the performance of the firm should be lower than 
when political uncertainty is low.  
H8: The higher the political uncertainty, the lower the performance, ceteris paribus 
Hypothesis 9 
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Similar to H4 and H5 (discussed in section 4.5.1), our interest is to explore whether 
the non-market uncertainty such as political uncertainty can moderate the effect of 
the market uncertainty on performance.  
As political uncertainty is a vital dimension of institutional environments which 
captures political system and set of regulations in particular locations (Demirbag, 
Glaister and Tatoglu 2007), the change in political situation will result in the change 
in underlying conditions that is a basis for a market. If the political uncertainty is high, 
demand uncertainty is also expected to be higher than its usual level because 
travellers tend to make last minute decisions. The higher the political uncertainty, the 
more likely there will be a downward trend as travellers will fear that the situation will 
aggravate. Therefore, when political uncertainty is high, the focal firm will face both 
lower demand and higher demand uncertainty. Consequently, the negative effects of 
demand uncertainty on performance due to lower demand, improper planning, and 
opportunism from a third party (as stated in H8) are likely to be more negative. 
Hence, when political uncertainty is high, the negative impact of demand uncertainty 
on performance will be stronger than when political uncertainty is low.  
H9: The higher the political uncertainty, the stronger the negative effect (more 
negative) of demand uncertainty on performance, ceteris paribus 
Hypothesis 10 
The high political uncertainty will increase a number of unforeseen contingencies 
that players in the market must react to. Some players may cope with these 
unforeseen contingencies better than others which will cause the competitive set‘s 
performance and actions to become not so volatile. If competitive uncertainty is 
high, the focal firm will have to adjust the strategy and operation on an ongoing 
basis. This may disrupt the operations and incur unforeseen cost to the focal firm. 
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Similar to the rationale discussed in H9, it is likely that when political uncertainty is 
high, the focal firm may have to start to follow competitor‘s moves by relying more 
on a third party to serve customer‘s needs for flexibility. This will result in an 
incremental cost of opportunism due to a higher portion of sales generated from 
third party channels which would not be the case if the focal firm did not need to 
deal with the customer‘s flexibility issue which is a consequence of political 
uncertainty. Therefore, when political uncertainty is high, the focal firm will face 
higher negative effects of competitive uncertainty on performance due to improper 
planning, and opportunism from a third party. 
H10: The higher the political uncertainty, the stronger the negative effect of 
competitive uncertainty on performance, ceteris paribus 
4.5.3 The impact of governance on performance 
The main aim of this section is to provide empirical evidence for TCA‘s 
discriminating alignment hypothesis. The following hypotheses are designed to test 
the subsequent effect of the focal firm‘s choice of governance on performance 
outcome which will provide empirical evidence on 1) whether or not transaction 
alignment will lead to superior performance and 2) whether or not TCA‘s prediction 
is valid with all uncertainty including the institutional variable which is a non-market 
uncertainty. 
Hypothesis 11 
H10 suggests a buffering effect of degree of vertical integration on the relationship 
between demand uncertainty and performance. When demand uncertainty is 
low and predictable, TCA predicts that the market is the most efficient mode of 
governance because the focal firm can get benefits from competition. However, 
when demand uncertainty is high, a third party will be more likely to be 
opportunistic since the performance is difficult to verify. Firms may face opportunity 
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loss when business is high and will even be in a risker situation when business is 
low. Using the firm‘s own sales force in accordance with TCA‘s prediction should 
result in a better subsequent performance than using a third party since the focal 
firm can utilize its market orientation to estimate the demand and come up with 
proper directions and control for the third party. On the contrary, using a third party 
will place the firm in a less advantageous position than using its own sales force 
since the focal firm will suffer the risk of opportunism from the third party.  
Based on the above scenarios, this hypothesis considers if the choice of 
governance can moderate the relationship between demand uncertainty and 
performance, specifically if a higher degree of vertical integration can lessen the 
negative impact of demand uncertainty on performance. 
H11: The higher the degree of vertical integration, the weaker the negative effect of 
demand uncertainty on performance, ceteris paribus 
Hypothesis 12 
Competitive uncertainty is a market industry-level uncertainty which the focal firm 
normally focuses their attention on. Thus, the focal firm is expected to have better 
intelligence about its direct competitors than third parties do.  
Similar to that of demand uncertainty, when competitive uncertainty is low, relying 
more on a third party sales force should result in a better performance outcome. 
Under this situation, the competitive situation is quite predictable. It is more difficult 
for a third party to act opportunistically since performance is not difficult to verify. 
Market orientation capability may not be that advantageous since the dynamic of 
competition is quite stable. In that case, a high degree of vertical integration might 
hurt rather than improve the focal firm‘s performance. Therefore, when competitive 
uncertainty is low, a high degree of vertical integration will worsen the negative 
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effect of competitive uncertainty on performance than a low degree of vertical 
integration, which is in line with TCA's prediction. 
On the contrary, when competitive uncertainty is high, being more vertically 
integrated will allow focal firms to benefit from their market orientation capability. 
Firms can utilize their market orientation to predict their competitor's direction and 
see how they can gain a competitor‘s business. A high degree of vertical 
integration will lessen the negative effect of competitive uncertainty on 
performance. The more a firm relies on a third party, the higher the risk of 
opportunism the firm is facing. Therefore, if a firm depends more on their sales 
force than on a third party, its performance is expected to be better. 
H12: The higher the degree of vertical integration, the weaker the negative effect 
(less negative) of competitive uncertainty on performance, ceteris paribus 
Hypothesis 13 
If political uncertainty is low, there is no negative or extreme incident in the general 
environment and it is expected that it would be difficult for a third party to act 
opportunistically. However, business gains from relying more on third party 
channels should offset the cost of opportunism. We view that relying more on third 
parties will allow firms to benefit from a third party‘s market capability on their 
knowledge about target customers without bearing additional cost. 
When political uncertainty is high, a firm‘s market orientation capability may not 
bear fruits under this situation since firms do not have knowledge about this type of 
uncertainty. Relying more on market will allow firms to benefit from market 
mechanisms such as cost advantage, wider customer base, and spreading out the 
risk. In addition, political uncertainty increases the risk of public appropriation. 
Therefore, in a high political uncertainty situation, the study views that the focal firm 
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should try to be less vertically integrated to avoid the risk i.e. subsequent 
incremental cost (Nickerson, Hamilton and Wada 2001). 
H13: The higher the degree of vertical integration, the stronger the negative effect 
(more negative) of political uncertainty on performance, ceteris paribus 
4.6 Summary 
This chapter discusses 13 hypotheses that will be tested in order to answer our 
research questions regarding the effect of uncertainty on channel deployment and 
performance. Prior to the hypotheses, the research questions are restated and the 
conceptual approach is presented in the subsequent section. The justification for 
our model choice variables is discussed after the model. 
The first five hypotheses (H1-H5) focus on the effect of uncertainty on channel 
deployment. We view that, when facing industry-level market uncertainty, firms will 
be more likely to vertically integrate and vice versa for the non-market uncertainty. 
However, the interactions among uncertainty variables will cause the firm to be 
less vertically integrated since firms have to depend more on third parties.  
The impact of uncertainty on performance is tested in the next 8 hypotheses (H6 – 
H13), and the study views that all types of uncertainty and their interactions will 
negatively affect performance. The moderating effects of the degree of vertical 
integration on the relationship between uncertainty and performance are 
hypothesized by integrating the view on TCA and organizational capability. The 
rationale is that vertical integration can lessen the negative effect of market 
uncertainty for firms which have market capability on that specific uncertainty. 
However, for non-market uncertainty such as political uncertainty, becoming less 
vertically integrated might be more advantageous since the market capability of 
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firms and third parties on the situation is equal. Relying on a third party will allow 
the firm to bear less risk and gain immediate efficiency. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
METHOD 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 provided details on the study‘s conceptual framework and explanation 
for each of the hypotheses. The main focus of this chapter is to present the 
research method to carry out this study. First, the philosophical view of this study is 
discussed in section 5.2. The research design is presented in section 5.3 to give an 
overview of the nature of our data. Section 5.4 provides the context of this study. 
Next, section 5.5 provides the measurement details of each construct.  Section 5.6 
presents the characteristics of the sample. The estimation method is discussed in 
section 5.7. The econometric models, including the rationale for including each of 
the variables, are discussed in section 5.8. Section 5.9 includes alternative models 
which provide justification for our preferred model. Finally, section 5.10 concludes 
this chapter. 
5.2 Philosophical worldview 
This section discusses the philosophical worldview which is often addressed as the 
―research paradigm‖ or ―epistemology‖ that governs each study. The philosophical 
worldview is defined as ―a set of linked assumptions about the world which is 
shared by a community of scientists investigating the world‖ (Deshpande 1983, 
p.101) and is, generally in social science, divided into two different approaches: 
positivism and interpretivism. Positivism is an epistemological position that 
advocates the applications of the methods of natural science to the study of social 
reality and beyond with the objective of seeking ultimately causal explanations. It 
emphasizes that knowledge must be generated only through direct observations 
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and mainly (although not necessarily exclusively) uses quantitative methods to 
verify hypotheses. On the contrary, interpretivism is taken to denote an alternative 
to the positivist orthodoxy. It is predicated upon the view that a strategy is required 
that respects the differences between people and the objects of the natural 
sciences, and therefore requires the social scientist to grasp the subjective 
meaning of social action (Bryman and Bell 2007, p.17; Lee and Lings 2008). The 
methods employed by interpretivism are chiefly qualitative, although quantitative 
data is sometimes used (often for example in descriptive analyses).  
To decide the appropriate research paradigm for the present study, the 
philosophical goal and belief of this study are first considered. The goal or the 
―axiology‖ of this study is not to explain the impact of uncertainty in any particular 
context, but to try to understand the causal relationships between uncertainty and 
other variables based on the governance theory. The belief about the nature of 
reality or the ―ontology‖ of this research is that reality is objective. The study aims 
to understand the phenomenon through a deductive process. The model 
specification and measurements are carefully considered with the intention to 
generalize the findings. Taking these above notions into consideration, it seems 
that positivism should be the appropriate paradigm for this study for two reasons. 
First, positivism views reality as objectively measurable and not context specific. 
Second, contrary to the interpretivism approach that aims to describe and 
understand one particular issue through induction, positivism focuses on deductive 
explanations and aims for generalizability of the findings which is consistent with 
our intention to test the applicability of TCA‘s prediction to create circumstances 
where TCA‘s predictions can be applied.  
Nonetheless, the positivism paradigm may not best fit this project. True positivism 
suggests that knowledge can only be generated through direct observation (Lee 
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and Lings 2008), which is not possible in this study. For example, how can one 
directly observe competitive uncertainty or the volatility of competitive intensity? 
Uncertainty or volatility can never be directly observed, it could only be measured 
through proxies. In a similar fashion, political uncertainty represents a number of 
different circumstances in the political environment ranging from the usual change 
in administration to the extremity of coup d‗etat and war, but while those 
circumstances can directly observed, they are simply proxies for an overall concept 
of political risk,  combined through a political risk score. As mentioned in the above 
paragraph, the axiology of this study is to understand the causal relationships 
based on governance theory. The fact that direct observation cannot be achieved 
in this study also leads to the issue with the axiology of this study. In summary, if 
positivism is adopted as the research paradigm for this study, no knowledge can 
be generated since the phenomena cannot be directly observed. 
With the aforementioned issues in positivism, the more appropriate paradigm to 
guide this study would be realism. ―Realism shares two features with positivism; a 
belief that the natural and social sciences can and should apply the same kinds of 
approach to the collection of data and to explanation, meaning reality should be 
objectively measured, and a commitment to the view that there is an external 
reality to which scientists direct their attention (in other words, there is a reality that 
is separate from our descriptions of it‖ (Bryman and Bell 2007, p.18). What makes 
realism a suitable paradigm for this study is its view about the observation of reality. 
While positivism suggests that knowledge must be generated through direct 
observation only, realism views that the unobservable can be measured through 
proxies (Lee and Lings 2008). As the unobservable can be measured through 
proxies, causal relationships between variables can be drawn. This fits with the 
study‘s axiology to understand the causal relationships between uncertainty and 
other variables based on the governance theory. 
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5.3 Research design 
As the objective of this study is to investigate the continuous shifts within the 
concurrent channels, from lower to higher degrees of vertical integration, and to 
view the subsequent performance outcomes of the shift, the most appropriate 
research design is through a longitudinal study using secondary panel data. This 
design has the advantage in understanding organizations as a way of providing 
data on the mechanisms and processes through which changes are created. This 
involves drawing on ―phenomena at vertical and horizontal levels of analysis and 
interconnections between those levels through time‖ (Pettigrew 1990, p.269). 
Longitudinal study‘s drawbacks on time and cost issues in data collection are 
overcome by the use of secondary data. There are two key benefits of employing 
secondary data. First, secondary data represent the reality of the situation. The 
data represent the real decisions not just attitudes or behavioral intention (Houston 
2004). Second, it is economical in both time and cost which is particularly favorable 
for this study as sufficient numbers of observations covering adequate periods can 
be collected in shorter time at lower cost (Houston 2004; Mooi and Sarstedt, 2014) 
which allows the study to investigate this phenomenon dynamically and measure 
changes without having to be concerned about errors from between subject 
variations. As a consequence, this large number of observations increases the 
statistical power which can enhance the efficiency of the estimation (Rothaermel, 
Hitt and Jobe 2006). 
Although secondary data is known to have the drawback in the matter of construct 
validity and a few disadvantages in the area of relevancy, accuracy, dependability 
and timeliness, the data used in this study is not affected by those issues. The data 
used in this study is not single-sourced and is objectively verifiable. Concerning 
construct validity, the study adopts the three-step method established by Houston 
(2004) to assess construct validity. First, each of the constructs is clearly defined 
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both theoretically and conceptually. Second, the selected measurements of the 
constructs follow the definitions and lie within the domain of the research context. 
Third, the measures are assessed for their nomological validity. If more than one 
measure is available for any construct, those measures are evaluated based on 
theoretical fit and consistency with other measures of the same construct. Finally, 
once the appropriate measure is selected, all the measures are evaluated to see if 
the relationships among intended measures are in line with the expectation 
(Houston 2004; Mooi and Sarstedt 2014). 
As for relevancy, the internal secondary data from the company which provides the 
information on the company and competitor‘s performance are the sales and 
financial reports that the company used for its own operations. Thus, it provides 
relevant information on sales by channel types, revenue performance, and 
competitive performance. In terms of accuracy and dependability, the internal data 
must be audited by a Certified Public Account (CPA) since this company is listed 
on the Stock Exchange of Thailand. Its way of working strictly complies with rules 
and regulations set up by the Stock Exchange Committee which is of international 
standard. Published external data from each country are sourced from the 
authorities who are responsible for publishing those data. Demand information is 
provided by the tourism authority of each country. The economic indicators which 
are used as country level control variables are obtained from each country‘s 
national bank. Political uncertainty scores are purchased from International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG) which is one of the databases that the World Bank 
uses as part of its political report. Most of the data are raw and, therefore, suffer 
from less statistical errors. The data is current and suitable for observing the 
change in variables. The data are measured at one-month intervals over a long 
period of 72 months from January 2008 to December 2012. In addition, the 
standard data collecting method allows the study to observe changes across time 
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and analyze the differences across geography which helps strengthen the 
generalizability of the study. Finally, unlike survey data, the secondary data is 
unlikely to suffer from the issue of response bias. In conclusion, longitudinal data is 
appropriate since it reduces concerns of common method variance and causal 
inference that would have existed with cross-sectional data (Rindfleisch, et al. 
2008). Hence, it should provide more empirical insights. 
5.4 Research context 
The context of this study is the hotel industry in 4 different countries, namely 
Thailand, United Arab Emirates (UAE) - Dubai, the Philippines, and Egypt. The 
data employed in this study belongs to a leading Thai-based hotel management 
company founded in 1948 which owns, develops and operates 24 hotels in 9 
countries under four distinct brands (as of October 2014). The company has been 
listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand since 1975 and currently has USD 273 
million in total assets (as of June 2014). During the period of this study, there were 
significant developments in the general environment of each country. Thailand, the 
Philippines, and Egypt were faced with considerable political turmoil during the 
study period. Although the political situation in UAE-Dubai has been stable, the 
country has faced a serious debt crisis. These factors offer a unique opportunity to 
study the impact of both 1) non-market uncertainty under both usual and unusual 
circumstances and 2) industry-level market uncertainty namely, demand and 
competitive uncertainty. Brief summaries regarding the general environment of 
each country and the hotel industry are presented in the following sub-sections 
5.4.1 and 5.4.2.  
5.4.1 General development in each country 
Thailand 
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Thailand has had a series of political unrest since 2006 in the form of conflict 
between the opponent and supporters of former Prime Minister Thaksin 
Shinnawatra whose popular policy won a landslide election in 2001. The 
opponents of Thaksin, mainly the elite, had accused PM Thaksin and his party of 
massive corruption and started to rally against his government in April 2006. Finally, 
the military stepped in and staged a bloodless coup in September 2006 while PM 
Thaksin was in the U.S. Ever since, the political situation in Thailand has escalated. 
Although there was a general election in December 2007, both opponents and 
supporters of Thaksin have taken turns in blockades of the nation‘s government 
houses, roads, and central business district. The country seemed to return to 
normalcy after a general election in July 2011. The Thaksin party won the majority 
of the votes and his sister, Yingluck Shinnawatra, was appointed as the new prime 
minister. However, the conflict between these two groups continues in forms of 
demonstration, blockades, and some degree of violence. The military had to stage 
another bloodless coup in May 2014 in order to control the situation. 
Dubai 
Dubai is one, and the most populous, of the seven emirates that make up the 
United Arab of Emirates (UAE). Oil is its major economic driver. The UAE held its 
first election in December 2006 and has gradually been reforming itself with an aim 
to become the world economic leader. Dubai has been making substantial 
investment in its infrastructure, construction, and portfolio of businesses through its 
investment company ―Dubai World.‖ In 2009, Dubai World faced a serious debt 
crisis which dampened its economic atmosphere. Abu Dhabi had to provide Dubai 
World with a rescue package to ease the situation.  
The Philippines 
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The political situation in the Philippines can also be considered as not fully stable. 
In addition to the irregular administration changes on the ground of corruption and 
vote-rigging, the country has also experienced a series of violence caused by 
Islamic communist groups namely Abu Sayyaf- an Islamic militant organization, 
MILF- Moro Islamic Liberation Front, and NPA- New People‘s Army. The nature of 
events caused by these groups can be described a regional, separate, but violent. 
Some events are rooted in the conflicts between Christians and Islamic 
communities.  
Egypt 
During 2007 – 2012, the political unrest in Egypt can be divided into 2 phases. The 
first phase started in 2010 with a series of movements in an attempt to overthrow 
President Hosni Mubarak who was appointed as president of Egypt in 1981. The 
political uprising first took place on January 25, 2011, mainly in the city of Cairo. 
The situation escalated from demonstrations into clashes between security forces 
and protesters resulting in a total of 846 deaths and over 6,000 casualties which 
forced President Mubarak to finally step down on Feb 11, 2011. President Mubarak 
was charged with corruption and sentenced to life imprisonment in June 2012 
(www.bbc.co.uk 2011).  
The second phase of protest started in 2012 with a series of protests against the 
newly elected President Mohammed Morsi. The main event that triggered the 
violence of this phase was President Morsi‘s issuance of a decree that granted his 
government unlimited power. Although the decree was finally withdrawn, the 
political movement has continued. 
The key developments of political situations of each country are presented in table 
5.1 below. 
135 
 
Year Q Thailand Dubai 
The 
Philippines 
Egypt 
2007 
Q
1 
  
Jan - Death of 
Abu Sayyaf 
(Islamic Militant 
Organization) 
leader, 
Khaddafy 
Janjalani 
 
Mar - 
Referendum 
for 
constitutional 
amendments. 
Changes 
approved by 
76% of voters, 
but the result 
is skeptical 
 
Q
2 
  
Apr - UAE 
announces its 
national 
development 
strategy 
Apr - Abu 
Sayyaf 
decapitated 7 
Christian 
hostages 
 
Jun - General 
election. 
Government 
National 
Democratic 
Party (NDP) 
wins most 
votes 
 
Q
3  
Sep - Dubai 
and Qatar 
become the 
two biggest 
shareholders 
of the London 
Stock 
Exchange 
Nov - Rebel 
soldiers fail to 
make coup in 
Peninsular 
Hotel, Manila 
 
Q
4 
 
Dec - General 
Election after 
military power 
seized in Sep 
2006. 
Although 
former PM 
Thaksin is 
ousted, his 
party wins the 
most votes  
      
 
Table 5.1: Key development of political situations 
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Year Q Thailand Dubai 
The 
Philippines 
Egypt 
2008 
 
 
Q
1 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Q
2 
 
  
 
      
Q
3 
Sep - 
Government 
House seized 
by Anti-
Thaksin 
protesters 
(Yellow shirts). 
This marks a 
beginning of 
Anti-Thaksin 
protests 
 
 
Jul - 
Government 
reaches 
agreement with 
Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front 
(MLIF) rebels, 
but deal 
collapses after 
being objected 
to by Christian 
communities. 
This causes a 
new series of 
fighting in the 
southern islands 
 
Q
4 
 
Nov - Airport 
seized by Anti-
Thaksin 
protestors to 
make their 
final battle. 
 
Dec - Court 
disbanding 
Thaksin's party 
for electoral 
fraud. 
Opposition 
leader 
becomes the 
new PM 
  
Dec - New 
People's Army 
(NPA) attacks 
army patrol on 
Mindanao 
  
 
Table 5.1: Key development of political situations (Continued) 
137 
 
Year Q Thailand Dubai 
The 
Philippines 
Egypt 
 
2009 
 
 
 
Q
1 
Mar - Thaksin 
supporters 
holds weekly 
mass protests 
 
Feb- Dubai sold 
$10bn in bonds 
to the UAE to 
ease liquidity 
problem 
  
Feb - Bomb 
attack in 
popular tourist 
area kills 1 
French student 
and injures 24 
people 
Q
2 
Apr - Thaksin 
supporters 
invade Asean 
Summit. 
Clashes 
between 
soldiers and 
protesters 
  
Sep - Army 
captures leading 
MLIF figure 
  
Q
3     
Q
4 
Dec - Thaksin 
supporters 
protest to 
demand for 
new election  
Nov - Dubai 
requests a 
moratorium on 
debt 
repayments. 
Abu Dhabi 
gives Dubai 
$10 bn 
handout 
Nov - Attack on 
Mindanao, 57 
dead 
Dec - Peace talk 
between Manila 
and MLIF 
resumes 
Nov - Row 
between Egypt 
and Algeria 
following 
violence at 
football 
matches 
Dec - Foreign 
activists protest 
in Cairo against 
Egypt's refusal 
to let aid 
convoys into 
Gaza 
 
2010 
Q
1 
 
Feb - Supreme 
court withholds 
half of Thaksin's 
wealth resulting 
in a new round 
of protests. 
Thaksin 
supporters start 
occupying 
central Bangkok  
Jan - Tallest 
building in the 
world opened 
in Dubai 
Feb - Army 
captures Abu 
Sayyaf leader 
Mujibar Alih 
Amon 
 
Table 5.1: Key development of political situations (Continued) 
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Year Q Thailand Dubai 
The 
Philippines 
Egypt 
2010 
Q
2 
May - Clashes 
between 
soldiers and 
protesters 
(Thaksin 
supporters) to 
end the 
protests, death 
toll is 91 
  
Jun - Benigno 
Aquino 
becomes 
president 
  
Q
3    
Nov - Coptic 
Christians 
clash with 
police in Gaza 
over 
construction of 
church 
  Q
4 
  
      
 
2011 
 
 
Q
1   
Feb - Peace 
deal with 
communist NPA 
(New People's 
Army) 
Jan - Bomb at 
church in 
Alexandra, 21 
killed. Anti-
government 
demonstrations 
 
Feb - 
President 
Mubarak steps 
down and 
hands power 
to the army 
council 
Q
2 
      
Apr - President 
Mubarak and 
his sons are 
arrested for 
suspicion of 
corruption. 
Protests 
continue in 
Cairo. Army 
disbands the 
protesters in 
August 
Table 5.1: Key development of political situations (Continued) 
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Year Q Thailand Dubai 
The 
Philippines 
Egypt 
2011 
Q
3 
Jul - General 
election. 
Thaksin's new 
party wins 
most votes. 
Thaksin's 
sister, 
Yingluck 
Shinnawatra, 
becomes the 
new PM 
 
  
Q
4 
Oct - Biggest 
flood in 
Thailand's 
history 
  
Nov- Former 
President Gloria 
Arroyo is 
arrested on 
vote-fraud. She 
denies the 
charge and is 
bailed 
Oct - Clashes 
between 
Coptic 
Christians and 
security force, 
24 killed 
Nov - Violence 
in Cairo. 
Clashes 
between 
protesters and 
security forces. 
PM Essam 
Sharaf resigns 
Dec -National 
unity 
Government 
headed by PM 
Kamal al-
Ganzouri takes 
the office 
2012 
 
 
Q
1     
Q
2 
Jun - Anti-
Thaksin 
protesters rally 
in Bangkok to 
overthrow PM 
Yingluck 
  
May - 
Confrontation 
between the 
Philippines and 
Chinese ships 
on the shoal reef 
which may have 
reserves of oil 
and gas 
May - Military 
leader ends 
the state of 
emergency in 
place since 
1981 
Table 5.1: Key development of political situations (Continued) 
140 
 
Year Q Thailand Dubai 
The 
Philippines 
Egypt 
2012 
Q
2 
    
Jun - 
Presidential 
election. 
Mohammed 
Morsi wins. 
President 
Mubrak is 
sentenced to 
life 
imprisonment 
for killing of 
protesters in 
2011  
Q
3    
Aug - New PM 
appoints 
cabinets. 
Islamist 
fighters kills 16 
soldiers in 
Sinai 
Sep - Egypt 
kills 32 
militants and 
destroys 31 
smuggling 
tunnels in 
Gaza 
Q
4 
    
Oct - Former 
President Gloria 
Arroyo is 
arrested on 
charges of 
plundering state 
funds 
Nov- Protests 
against 
President 
Morsi's decree 
stripping the 
judiciary right 
to challenge 
his decisions. 
Decree 
withdrawn 
Table 5.1: Key development of political situations (Continued) 
Corresponding to the key events shown in Table 5.1, figure 5.1 below shows the 
change in political uncertainty score which is used as a proxy for political 
uncertainty; the higher the score, the higher the instability. Among the four 
countries, UAE –Dubai is the most politically stable. Egypt on the other hand, is 
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fundamentally unstable. The situation was worsened at the beginning of 2011 
when the clash between security forces and Anti-Mubark demonstrators took 
place. The situations in Thailand and the Philippines are quite similar due to the 
fact that both seem to have a few small waves of changes. As for Thailand, the 
score shows the country gradually became more unstable and sharply dropped in 
July 2011 when the general election took place. Unlike Thailand and Egypt, the 
changes in the Philippines seem to be connected with separate terrorists groups 
rather than one major continuous movement.  
Figure 5.1: The level of political uncertainty in each country from Jan 2007 – December 2012 
The next figure (Figure 5.2) shows the relationship between demand uncertainty 
and political uncertainty. The left Y-axis represents scale for demand uncertainty, 
while the right Y-axis represents the scale for Political risk score.  It is noticeable 
that the demand and political uncertainty move in opposite directions. 
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39 The Phillipines
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Figure 5.2: The relationship between demand uncertainty and political uncertainty 
5.4.2 Hotel industry 
In regards to the industry, the hotel industry provides a suitable context to the study 
for at least 4 reasons. First, most hotel operations are standardized which makes 
the data comparable across hotels. Second, tourism entities i.e. hotels, tour 
operators, and travel agencies, operate as an open system and are strongly 
affected by the external environment (Coulter 2002; Jogaratnam and Wong 2009) 
providing a good opportunity to observe the environmental effect. Third, hotels 
usually keep their records using standard software, which provides high quality 
data for longitudinal analysis. Finally, similar to other business-to-business 
companies, it is a general practice in the hotel industry to use multiple forms of 
sales force (concurrent channels) to serve different channels depending on the 
type, size, and amount of service required by those channels. For example, a 
hotel‘s own (direct) sales force is assigned to serve their key account customers 
and the travel agency (indirect or third party sales force) functions as the hotel‘s 
route to market for those individuals who are beyond the access of the hotel‘s own 
sales force. The hotel‘s own sales force allows the hotel to build a relationship with 
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it key account customers who have potential to generate recurring business, while 
the travel agency offers advantages in reaching a wider customer base and in cost 
saving as travel agencies are compensated on commissions tied to sales 
outcomes. Having both direct and indirect sales force reduces the cost of 
bureaucratic monitoring and control (Dutta, et al. 1995).  
Although the study uses the data from a single hotel chain company to assure 
consistency and comparability, this hotel chain company is a good representative 
and would provide an appropriate context for testing the generalizability of the 
findings for the following reasons. First, all of the hotels in this chain, regardless 
whether they are owned or managed by the company, are managed using the 
same standard. Second, data from all hotels are kept using the same method and 
criteria and thus creates consistency across periods as well as consistency 
between hotels and countries. The operations are run according to international 
standards using standard hotel software. Hence, the data between hotels are 
comparable. Third, this hotel chain company is a listed company in Thailand. Its 
financial information must follow International Accounting Standards (IAS) and 
must be audited by an independent Certified Public Accountant (CPA). Thus, it is 
transparent and verified. Fourth, although the focal firm is a Thailand-based 
company, its hotels are situated in 4 different countries with clearly different sets of 
cultural values. The senior executives are both Thai and foreign and are 
experienced individuals who previously worked in many countries. Therefore, their 
views and values are not biased toward any context in particular.  
5.5 Measurement 
5.5.1 Dependent variables 
Degree of vertical integration 
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Governance in this study refers to the shift between direct and indirect channels in 
a plural distribution or concurrent channels context. Concurrent channels refer to 
the use of two or more forms of distribution simultaneously, for example, the use of 
both direct channel (house account) and indirect channel (independent 
manufacturers ‗representatives) to distribute a firm‘s products. Although this 
concurrent channels distribution is a common practice in firms, the empirical TCA 
research on this subject is still limited (Bradach and Eccles 1989) and often treats 
concurrent channels in one of the following ways: discarding the observations with 
plural distributions, changing the unit of analysis to the outlet level, or adopting the 
hybrid form perspective. None of the above explains the simultaneous use of two 
or more forms of distribution (Dutta, et al. 1995). 
The simultaneous deployment of direct and indirect sales forces addressed in this 
study is captured through degree of vertical integration which will be used as a 
dependent variable in model 1 and an independent variable in model 2. The study 
follows Sa Vinhas and Anderson (2005) which defines degree of vertical integration 
as ―the percentage of total sales that customers place directly (without going 
through channel intermediaries) to the manufacturer or to an entity in which the 
manufacturer has majority equity‖ (Sa Vinhas and Anderson 2005, p.511). 
Therefore, the higher the degree of vertical integration, the higher the proportion of 
sales placed through direct channels. Degree of vertical integration is directly 
measured by the actual percentage of total room nights that customers booked 
directly with the hotel (without going through intermediaries i.e. travel agency) by 
the total room nights that the hotel sells each month. 
Performance 
The performance measurement in this study is objective financial measures -sales 
performance which is measured by room revenue (in million baht) or the revenue 
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generated by the room department only (excluding revenue generated by other 
departments such as food and beverage, laundry, etc.). Revenue is the appropriate 
measure for the reasons that it is the direct performance measurement that 
excludes the effect of other factors that are irrelevant to sales effort such as 
depreciation, interest, expenses, efficiency, etc. In addition, high revenue is an 
indicator of a successful business regardless of which strategy the firm has 
pursued (Brouthers 2002). As our concern is whether being more or less integrated 
will yield a superior sales performance in times of uncertainty, only room revenue is 
relevant. Including revenue from other departments is irrelevant and would 
compromise rather than improve our result.  
5.5.2 Independent variables 
Uncertainty  
Based on how uncertainty variables are operationalized in governance and 
hospitality literature (as discussed in chapter 3), the study focuses on uncertainty in 
3 domains of environment: demand, competitive and political. All are objectively 
measured using secondary data.  
Demand and competitive uncertainty are industry-level uncertainty variables that 
capture industry dynamics that our focal firm operates within, while political 
uncertainty reflects the major changes in the general environment, and specifically 
the opportunities and threats related to the changes in the political system—the 
stability/instability of political situation in the country which includes revolution, 
coup d‘état, change of administration, etc. (Miller 1992).  
Demand and competitive uncertainty are usually conceptualized as dynamism, 
which is one of the frequent conceptualizations of uncertainty in literature. 
Dynamism is defined as unexpected change or change that is hard to predict (Dess 
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and Beard 1984) which makes it difficult for firms to anticipate and adjust to these 
changing circumstances (Anderson 1988). Typical measures of dynamism using 
secondary data include the volatility of interest (Boyd 1995; Simerly and Li 2000; 
Harrington 2005). Hence, demand and competitive uncertainty are operationalized 
as the volatility of demand and of the competitive situation, respectively. Political 
uncertainty is measured by the Political Risk Score (PRS), which captures the 
changes in the political situation. This score is well recognized and has been 
included in studies related to political uncertainty (cf.Knack and Keefer 1995; 
Enders, Sandler and Parise 1992; Heinz 2000; Olson, Sarna and Swamy 2000). 
The following sections will discuss in detail the measurement of each uncertainty 
variable. 
Demand uncertainty 
Demand in this study refers to ―tourism demand which can be measured from 
number of tourists or receipts from tourism‖ (Neumayer 2004, p.267). However, the 
study prefers number of tourists to tourism receipts, as tourism receipts are 
typically taken from the balance-of-payment statistics, which are known to be 
inaccurate (Sinclair 1998) and varied according to other economic factors. 
In transforming the ―demand‖ data into ―demand uncertainty‖, the study 
conceptualizes uncertainty as dynamism and follows the widely-implemented 
secondary measure (cf.Dess and Beard 1984; Boyd 1995; Simerly and Li, 2000; 
Harrington and Kenadall 2005) by using the standardized measures of the volatility 
of the demand over five preceding periods. This is done by regressing the current 
number of tourist arrivals in each country on its average of 5 preceding months 
(this is a rolling window) and using the standard error as a measure of demand 
uncertainty. A 5-month period is used because it reflects recent conditions of 
volatility in the industry, which is suitable for the hotel industry as the players can 
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adjust to changing circumstances fairly quickly. Therefore, demand uncertainty is 
the standard errors of volatility of demand over five preceding months. 
Competitive uncertainty 
―Competitive uncertainty is a broad category covering the uncertainty assoicated 
with the rivalry among exsitng firms and potential entrants into the industry‖ (Miller 
1992, p317) which covers the inability to predict amount of goods in the market, the 
intensity of the competition, and innovations.  
In the context of our study, the most appropriate conceptualization of competitive 
uncertainty is the uncertainty relating to competitve intensity. ―Competitive intensity 
is defined as the degree of competition that our focal firm is facing‖ (Grewal and 
Tansuhaj 2001, p.71). In this context, hotels measure competitive intensity by 
using an ―occupancy index‖, which is the ratio of the focal firm‘s relative 
performance to that of their competitive set, and is used as one of the 
management‘s key performance indicators (KPI). The index is calculated by using 
average occupancy rate (in percent) of the hotel‘s competitive set, normally 3 - 5 
hotels of the same standards in similar locations, and dividing it by our focal hotel‘s 
occupancy rate. The higher the index, the better the direct competitors perform 
relative to our firm.  
As the study focuses on the unpredictability aspect of uncertainty, competitive 
uncertainty is conceptualized as the volatility of competitive intensity. Similar to the 
operationalization of demand uncertainty, the study converted competitive intensity 
information into competitive uncertainty by regressing current competitive intensity 
on its average of 5 preceding months and using the standard error as a measure of 
competitive uncertainty. Therefore, demand uncertainty is the standard errors of 
volatility of occupancy index over five preceding months. 
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Political uncertainty  
This variable measures the stability in the political environment. Political 
uncertainty refers to instability in general political situations that impact the firms 
and includes both uncertainties in the political situation and policy changes, as 
changes in policy can be impactful to business even though the political situation is 
stable (Miller 1992). The construct represents overall political events that may have 
major impacts on other constructs. Exploring the literature, there are 3 common 
secondary measures for political risks: risk rating/institutional indices, dummy 
variable, and event counting. The study decided to rule out the third option, event 
counting, as it does not reflect the intensity or the true instability in the political 
environment. Most of the time, it only considers non-constitutional political events, 
i.e. revolutions, or recognizes newsworthy incidents, therefore, it is not without bias 
and could be misleading (Knack and Keefer 1995; Enders and Sandler 2000). The 
study is left with two options, dummy variable and risk rating. We choose risk rating 
as the preferred measure for the reason that it allows us to study the different 
degree of uncertainty. While the dummy variable also captures the uncertainty, its 
result is only binary. Therefore, using the continuous scales such as risk rating or 
risk score should provide a better reflection of the political events.  
The study follows the World Bank‘s political risk rating score, which comprises the 
score from 6 rating agencies, also known as institutional indicators. However, an 
institutional indicator is only available for an annual interval. Therefore, the study 
looks into the score of each of the 6 rating agencies. Four of them are only 
available at annual intervals. The two that are available in monthly format are the 
Beri Index and Political Risk Score. However, the Beri Index does not provide a 
score for the United Arab Emirates where two of our hotels are located. The 
Political Risk Score is the only risk rating score that is available in monthly format 
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and covers all the countries under investigation. Due to this limitation, the study 
adopts the Political Risk Score (PRS) as our political uncertainty measurement. 
PRS is a part of International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) created in 1980 
(www.prsgroup.com). The aim of the political risk rating is to provide a means of 
assigning risk points to a preset group of factors, termed political risk components. 
Prior studies have indicated that ―this measure is reassuringly correlated with other 
measures of the quality of governance and also is related to both economic 
outcomes and political regime‖ (Olson, Sarna, Swamy 2000, p.344). Knack and 
Keefer (1995) assessed the explanatory power of ICRG/Beri indices relative to the 
traditional political violence indicators. The result shows that in all cases the 
economic impact of the ICRG score is significant and greater than that of political 
violence indicators (Knack and Keefer 1995, p.15). Henisz (2000) uses this score 
as a measurement for political hazard in his study on how institution environment 
affects the mode of entry in a foreign market. Olson, Sarna, Swamy (2000) uses 
this score to compare the productivity growth among countries. The above reasons 
support our belief that this score would be a good measurement for the political 
uncertainty variable. 
As PRS represents political stability, the study inverted this score into political 
uncertainty by using 100 – PRS. For example, if the PRS for period 1 is 55 and this 
represents the level of political stability, the different between the maximum score 
(100) and 55 is the level of political uncertainty. Therefore, political uncertainty for 
period 1 is 100 – 55 = 45. Due to the transformation, interpretation is facilitated as 
the higher the score, the higher the level of uncertainty. 
Instrumental variable 
Percentage of F&B revenue 
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The study uses the percentage of food and beverage revenue to total revenue (FB 
revenue) as the instrument variable for degree of vertical integration in the first 
stage of model 2. This is our preferred instrument variable based on the 
assumption that guests who booked directly with the hotel tend to dine in the hotel 
more than guests who booked as a package through a travel agency. For example, 
leisure guests who booked with a package tour tend to have other activities outside 
the hotel as part of their package while business guests tend to organize corporate 
functions within the hotel. This makes the proportion of revenue from food and 
beverage revenue vary according to the degree of vertical integration, the 
proportion of guests who book directly with the hotel sales force, which makes it a 
good instrumental variable. This rationale is supported by Novak and Stern (2008) 
which ―employs instruments correlated with vertical integration for a given system 
but exogenous to the performance of that system (p.1965). In this case, the 
performance of FB revenue is related to the overall performance of the hotel but 
exogenous to the dependent variable, the performance of the room department. 
This variable is measured by the percentage of revenue generated by the food and 
beverage department by total revenue in each month. 
Control variables 
Average room rate 
The study uses average room rate as a firm-level control variable to remove the 
effect of price, which is typically a key variable in explaining performance. The 
average room rate is calculated by using the hotel‘s room revenue divided by total 
occupied room nights in each monthly period.  
Gross domestic product 
Gross domestic product (GDP) is an indicator of the overall economic health of the 
country which reflects the overall standard of living. The study uses real GDP (in 
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billion baht) because it measures the real changes in the economy without 
factoring in the inflation.  
5.6 Characteristics of the sample 
The sample used in this study is monthly financial data covering the span of 5 
years from January 2007 to December 2012 (72-monthly periods) of 16 hotels in 4 
countries, 11 in Thailand, 3 in Dubai, 1 in the Philippines, and 1 in Egypt, which are 
owned and managed by the focal firm. In principle, there should be a total of 72 
periods x 16 hotels = 1,152 observations. However, only 11 out of 16 hotels were 
in operation over the entire 72 operating periods, which reduced the number of 
observations to 996. In addition, certain values are missing for some hotels. 
Accounting for these incomplete observations, the study is left with 815 
observations for the empirical analysis. Table 5.2 presents the number of usable 
observations by hotels. The differences in number of observations between hotels, 
even though they share similar operating periods, are due to missing values. 
Hotel Country 
Operating 
Periods 
Date of 
Observations 
Missing 
Values 
Number of 
Observations 
1 Thailand 72 Jan 2007 - Dec 2012 24 48 
2 Thailand 72 Jan 2007 - Dec 2012 6 66 
3 Thailand 72 Jan 2007 - Dec 2012 29 43 
4 Thailand 72 Jan 2007 - Dec 2012 5 67 
5 Thailand 72 Jan 2007 - Dec 2012 5 67 
6 Thailand 42 Jan 2008 - Nov 2011 13 29 
7 Thailand 48 Jan 2009 - Dec 2012 5 43 
8 Thailand 72 Jan 2007 - Dec 2012 5 67 
9 Thailand 72 Jan 2007 - Dec 2012 5 67 
10 Thailand 72 Jan 2007 - Dec 2012 24 48 
11 Thailand 72 Jan 2007 - Dec 2012 5 67 
12 UAE - Dubai 72 Jan 2007 - Dec 2012 11 61 
13 UAE - Dubai 18 Jan 2010 - Jul 2011 5 13 
14 UAE - Dubai 60 Jan 2008 - Dec 2012 29 31 
15 The Philippines 72 Jan 2007 - Dec 2012 5 67 
16 Egypt 36 Jan 2010 - Dec 2011 5 31 
Total   996   181 815 
Table 5.2: Number of observations  
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Table 5.3 shows the summary of descriptive statistics which includes number of 
observations, mean values, standard deviation, minimum and maximum of the 
variables in the sample. The two dependent variables are room revenue and 
degree of vertical integration. Demand, competitive, and political uncertainty are 
the three independent variables. Control variables include average room rate and 
Gross Domestic Products. Percent of FB Revenue is included as the instrumental 
variable. The next sub-sections discuss the diagnostics performed prior to our 
estimations, which are used for the detection of outliers in sub-section 5.5.1 and 
stationary tests in sub-section 5.5.2. 
 
  
  
 
Variable 
 
 
Obs 
 
 
Mean 
 
 
Std. Dev. 
 
 
Min 
 
 
Max 
 
1 Room Revenue (million baht) 932 13.68 16.30 0.33 78.26 
2 Degree of Vertical Integration 958 0.57 0.20 0.04 1.00 
3 Demand Uncertainty 1036 3.85 2.93 0.09 10.74 
4 Competitive Uncertainty 829 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.12 
5 Political Uncertainty 1152 38.46 8.50 20.00 51.00 
6 Average Room Rate  931 2368.66 1656.82 233.88 11008.00 
7 
Gross Domestic Products  
(billion baht) 1128 311.32 19.29 65.30 568.52 
8 Percent of FB Revenue 950 0.35 0.10 0.12 0.66 
Table 5.3: Descriptive statistics among variables  
Table 5.4 below presents the correlations among variables. Correlations that 
exceed |.07| are significant at p < .05, two-sided and correlations that exceed |.06| 
are significant at p < .05, one-sided. The strongest correlation is between the 
Average Room Rate and Room Revenue. The marked medium correlation 
includes the relationship between Demand Uncertainty and Room Revenue (0.36), 
percentage of FB Revenue and Degree of Vertical Integration (0.38), Demand and 
Political Uncertainty (0.33), and Political Uncertainty and percentage of F&B 
Revenue (0.38).  
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Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Room Revenue (million baht) 1.00        
2 Degree of Vertical Integration -0.16 1.00             
3 Demand Uncertainty 0.37 0.12 1.00      
4 Competitive Uncertainty -0.08 0.27 0.05 1.00         
5 Political Uncertainty 0.05 0.09 -0.33 0.16 1.00    
6 Average Room Rate 0.79 -0.31 0.12 -0.10 0.25 1.00     
7 
Gross Domestic Products  
(billion baht) 0.13 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 0.01 0.10 1.00  
8 Percent of F&B Revenue -0.05 0.38 -0.17 0.28 0.39 -0.22 -0.01 1.00 
Table 5.4: Correlation matrix among variables  
5.6.1 Outliers 
Several diagnostics are performed to ensure that each of the variables does not 
possess any property that will cause the estimation result to be inefficient and 
biased. First, inspections for possible outliers for each variable are done 
graphically and numerically both before (variables inspection), through listing out 
the extremes value of each variable, and after model estimations (residuals 
inspection). The study detected a few outliers but did not remove the observations 
that contain those outliers for the following two reasons. First, these outliers are not 
the result of incorrect entries. Second, and related, these outliers are not random 
(Woolridge 2006, p.328). These outliers represent the phenomenon that this study 
aims to investigate. All of the outliers are in Egypt, where there were extreme 
political outrages. Including these outlying observations will increase variation in 
the explanatory variables (Woolridge 2006, p.328). In sum, these outlying 
observations are crucial in providing valuable information, and by including them, 
the true nature of the phenomenon will be better reflected rather than distorted. 
However, the models were run both with and without outliers and no statistical 
differences were found. 
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5.6.2 Stationary test 
The second diagnostic is stationary test. As panel data sets are time series or ―a 
sequence of random variables indexed by time‖, it is common practice to test for 
unit roots in panel data (Maddala 1999; Woolridge 2006, p.343). Stationary or unit 
roots tests are performed for each variable to ensure that its property does not 
violate the stationary concept.  
Stationary or unit roots play an important role in the analysis of time-series. A 
stationary process means the probability distribution of that variable is stable over 
time. This means any set of values (or ensemble) will have the same joint 
distribution as any other set of values measured at a different point in time. The 
mean and variance will have to be identically distributed or constant over time 
which is often not the case for financial time series data such as GDP or Inflation. 
Any process exhibiting a drift or trend will fail to meet that requirement in that its 
mean and variance are changing over time are said to be non-stationary. The 
consequences non-stationary data is that the result might be spurious and 
inconsistent which violates the OLS assumption (Woolridge 2006, p.381). 
Therefore, the Phillips-Perron Unit-root test which is used to inspect the stationary 
property of the data is employed to inspect each variable. This Phillips-Perron Unit-
root test uses Newey-West (1987) standard errors that account for both 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, which makes it a proper test for panel 
data setting. To properly perform this test, one of the requirements is that the 
number of lags for calculating standard errors must be specified. The study follows 
the default calculation by Newey and West‘s (1994) plug-in estimator which is a 
―procedure that delivers the optimum number of lags according to an asymptotic 
mean squared error criterion‖ (Hoechle 2007, p.289). The plug-in procedure states 
that lag length is equal to the round up integer of {4(T/100)2/9} lags, where T is the 
time dimension. When applying the formula to the values from the study, the lag 
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length is equal to the roundup of integer of 4(72/100)2/9} = 3.71, which is 4. 
Therefore, 4-lag is specified in calculating the standard errors in this study 
(www.stata.com/manuals13/tspperron). Table 5.4 reports the result for 3 tests 
performed by the Phillips-Perron Unit root test 1) inverse normal (Z) statistics, 2) 
invesre chi-squared (P), and 3) invest logit (L). The Null hypothesis of all three 
tests is that all the panels contains unit root. 
  
  
  
  
Variable 
 
  
 
Inverse Normal 
Z 
 
Inverse 
Chi-squared 
P 
Inverse Logit 
L 
  Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Statistic p-value 
1 Room Revenue (million baht) -9.84 0.00 184.96 0.00 -9.84 0.00 
2 Degree of Vertical Integration -8.95 0.00 155.08 0.00 -10.61 0.00 
3 Demand Uncertainty -2.13 0.01 54.36 0.00 -2.07 0.02 
4 Competitive Uncertainty -13.58 0.00 275.25 0.00 -19.07 0.00 
5 Political Uncertainty -4.83 0.00 80.32 0.00 -4.85 0.00 
6 Average Room Rate -9.12 0.00 158.16 0.00 -10.80 0.00 
7 
Gross Domestic Products 
(billion baht)  0.78 0.78 21.04 0.93 0.67 0.75 
8 Percent of FB Revenue -17.69 0.00 429.38 0.00 -30.71 0.00 
Table 5.5: Unit root test result 
The three statistics reported by Phillips-Perron Unit-root are consistent and show 
that Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the only variable that contains unit roots. 
This is not unexpected since economic data such as GDP is known to be non-
stationary. Therefore, GDP is transformed using first differences as suggested by 
Wooldridge (2006), page 397. The transformed GDP variable is stationary 
following a repeat of the Phillips-Perron Unit-root test that has just been described.  
5.7 Estimation method 
Our 13 hypotheses which represented two key relationships, the impact of 
uncertainty on governance and the impact of governance on the relationship 
between uncertainty and performance, will be tested in two econometric models. 
Model 1 tests the relationship between uncertainty and governance while model 2 
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focuses on the uncertainty-governance-performance relationship. The in-depth 
discussion about each model will be included in section 5.8.  
The results from previous estimations (to be discussed in section 5.9) show that 
the residuals of our analysis were heteroskedastic and autocorrelated. It is known 
that OLS standard errors are correct only when the residuals are independent and 
identically distributed. However, when the residuals are correlated across 
observations, OLS standard errors can be biased and either over or under estimate 
the true variability of the coefficient estimates. Standard errors must be adjusted to 
deal with these biases. Therefore, the Newey-West (1987) standard error which 
produces standard errors that are robust to both heteroskedasticity and auto 
correlations is employed to correct for the biases in both models.  
The Newey-West (1987) standard error is an extension of Huber/White/sandwich 
robust variance estimator which produces consistent standard errors for OLS 
regression coefficient estimates in the presence of heteroskedasticity only. Newey-
West standard errors assume that the error terms is heteroskedastic 
autocorrelated for a certain period of time (StataCorp 2013). Therefore, a number 
of lag must be specified. The study follows a rule of thumb for chosen number of 
lag from Stock and Watson (2007, p.607) which is ―number of lag = {0.75*n1/3}, 
where n is the number of observations used in the regression‖. When applying the 
formula to the values from the study, which are 815 for model 1 and 784 for model 
2, the results are 7.00 for model 1 and 6.91 for model 2 which can be rounded to 7. 
Therefore, 7-lag is specified for all models.  
For our first model which corresponds to hypotheses 1-5, an OLS estimator using 
New-West (1987) standard error is used as the estimator for the relationship 
between governance and three types of uncertainty. As for model 2, which focuses 
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on the relationship between governance, uncertainty, and performance, attention is 
paid to the interdependency between governance and performance which will 
introduce the possibility of endogeneity. ―Endogeneity is one of the major 
complications in econometrics and will result in a biased OLS coefficient‖ 
(Cameron and Trivedi 2005, p.35). Endogeneity exists when the changes in 
endogenous variable x are associated not only with the changes in exogenous 
variable y, but also with changes in the error terms u. This issue may rise from the 
problem of time-varying omitted variables which cannot be solved with a panel data 
method, measurement error and simultaneity (Woolridge 2006, p.510). In the 
context of this study, we are interested in seeing the effect of the change of 
governance on the change of performance. However, it is likely that what drives 
the change in performance might be another omitted variable in error terms which 
will cause the result to be biased.  
In summary, endogeneity is unlikely to be an issue in model 1 as it is a single 
equation in which the independent variables are completely exogenous. However, 
model 2 involves simultaneity of two equations as we are interested in how the 
selected choice of governance will affect subsequent performance. As endogeneity 
is likely to be an issue in model 2, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) Test for 
endogeneity was conducted in preliminary models (to be discussed in section 5.9). 
The test rejected the null hypothesis that OLS was consistent (p=0.0296), 
indicating that endogeneity is likely to exist. Hence, this study employs an 
Instrumental Variables (IV) Estimator using a Two-Stage Least Squares model 
(2SLS) as the second econometric model to test hypotheses 6-13 in order to 
correct for endogeneity. 
The IV Estimator is a remedy to the inconsistency of the OLS estimator caused 
from an endogenous explanatory variable. The IV estimator introduces an 
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instrumental variable z that is exogenous in the equation; this variable z associates 
with the change in x but not the change in y (Cameron and Trivedi 2005, p.37). The 
2SLS estimator is a type of IV estimator that delivers its result in two consecutive 
OLS regressions. The first stage regresses x on z to get the predicted value of x. 
Therefore, the first stage purges the correlation of x and the error terms u before 
running the second stage. The second stage regresses y on the predicted value of 
x which gives the result of the 2SLS estimator (Cameron and Trivedi 2005, p.42; 
Woolridge 2006, p.526). 
Besides the main effect of three uncertainty variables, the independent variables in 
both models also include pairwise product terms among uncertainty variables. For 
interpretation purposes, all the independent variables are mean-centered. The 
interaction terms are created after the mean centering process (Jaccard and Turrisi 
2003).  
Both country and firm control variables are included in both models. These control 
variables are chosen from theoretical and statistical approaches. For country level, 
the study considered the major key economic indicators and then used stepwise 
regression to select the ones that are significant. First, a number of volatility 
measurements; Consumer Price Index, Consumer Confidence Index, Inflation, 
Foreign Direct Investment, Stock Market Variance, and Gross Domestic Product, 
were loaded into the models to establish that the overall economic conditions are 
controlled for, ensuring that the changes in the dependent variables of both models 
are truly from the effect of explanatory variables. The study excluded a few 
variables namely Consumer Price Index, Consumer Confidence Index, and Foreign 
Direct Investment that are redundant or had a lot of missing values. In a final model, 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is chosen as the country level control variable for 
two reasons. First, it is one of the most fundamental indicators for the overall 
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economy of any country. Second, as the consequence of GDP being the most 
fundamental indicator, its information is available for all countries. 
At the firm level, the variables that can influence degree of vertical integration and 
performance include marketing expenditures and average room rate. However, 
these two variables are highly correlated with each other (r=0.61) which can induce 
collinearity4. The study finally selected ―average room rate‖ as the firm level control 
variable as it is the key factor that could influence performance outcome; thus, this 
variable could potentially mask the true impact of uncertainty.  
5.8 Model specification 
5.8.1 Model 1: The relationship between uncertainty and governance 
The specification for model 1 is presented in equation 1 below. The dependent 
variable in this model (degree of vertical integration) captures how the focal firm 
shifts its degree of vertical integration in response to uncertainty. The model is 
displayed below in equation 5.1. 
 
Degree of vertical integrationit = β0+ β1 Demand uncertaintyit 
+ β2 Competitive uncertaintyit 
+ β3 Political uncertaintyit 
+ β4 Demand uncertaintyit x Competitive uncertaintyit 
+ β5 Demand uncertaintyit x Political uncertaintyit 
+ β6 Competitive uncertaintyit x Political uncertaintyit 
+ β7 Gross domestic productsit 
+ β8 Average room rateit +eit                   (Equation 5.1) 
 
                                                          
4
 Equation 5.1 is re-estimated using marketing expenditure as a control variable instead of average 
room rate. All of the results are identical in both significance level and direction of the relationship. 
However, the F-value of the model estimated with marketing expenditures is lower than that of average 
room rate.  
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5.8.2 Model 2: The effect of governance on the relationship between uncertainty 
and performance  
The second model estimates the moderating effect of the degree of vertical 
integration on the relationship between uncertainty and performance (H6 – H13). To 
correct for the potential issue of endogeneity, as the degree of vertical integration 
is endogenous to the changes in uncertainty, and due to the potential 
interdependency between the degree of vertical integration and performance, 
2SLS is employed as our choice of estimation. For both theoretical and model 
specification consistency, the study maintains the same set of independent 
variables from model 1 in this model.  
The first stage of the 2SLS estimation (equation 2-1 presented below) estimates 
the relationship between uncertainty and the degree of vertical integration. The 
proportion of Food and Beverage Revenue to Total Revenue (FB Revenue) is 
added as the instrument variable. As shown in table 5.3, the correlation among FB, 
Room Revenue, and Degree of Vertical Integration confirms our assumption. FB 
Revenue is 38% correlated with Degree of Vertical Integration and only negative 5% 
related to room revenue, which confirms that FB Revenue is a proper instrument 
for the study. Equation 5.2-1 below presents the specification for the first stage of 
the 2SLS model:  
 Degree of Vertical Integrationit = β0+ β1 Demand uncertaintyit 
+ β2 Competitive uncertaintyit 
+ β3 Political uncertaintyit 
+ β4 Demand uncertaintyit x Competitive uncertaintyit 
+ β5 Demand uncertaintyit x Political uncertaintyit 
+ β6 Competitive uncertaintyit x Political uncertaintyit 
+ β7 FB revenueit 
+ β8 Gross domestic productsit 
+ β9 Average room rateit +eit       (Equation 5.2-1) 
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Derived from equation 5.2-1 is the predicted value of the degree of vertical 
integration which is the predicted value of the firm‘s governance in the presence of 
uncertainty. This predicted degree of vertical integration is included in the second 
stage to estimate the relationship between uncertainty and performance. The 
predicted degree of vertical integration (mean-centered) is interacted with each of 
the uncertainty variables to see if it can moderate the relationship between 
uncertainty and performance and to which direction. Below is the specification for 
the second stage of the 2SLS model (equation 5.2-2): 
Room revenueit  = β0+ β1 Predicted degree of vertical integrationit 
+ β2 Demand uncertaintyit 
+ β3 Competitive uncertaintyit 
+ β4 Political uncertaintyit 
+ β5 Demand uncertaintyit x Competitive uncertaintyit 
+ β6 Demand uncertaintyit x Political uncertaintyit 
+ β7 Competitive uncertaintyit x Political uncertaintyit 
+ β8 Predicted degree of vertical integrationit x Demand uncertaintyit 
+ β9 Predicted degree of vertical integrationit x Competitive uncertaintyit 
+ β10 Predicted degree of vertical integrationit x Political uncertaintyit 
+ β11 Gross domestic productsit 
+ β12 Average room rateit +eit     (Equation 5.2-2) 
  
5.9 Robustness test 
Variations of model estimations that are not presented here were performed to 
ensure that the final estimation does not violate any OLS assumption and is the 
Best Linear Unbiased Estimation (BLUE). As discussed in section 5.5, all the 
variables were inspected for the property that might violate the OLS assumptions. 
Once there was no issue with any of the variables, the study conducted the 
empirical analysis with the preferred choice of estimation and conducted post 
estimation analysis to ascertain that error terms did not violate any OLS 
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assumptions. If the violations were identified, the study would correct for each of 
the violations until it was established that the choice of estimation and model 
specification produced the result that would not compromise the findings and would 
answer the central research questions. The following presents the key steps in 
deriving the choice of estimation for this study. 
The first preferred choice of estimation is the panel estimation using a fixed effect 
model since it has unique properties that control for idiosyncratic effects of 
individual hotels (such as superior management) that are time-invariant (Allison 
2009). Therefore, it is well suited to capture the ―pure‖ channel effect of vertical 
integration on performance, which improves the estimation and test hypotheses 
that are impossible to study in cross-sectional design (Macher and Richman 2008). 
Two models were developed to answer the research question. The first model 
estimated the relationship between uncertainty and the degree of vertical 
integration. The second model estimated the moderating effect of the degree of 
vertical integration on the relationship between uncertainty and performance.  
A fixed effect model used our preferred control variables which included Consumer 
Price Index, Consumer Confidence Index, Inflations, Foreign Direct Investment, 
Stock Market Variance, Gross Domestics Product, to control for the overall 
economic condition. Next, stepwise regression was brought in to select the control 
variables that were significant. A few variables, namely Consumer Price Index, 
Consumer Confidence Index, and Foreign Direct Investment had to be excluded 
from the model for the reason that they were highly correlated or had a lot of 
missing values. As discussed in section 5.3, after a careful inspection, only GDP 
was included in the final model for the reason that it is one of the most fundamental 
indicators for the overall economy of any country. For firm level control variables, 
the preference was to control for both the hotel‘s marketing expense and average 
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room rate. The rationale for including the hotel‘s marketing expense was that, as 
with the average room rate, the higher marketing expense tended to result in a 
higher performance. However, the hotel‘s marketing expense and average room 
rate are highly correlated. As average room rate is the obvious factor that can drive 
the performance, it was selected as the firm level control variable. 
The next consideration was whether or not lagged effect needed to be included. 
Although some may view that there might be a lagged effect on the relationship 
between political uncertainty and performance, the study did not include the lagged 
effect based on our knowledge that a cancellation was normally not done until 48 
hours prior to check-in. Therefore, the cancellation would be done only if the 
political uncertainty was still present during the very same period. This assumption 
is in accordance with an adaptive expectation model by Harvey (1990) which 
states that ―an event of violence is likely to deter tourism most in the period of 
occurrence and less over time because the media report less and less about it‖ 
(Neumayer 2004, p.266).  
Up to this point, the study was able to finalize our model specification by 
establishing that fixed effect estimation was the preferred estimation method, GDP 
and Average Room Rate were the choice of control variables, and lagged effect 
would not be included into the model. The next step was to test if this preferred 
model was indeed the most appropriate. As control variables were carefully 
selected and the decision not to include lagged was clearly made, attention was 
next paid to the choice of estimation.  
Post-estimation tests were conducted to detect for potential issues of 
multicollinearity, heteroskedasticity, and autocorrelation. The result showed that 
the residuals were autocorrelated, heteroskedastic and not normally distributed. 
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Therefore, the models were run again using robust standard errors to control for 
those issues. The Variance Inflation Factor was used to test for multicollinearity. 
The result showed that the none of the variables had a VIF value higher than the 
threshold value of 10 suggested by Hair et al. (2006, p.230).  Therefore, 
multicollinearity was not an issue. However, the issue of autocorrelation remains 
since robust standard errors only correct for heteroskedasticity.  
Given the concern in the issue of autocorrelation, other panel estimators that can 
potentially correct for autocorrelation issue were considered. The panel estimator 
that seems to fit with our dataset is the Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) 
which is suitable with panel data that has a smaller time dimension (T) than its 
cross-sectional dimension (N) and is feasible in the presence of autocorrelation 
and heteroskedasticity (Hoechle 2007). However, the autocorrelation specified in 
FGLS is only restricted for the maximum of 1 period for an autoregressive (AR) 
model or the model in which the independent variables include a lagged dependent 
variable. In addition, the standard errors from FGLS are likely to be optimistic 
(Hoechle 2007)5. Hence, the result from FGLS might still be biased and cannot 
remedy the autocorrelation issue. The choices of estimators are then expanded 
beyond the scope of panel estimators to consider other models that can handle 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. Finally, an OLS estimator with Newey-West 
standard errors which are robust to the disturbances being heteroskedastic and 
autocorrelated was chosen as it provides a more flexible remedy both to 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation for a panel dataset. The post-estimations 
process for multicollinearity was repeated and the VIF showed that multicollinearity 
was not an issue. 
                                                          
5 
Arrellano and Bond‘s (1991) consistent generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator which is a type of panel 
estimators that can produce robust standard errors for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelations was also reviewed. 
However, this estimator is suitable for datasets with N >T which is the opposite case of our dataset.  
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Once the model specification and choice of estimation were confirmed, the study 
also tested if the effect of degree of vertical integration was non-linear by adding its 
squared terms and its interaction terms with each of the three uncertainty variables. 
The relationship between the squared terms and dependent variables were all 
insignificant, suggesting no presence of non-linear effect. Lastly, the study also 
considered a three-way effect between degree of vertical integration and two types 
of uncertainty variables, but the results were also insignificant. 
The final diagnostic focused on the issue of endogeneity. The study performed the 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman for endogeneity. The study viewed that endogeneity might be 
an issue as there might be an interdependency between the degree of vertical 
integration and performance. The test rejected the null hypothesis that OLS was 
consistent (p = 0.0296); hence, endogeneity is likely to exist. The study 
approached the endogeneity issue by using both the Control Function (CF) 
Approach (Petrin and Train 2010) and 2SLS. The results from both models were 
consistent. Finally, the study decided to use the 2SLS model as our choice of 
estimation for the reason that CF approaches required extra assumptions not 
imposed by the 2SLS approach. The result from the CF approach can be less 
robust and inconsistent where the result from 2SLS is consistent (Woolridge 2006). 
The 2SLS has a clear method of controlling for endogeneity and serves the study‘s 
objective which is to extend the investigation on uncertainty-performance linkage – 
if the firm‘s preferred choices of governance will indeed lead to superior 
performance.  
5.10 Summary 
In this chapter, philosophical view, research design, method, and measurement are 
discussed. The beginning of the chapter presents the rationale why realism is 
selected as the philosophical world view. The next section focuses on our research 
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which is longitudinal using secondary panel data. The advantages and 
disadvantages of using this design are discussed. Then, the context of this study is 
presented, especially the overall political conditions in each country as well as the 
justification for using data from a single hotel chain. Following the research context 
are the characteristics of the sample which includes the number of observations 
and variable diagnostics. The rest of the chapter emphasizes subjects that relate to 
estimation method and econometric models. As our choice of estimation is 
challenged with the issues of heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation, and endogeneity, 
two-Stage Least Square estimation with Newey-west standard error is employed to 
correct for those issues. The last section of this chapter provides various tests that 
were conducted prior to the final models. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
RESULTS 
 
6.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents the findings of the analysis of the samples. The 
measurements of each construct as well as the rationale behind the selected 
estimation technique that were discussed in the previous chapters (Chapter 5) are 
summarized in section 6.2. Section 6.3 restates the hypotheses. Next, section 6.4 
presents the results from the hypotheses testing. The results for H1 to H5 which 
explore the relationship between uncertainty and governance are presented in 
section 6.4.1. Section 6.4.2 shows the results for H6 – H10 which investigate the 
relationship between uncertainty and performance. Section 6.4.3 focuses on the 
estimation result for the moderating impact of governance on the relationship 
between uncertainty and performance. Section 6.5 presents the result summary 
table. Finally, section 6.6 summarizes and concludes this chapter. 
6.2 Research method 
This section provides a brief summary of the research method discussed in 
Chapter 5. The two relationships of interest in this study, the impact of uncertainty 
on governance and the impact of governance on the relationship between 
uncertainty and performance, are investigated using longitudinal secondary panel 
data which covers 72 monthly periods (January 2007- December 2012) from a 
hotel company which operates 16 hotels in 4 countries – Thailand, The Philippines, 
United Arab Emirates, and Egypt. Two econometric models are employed to test 
13 hypotheses. The first model which focuses on the relationship between 
uncertainty and performance is an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator. The 
second model which focuses on the impact of governance on the relationship 
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between uncertainty and performance is estimated with an Instrumental Variables 
(IV) Estimator using Two-Stage Least Squares. Both models use Newey-West 
standard errors as it is the standard errors that are robust to the residuals being 
heteroskedastic and autocorrelated. The specifications for each model are 
presented below:  
Model 1: The relationship between uncertainty and governance 
 
Degree of vertical integrationit = β0+ β1 Demand uncertaintyit 
+ β2 Competitive uncertaintyit 
+ β3 Political uncertaintyit 
+ β4 Demand uncertaintyit x Competitive uncertaintyit 
+ β5 Demand uncertaintyit x Political uncertaintyit 
+ β6 Competitive uncertaintyit x Political uncertaintyit 
+ β7 Gross domestic productsit 
+ β8 Average room rateit +eit                   (Equation 5.1) 
 
Model 2: The effect of governance on the relationship between uncertainty and 
performance  
Equation 5.2-1 below presents the specification for first stage of 2SLS model:  
Degree of Vertical Integrationit = β0+ β1 Demand uncertaintyit 
+ β2 Competitive uncertaintyit 
+ β3 Political uncertaintyit 
+ β4 Demand uncertaintyit x Competitive uncertaintyit 
+ β5 Demand uncertaintyit x Political uncertaintyit 
+ β6 Competitive uncertaintyit x Political uncertaintyit 
+ β7 FB revenueit 
+ β8 Gross domestic productsit 
+ β9 Average room rateit +eit       (Equation 5.2-1) 
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Below is the specification for the second stage of 2SLS model (equation 5.2-2): 
Room revenueit  = β0+ β1 Predicted degree of vertical integrationit 
+ β2 Demand uncertaintyit 
+ β3 Competitive uncertaintyit 
+ β4 Political uncertaintyit 
+ β5 Demand uncertaintyit x Competitive uncertaintyit 
+ β6 Demand uncertaintyit x Political uncertaintyit 
+ β7 Competitive uncertaintyit x Political uncertaintyit 
+ β8 Predicted degree of vertical integrationit x Demand uncertaintyit 
+ β9 Predicted degree of vertical integrationit x Competitive uncertaintyit 
+ β10 Predicted degree of vertical integrationit x Political uncertaintyit 
+ β11 Gross domestic productsit 
+ β12 Average room rateit +eit     (Equation 5.2-2) 
 
6.3 Hypotheses 
The 13 testing hypotheses are 
The impact of uncertainty on governance 
H1: The higher the demand uncertainty, the higher the degree of vertical 
integration, ceteris paribus. 
H2: The higher the competitive uncertainty, the higher the degree of vertical 
integration, ceteris paribus. 
H3: The higher the political uncertainty, the lower the degree of vertical integration, 
ceteris paribus. 
H4: The higher the political uncertainty, the weaker the positive effect (less positive) 
of demand uncertainty on degree of vertical integration, ceteris paribus. 
H5: The higher the political uncertainty, the weaker the positive effect (less positive) 
of competitive uncertainty on degree of vertical integration, ceteris paribus. 
The impact of uncertainty on performance 
H6: The higher the demand uncertainty, the lower the performance, ceteris paribus. 
H7: The higher the competitive uncertainty, the lower the performance, ceteris 
paribus. 
H8: The higher the political uncertainty, the lower the performance, ceteris paribus. 
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H9: The higher the political uncertainty, the stronger the negative effect (more 
negative) of demand uncertainty on performance, ceteris paribus. 
H10: The higher the political uncertainty, the stronger the negative effect (more 
negative) of competitive uncertainty on performance, ceteris paribus. 
The impact of governance on the relationship between uncertainty and 
performance 
H11: The higher the degree of vertical integration, the weaker the negative effect 
(less negative) of demand uncertainty on performance, ceteris paribus. 
H12: The higher the degree of vertical integration, the weaker the negative effect 
(less negative) of competitive uncertainty on performance, ceteris paribus. 
H13: The higher the degree of vertical integration, the stronger the negative effect 
(more negative) of political uncertainty on performance, ceteris paribus. 
6.4 Results 
Table 6.1 and 6.2 present the results of econometric model 1 and 2 respectively. In 
each model, the results are presented in two steps. First, the dependent variable is 
regressed on independent and control variables in baseline model to investigate the 
main effects of each variable.  Next, the interaction terms are added in the 
interaction effects model to examine the effects of these terms. Although OLS with 
Newey-West Standard Errors is the selected and most suitable choice of estimator 
as the standard errors are correctly calculated, the result (interaction effects model 
only) using panel estimator Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) is also 
presented as panel data estimators reflect the traditional ways of calculating 
standard errors6. The rationale for including both results is to compare whether or 
not the parameters of both models are consistent.  
6.4.1 The relationship between uncertainty and governance 
This section discusses results of Model 1 presented in Table 6.1 which investigates 
hypotheses 1 – 5. Hypotheses 1-3 test the main effects of each uncertainty on 
                                                          
6
 The standard errors from FGLS only accounted for heteroskedasticity but not autocorrelations 
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governance while hypotheses 4-5 test the interaction effect between industry-level 
market uncertainty, demand and competitive uncertainty, and non-market 
uncertainty, political uncertainty.  
The effect of demand uncertainty (H1) and competitive uncertainty (H2) on 
performance are hypothesized to follow transaction cost analysis (TCA)‘s prediction 
that firms will try to become more vertically integrated when there is a presence of 
industry-level market uncertainty (positive relationship). The effect of political 
uncertainty (H3) is hypothesized to have an opposite effect on the degree of vertical 
integration (negative relationship).  
The dependent variable – governance - is a continuous value indicating the degree 
of vertical integration. The higher the value means the higher the degree of vertical 
integration – the more sales go through the firm‘s own sales force. The independent 
variables are the three uncertainty variables, demand, competitive, political, and 
the pairwise interaction terms. Control variables include a firm-level variable, 
average room rate, and a country-level variable, gross domestic product. As our 
hypotheses are directional, the p-values for direct effects and interaction effects 
are one-tailed.  
In the Baseline OLS model, the results under the main effects section indicates 
that there are significant positive relationships between demand uncertainty and 
degree of vertical integration (H1, b=0.01, p<0.05), competitive uncertainty and 
degree of vertical integration (H2, b=2.09, p<0.05). Hence, H1 and H2 are 
supported. Interestingly, the result for H3 also shows positive relationship between 
political uncertainty and performance at merely 90% confidence (b=0.01, p<0.05), 
but it is in the opposite direction to the hypothesis. Hence, support is not for our 
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hypothesis that firms are less likely to vertically integrate when there is a presence 
of political uncertainty.  
 
Table 6.1: Model 1 The Impact of uncertainty of governance 
In the interaction effects model, interaction effects between two uncertainties are 
inserted to assess the simultaneous effect of market and non-market uncertainty 
on governance. Therefore, the study only postulates the interaction between 
political and demand uncertainty (H4) and political and competitive uncertainty 
(H5).  
The relationships of the interactions terms in both hypotheses under this section 
are all negative in both OLS and FGLS models. The direction of the relationship is 
consistent with the rationale that firms tend to be less vertically integrated under 
Model 1: The Effect of Uncertainty on Degree of Vertical Integration
Estimator
Baseline Model Interaction Effects Model Interaction Effects Model
Dependent Variabile Degree of Vertical Integration Degree of Vertical Integration Degree of Vertical Integration
H Coef. t p-value Coef. t p-value Coef. t p-value
Direct Effects
H1 Demand Uncertainty 0.01 2.80 0.003 * 0.02 4.13 0.000 * 0.03 12.34 0.000 *
H2 Compettiive Uncertainty 2.09 3.47 0.001 * 2.33 2.94 0.001 * 2.09 6.16 0.001 *
H3 Political Uncertainty 0.00 1.18 0.119 0.01 2.43 0.007 * 0.01 7.43 0.007 *
Interaction Effects - Uncertainty variables
Demand x Competitive -0.11 -0.78 0.218 -0.19 -3.01 0.003 *
H4 Demand x Political -0.00 -2.35 0.009 * -0.01 -5.66 0.000 *
H5 Competitive x Political -0.09 -0.89 0.181 -0.14 -3.39 0.001 *
Control
Average Room Rate 0.00 -6.68 0.000 * -0.00 -7.12 0.000 * 0.00 -11.87 0.000 *
Gross Domestic Product 0.00 -0.18 0.856 -0.00 -0.48 0.633 0.00 0.67 0.501
(Constant) -0.01 -0.32 0.749 -0.03 -1.52 0.120 -0.03 -3.31 0.001 *
F-Value (5, 809) = 14.04 (8, 806) = 12.97
Wald Chi-Square 331.33 *
Number of Observations 815 815 815
The p-value fro the main interaction, and moderating effects variables  are the directional
The p-value for the ocntrol variable are two tailed
*Indicates p<0.05
OLS 
Newey-West Standard 
Errors
OLS 
Newey-West Standard 
Errors
FGLS
Heterokedastcity robust 
Standard Errors
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this situation. However, the finding from OLS shows that the only significant effect 
is that of H4 which is relationship between the interaction of demand and political 
uncertainty and degree of vertical integration (b=-0.00, p<0.05)7. Hence, H4 is 
supported. There does not appear to be a significant relationship between the 
interaction of competitive and political uncertainty and degree of vertical integration 
(H5) at p<0.05 level. Thus, H5 is not supported. The result from FGLS suggests H4 
and H5 are significant. 
Though the main effect of political uncertainty on governance (H3) differs from the 
baseline model, this relationship becomes positively strong in the interaction 
effects model (b=0.01, p<0.05) which includes all the specified variables. 
6.4.2 The relationship between uncertainty and performance 
Table 6.2 below presents the result from 2SLS model (model 2), which estimates 1) 
the relationship between uncertainty on performance and 2) the moderating effect 
of governance on the relationship between uncertainty and performance. In 
addition to model 1, the first stage model adds the proportion of food and beverage 
revenue to total revenue (FB Revenue) as an instrument variable to compute the 
predicted value of the degree of vertical integration. This predicted value of the 
degree of vertical integration from the first stage is then used as an independent 
variable in the second stage to estimate the relationship between uncertainty, 
degree of vertical integration, and performance. This predicted degree of vertical 
integration is also used to construct the interaction terms with uncertainty variables 
to see if the degree of vertical integration can amplify or buffer uncertainty effects 
on performance. The dependent variable in the second stage is performance and 
is measured by room revenue. As our hypotheses are directional, the p-value 
shown for main effects and interaction effects is one-tailed.  
                                                          
7
 The beta coefficient of 0.000 effect is due to the scaling of the independent variable relative to the dependent 
variable 
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H6 – H8 represent the main effect of each uncertainty variable on performance. 
Based on the baseline model in table 6.2, the result of H6 shows insignificant 
relationship between demand uncertainty and performance (b=0.47, p>0.05). The 
study cannot reject the null hypothesis that the relationship between demand 
uncertainty and performance is zero at 95% confidence. Hence, H6 is not 
supported.  
In regards to H7, the effect of competitive uncertainty on performance is negative 
as hypothesized and the relationship is significant (b= -165.41, p<0.05). Therefore, 
support is found for H7. Support is also found for H8 (b=-0.73, p<0.05) which 
suggests that political uncertainty reduces performance.  
The Interaction Effects model in table 6.2 aims to present the results from the 
addition of interaction and moderating effects. As for pairwise interactions among 
uncertainty variables (H9 and H10), the impact of the interaction of demand and 
political uncertainty H9 is negative as hypothesized but unsupported at 95% 
confidence (b=-0.13, p>0.05). Therefore, the null hypothesis that the effect of 
interaction of demand and political uncertainty on performance is zero cannot be 
rejected. However, this relationship would be supported at 90% confidence level. 
The FGLS model reported negatively significant result for H9 of (b=-0.007, p<0.05).  
Support is found for H10. The impact of the interaction of competitive and political 
uncertainty is negative and significant at 95% confidence (b = -12.54, p<0.05) 
which agrees with the hypothesis that political uncertainty will amplify the 
magnitude of competitive uncertainty. The result estimated by the FGLS model is 
also negatively significant (b = -5.39, p<0.05). 
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Table 6.2: Model 2 The impact of uncertainty on performance 
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6.4.3 The moderating impact of governance on the relationship between 
uncertainty and performance8  
The results for three hypotheses (H11 – H13) regarding the moderating impact of 
governance, which is operationalized as the degree of vertical integration, and 
whether it can buffer or amplify the effect of uncertainty on performance are 
presented in this section. Support is not found for H11 which suggests that the 
degree of vertical integration has no effect in buffering the relationship between 
demand uncertainty and performance (b =-0.82, p>0.05). Nonetheless, even 
though H11 is significant, the relationship would be meaningless since the main 
effect, demand uncertainty, is insignificant. The result estimated by the FGLS 
model is also unsupported (b =-0.59, p>0.05). Support is also not found for H12, 
the buffering effect of the degree of vertical integration on competitive uncertainty 
(b = 42.83, p > 0.05). FGLS also reported an insignificant result (b = -48.35, p > 
0.05).  
The attention-grabbing relationship is found for H13. The degree of vertical 
integration is found to moderate the relationship between political uncertainty and 
performance (b = 4.98, p < 0.05) which suggests that the higher degree to which 
the firm can vertically integrate its operation, the better the subsequent 
performance outcome. However, the direction of the relationship is positive which 
is opposite to the hypothesis. Therefore, H13 is not supported. Figure 6.1 below 
demonstrates the performance in low and high political uncertainty situation. This 
shows that, when political uncertainty is high, the firm‘s performance is remarkably 
                                                          
8
To ensure that sound conclusion can also be drawn from our equation 2-2 which employed predicted degree of 
vertical integration instead of actual degree of vertical integration as an explanatory variable due to the issue of 
endogeneity, several tests are performed. First, the correlation coefficient of actual degree of vertical Integration 
variable and predicted degree of vertical Integration variable (used in model 2) is 0.53 and is significant (t = 17.47, 
p<0.01).  Two models based on equation 2-2 are also run with panel estimator using fixed effect, one using actual 
degree of vertical integration and another one using predicted degree of vertical integration as their dependent 
variables. Both models have the same R
2 
(within) = 0.73 and similar R
2 
(overall) of 0.66-0.67. Finally, equation 2-2 
employing an OLS estimator using Newey-West standard errors is also run using actual instead of predicted degree 
of vertical integration. The result shows that, albeit some differences due to the presence of endogeneity, degree of 
vertical integration can positively moderate the relationship between political uncertainty and performance at 95% 
confidence 
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better when the degree of vertical integration is high than when the degree of 
vertical integration is low. FGLS also reports consistent findings (b = 7.60, p<0.05)
9
.  
 
Figure 6.1: The moderating impact of governance 
6.5 Summary of results  
Although OLS is selected as our estimator because it can correct both 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelations issues, the result from FGLS is also 
presented to represent the parameters from the panel estimator. Although the 
findings from both models are not identical, they are in the same directions. 
Table 6.3 summarizes the result from both estimators. Among 13 hypotheses, 6 
hypotheses are supported when estimated with OLS. Among the unsupported 
hypotheses, five of them are due to insignificant relationships. The other two 
                                                          
9
 As Thailand‘s sample account for approximately 75% of our total sample size, additional models with 
Thailand‘s sample only are run. These models provide the opportunity to investigate the effect of 
political uncertainty in a country which has a more balanced trend and control for country variance. 
Albeit few differences, the result shows that degree of vertical integration can buffer the negative effect 
of political uncertainty at 90% confidence (p = 0.058, one-tailed). 
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unsupported hypotheses showed significant relationship but the direction of the 
relationships are opposite to the hypothesized direction.  
The results reported by FGLS estimator, which only account for heteroskedasticity 
but not autocorrelations, are slightly more optimistic. Only two unsupported 
hypotheses are caused by insignificant relationships. The reason for three 
unsupported hypotheses is due to the direction of the relationship being opposite to 
the hypothesized direction. 
Hypothesis  Independent  
 Variables 
 Hypothesized  
 Direction 
OLS 
Newey-West 
Standard Errors 
FGLS 
Heterokedastcity robust 
Standard Errors 
 Significant 
 0.05% 
 Result   Support  Significant  
 0.05% 
 Result   Support 
 Relationship between main effects of uncertainty and governance 
H1 DU + Yes +  Support Yes +  Support 
H2 CU + Yes +  Support Yes +  Support 
H3 PU - Yes +  No Yes + No 
Relationship between interaction effect of uncertainty and governance 
H4 DU x PU - Yes -  Support Yes -  Support 
H5 CU x PU - No -  No Yes -  Support 
 Relationship between main effect of uncertainty and performance 
H6 DU - No +  No Yes + No 
H7 CU - Yes -  Support Yes -  Support 
H8 PU - Yes -  Support Yes -  Support 
 Relationship between interaction effect of uncertainty and performance 
H9 DU x PU - No -  No Yes -  Support 
H10 CU x PU - Yes -  Support Yes -  Support 
 Moderating effect of governance on the relationship between uncertainty and performance 
H11 DV x DU + No -  No No - No 
H12 DV x CU + No +  No No - No 
H13 DV x PU - Yes +  No Yes + No 
Table 6.3: Summary of results 
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6.6  Summary 
The results of the 13 hypotheses are presented in this chapter. Among 13 
hypotheses, 6 hypotheses are supported at 95% confidence. The result supports 
TCA‘s proposition that when uncertainty rises, firms are likely to become more 
vertically integrated. Although it is conclusive that uncertainty impacts a firm‘s 
performance, the directions of the relationship are varied. The answer to TCA‘s 
prediction on whether degree of vertical integration can alleviate the negative 
impact of uncertainty on performance is found in section 6.3.3. The result shows 
that the degree of vertical integration can reduce the negative impact of political 
uncertainty on performance, but cannot reduce those of demand and competitive 
uncertainty.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
DISCUSSION  
 
7.1 Introduction 
The focus of this study is on the transaction cost analysis (TCA) framework which 
prescribes that firms that align mode of governance with transaction dimensions 
will have a superior performance (Williamson 1991). However, the traditional view 
of TCA only conceptualized governance as the dichotomous ―make or buy‖ which 
is unlikely to be the current practice.  
This study advances the knowledge in this area by investigation of the relationship 
between uncertainty, governance and performance in a concurrent channels 
context which is a more consistent approach with current practice (Heide, Kumar 
and Wathne 2014; Parmigiani 2007) than the dichotomous ―make or buy‖ from the 
traditional view of transaction cost analysis (TCA). Employing Instrument Variable 
(IV) Estimator using Two-Stage-Least Squares (2SLS) model, compelling evidence 
is found on governance and performance linkage which answer the question as to 
whether firms should try to be more or less vertically integrated when dealing with 
uncertainty. Central to our findings is that being more vertically integrated can 
buffer the negative effect of non-market uncertainty on performance, but cannot 
buffer that of market uncertainty. Specifically, when political uncertainty is high, 
being more vertically integrated helps buffer the negative effect of political 
uncertainty on performance. On the contrary, being more vertically integrated 
cannot moderate the effect of two market uncertainties, demand and competitive 
uncertainty, on performance. Our rationale for this finding is that firms usually 
factored industry-level market uncertainty in their channel deployment decisions 
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and, often, non-market factors are neglected. This finding suggests that non-
market factors also play an important role in shaping a firm‘s performance and that 
the choice of governance matters when non-market uncertainty rises. 
Generally, the findings yield insights on how firms should deal with uncertainty, 
both industry-level market and non-market uncertainty. This study hypothesizes 
that when dealing with industry-level market uncertainties; namely demand 
uncertainty and competitive uncertainty, firms will respond to these uncertainties by 
becoming more vertically integrated as suggested by TCA‘s prediction. However, 
when dealing with non-market uncertainty such as political uncertainty, a firm may 
prefer to maintain its flexibility by becoming less vertically integrated. Support is 
found for the effect of demand and competitive uncertainty on vertical integration. 
Contradictory evidence to our hypothesis is found for the relationship between 
political uncertainty and vertical integration.  
As for performance effect, evidence to answer the key TCA question on whether a 
higher degree of vertical integration would lead to superior performance outcome in 
times of high uncertainty is derived. First, the direct effects of the three 
uncertainties on performance are tested. Supports are found only for the effect of 
competitive and political uncertainty on performance.  
The result for the moderating effect of vertical integration shows that when political 
uncertainty is high, being more vertically integrated helps buffer the negative effect 
of political uncertainty on performance. Although the relationship is unsupported as 
the direction of the relationship is contradictory to the hypothesis, this 
demonstrates that non-market uncertainty also plays an important role in shaping a 
firm‘s performance and firms should incorporate these factors when making 
business decisions.  
182 
 
Important findings of this study are presented in the previous chapters. The 
principal focus of this chapter will be the discussion of those findings and the 
highlighting of the theoretical as well as managerial implications from this study. 
Section 7.2 discusses the theoretical implications of this study. Empirical evidence 
from previous research related to unsupported hypotheses is explored in section 
7.3. Management implications of this research are discussed in section 7.4. 
Section 7.5 addresses the limitations of this study and provide suggestions how 
further research should overcome these issues. Finally, section 7.6 summarizes 
and concludes this thesis. 
7.2 Theoretical implications 
The key contributions of this study lie in the area of governance and performance 
linkage. Generally, this study is able to extend the theoretical contribution from 
Heide, Kumar and Wathne (2014) which provide arguments on whether a 
concurrent channels context is better than ―make or buy‖ in terms of performance. 
This study gives insight by looking into the shifts between the ―make and buy‖ 
decision within the concurrent channels setting and investigating the subsequent 
performance effects of the shifts. There are three key theoretical implications this 
study contributes to the area of governance. First, the knowledge about the effect 
of uncertainty on governance is extended beyond the choices of the make, buy, 
and hybrid situations. Our second contribution is the investigation of uncertainty 
effect on the subsequent performance effect of that particular governance decision. 
The third implication focuses on the extension of the TCA to include an institutional 
variable, political uncertainty, as the non-market uncertainty. The details of each of 
these implications will be discussed in the following sub-sections. 
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7.2.1 The effect of uncertainty in concurrent channels context 
The first contribution is to extend the knowledge about the effect of uncertainty 
beyond the original choices of make, buy, and hybrid, to a concurrent channels 
context which is consistent with current practice as firms usually rely 
simultaneously on both direct and indirect channels for the same products as the 
traditional ―make or buy‖ decision is too restrictive (Bradach and Eccles 1989; Mols 
2000). Several studies have provided a view on concurrent channels in comparison 
to the traditional ―make or buy‖ decision. For example, Sa Vinhas and Anderson‘s 
(2005) study on conflicts and channel structure discusses the situations in which a 
concurrent channel is likely to be employed. Parmigiani (2007) shows that 
concurrent channel is the distinct choice, not the linear combination of ―make and 
buy.‖ Heide, Kumar and Wathne (2014) focus on the benefit of concurrent channel 
in that it helps a firm in improving its governance mechanism in monitoring and 
relational norms. As for monitoring, the direct sales force can provide relevant 
performance benchmarks. The effect of relational norms would be undermined due 
to a threat of backward integration. However, a concurrent channels context is 
usually conceptualized as discrete mode of governance (i.e., concurrent channels 
vs. indirect channels) (Heide, Kumar and Wathne 2014). Heide, Kumar and 
Wathne (2014) suggest that evidence on whether or not firms should try to be more 
or less vertically integrated is scarce. Hence, investigation should focus on the 
dynamic of the firm‘s governance choices (Heide, Kumar and Wathne 2014).  
By focusing on the concurrent channels context, particularly on the change in the 
degree of vertical integration, this study is able to fill the literature gaps mentioned 
in previous literature. With the longitudinal design, this study also fills the gap for 
scholars who suggested that examining the changes overtime will improve our 
understanding of the impact of institutional changes (Demirbag, Glaister and 
Tatoglu 2007). Our results show that the focal firm follows TCA‘s discriminating 
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alignment hypothesis in response to the increment of each uncertainty tested in 
this study by becoming more vertically integrated. This extends the knowledge that 
TCA‘s prediction can be applied in a concurrent channel context.  
As for the interaction effect of uncertainty on governance, the study focuses on 
how the non-market uncertainty will moderate the market uncertainty. Specifically, 
we view that the presence of political uncertainty will cause demand and 
competitive uncertainty to become more volatile. As a result, firms may have to rely 
more on third parties to deal with the situation which will result in a lower degree of 
vertical integration. The interaction effect of uncertainty is tested in two hypotheses, 
H4 (the interaction between political and demand uncertainty) and H5 (political and 
competitive uncertainty). The significant relationship in H4 supports the rationale 
that high political uncertainty will lessen the positive relationship between demand 
uncertainty and the degree of vertical integration as political uncertainty amplifies 
the magnitude of demand uncertainty in a way that a firm tends to rely more on a 
third party to secure its business.  
7.2.2 The effect of uncertainty on performance 
Our focus on the investigation of uncertainty effects on the subsequent 
performance outcomes of governance follows the notion that most research in 
concurrent channels focuses on the antecedent conditions that lead to the use of 
concurrent sourcing, but not the subsequent performance outcomes (Heide, Kumar 
and Wathne 2014). The theoretical implication on performance focuses on both the 
direct effect of uncertainty on performance and whether vertical integration plays a 
role in moderating the effect of uncertainty on performance. We are able to report 
three key findings which contribute to the area of uncertainty and performance 
linkage. First, as different types of uncertainty affect performance differently, the 
findings agree with the notion that the effect of uncertainty is contextual. Second, 
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there are interaction effects between market and non-market uncertainty. Last and 
most important, the result presents the subsequent performance effect of 
governance decisions which indicates that governance choice matters. Overall, our 
findings extend the notions from Heide, Kumar and Wathne (2014) that the effect of 
governance form on performance might be contextual.  
The conclusion about contextual effect of uncertainty is drawn from the 
investigation of the direct relationship between uncertainty and performance. The 
study found that not all relationships have the expected directions. The effects of 
competitive and political uncertainty on performance are negative as hypothesized. 
Interestingly, the effect of demand uncertainty is positive which is opposite to the 
hypothesis. Although the relationship is insignificant, the positive relationship 
between demand uncertainty and performance suggests that although uncertainty 
signals a negative notion, its effect is not always negative. Therefore, caution must 
be applied when concluding the effect of uncertainty on other constructs.  
Second, the interaction of the two uncertainty variables also shows that non-market 
uncertainty worsens the impact of market uncertainty on performance. This sheds 
light on the impact of different uncertainty variables on performance and supports 
our rationale that the change in non-market uncertainty will cause the market 
uncertainty to become more volatile. As a consequence, firms will have to adjust 
strategy and operations on an ongoing basis which may disrupt the operation and 
incur unforeseen cost. In addition, the firm will also suffer from higher cost of 
opportunism as it will have more reliance on third parties.  
As for the last finding regarding the moderating effect of vertical integration, the 
study found evidence that among the three uncertainties investigated, vertical 
integration cannot moderate the negative effect of market uncertainty demand 
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(H11) and competitive uncertainty (H12), on performance, but can buffer the 
negative effect of non-market uncertainty, political uncertainty, on performance 
(H13). Although the result shows that vertical integration can buffer the effect of 
political uncertainty at 95% confidence, the relationship is insignificant as its 
direction is opposite to the direction of our hypothesis. Nonetheless, the result is 
thought-provoking. Our rationale on why vertical integration can only moderate the 
effect of non-market uncertainty is that the focal firm has already taken the two 
market uncertainties, but not the non-market uncertainty, into account when 
planning its governance structure. As the non-market uncertainty is usually 
unaccounted for, the change in degree of vertical integration from the usual 
circumstance is, therefore, impactful. Moreover, according to TCA‘s underlying 
assumption that opportunism is likely to be higher in times of uncertainty, the 
expenses such as advertising cost, commissions, and incentives, of using a third 
party would be higher than if the same activities were conducted internally as third 
parties are like to take advantage of the volatile situation. We agreed with D'Aveni 
and Ravenscraft (1994, p.1167) which suggests that ―vertical integration results in 
economies of integration, even after industry effects and economies of scope and 
scale are controlled for.‖ Firms can expect to economize on general and 
administrative, other selling, and advertising expenditures. These cost savings are 
likely to result in increased profitability. In addition, integration implies lack of 
market pressure on captive suppliers and results in efficiency. Although vertical 
integration will increase bureaucracy cost, we view that these costs are rather fixed, 
and the tradeoff between these costs and savings from other expenses such as 
commissions, incentives, and advertising, are likely to be beneficial to the firm‘s 
performance.  
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7.2.3 The extension of transaction cost theory 
The third implication focuses on the extension of TCA to include an institutional 
variable which is consistent with suggestions from several previous studies in this 
area (cf. Brown and Potoski 2003; McCann, et al. 2005; Cadeux and Ng 2012). 
Institutional context variables provide a valuable extension to transaction cost 
theory because they refer to the fundamental circumstances of the exchange 
(Delios and Beamish 1999; Brouthers 2002). However, one of the areas to 
investigate is that studies in TCA often lack the systematic treatment of these 
fundamental factors (McCann, et al. 2005). McCann, et al. (2005) suggests that 
transaction cost will also depend on the broader institutional environment, and 
changes in the environment will affect transaction cost (McCann, et al. 2005). The 
institutional variable or non-market factor that is added in this study is political 
uncertainty. Our finding shows that this type of uncertainty is particularly important 
for firms that have to operate in high non-market uncertainty as it can amplify the 
magnitude of the market uncertainty.  
Several studies in choices of entry modes in foreign markets (cf. Gatignon and 
Anderson 1988; Roberts and Greenwood 1997; Chatterjee and Singh, 1999; Davis, 
Desai and Francis 2000; Brouthers 2002) suggest that the institutional context may 
have a significant influence on entry mode performance because of the type and 
use of organizational capabilities and the connection with entry mode choices. For 
example, firms that consider both institutional and cultural contexts in choosing 
their entry modes, as well as transaction cost efficiencies, perform better than firms 
that do not (Brouthers 2002). The study by Brown and Potoski (2005) which 
investigates how government makes their decisions in contracting services shows 
that institutional factors affect how government chooses its service mechanism and 
suggests that the institutional environment is valuable in complementing TCA 
(Brown and Potoski 2005). The reason is that the organizational rules and norms 
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that are shaped from these institutional factors may influence organizational 
members to behave in a certain way (March and Simon 1993) which will be 
different from organization to organization. Makino, Isobe and Chan (2004) explore 
if country effects can explain the differences in performance of multinational firms 
that operate in various countries. The study found that country effects do affect a 
firm‘s performance which supports the view that institutional environment, which is 
a non-market factor, should be taken into consideration when performance is 
considered. McCann, et al. (2005) attempts to measure transaction costs in 
different environmental policies and suggests that transaction cost of the same 
subject vary according to environmental policy. The comprehensive investigation of 
the effect of institutional variable in TCA is the meta-analysis of environmental 
uncertainty and forward integration by Cadeaux and Ng (2012). The result 
suggests that firms that operate in domestic environments tend to respond to 
environmental uncertainty by being more vertically integrated, while firms that 
operate in international markets tend to be less vertically integrated. The 
explanation for these differences is that firms feel more comfortable to vertically 
integrate in the context that they are familiar with (Cadeux and Ng 2012). Overall, 
the result from our study provides consistent evidence with the aforementioned 
study that non-market factors do matter and emphasizes the need to incorporate 
institutional environments in TCA‘s framework. 
7.3  Empirical evidence from previous research for unsupported hypotheses 
Further to the preceding section (7.2), which dealt with the central theoretical 
implications of this study, additional important implications can be derived from 7 
unsupported hypotheses. The lack of supported hypotheses might due to the 
nature of longitudinal and factual data which are collected from different sources 
for different purposes.  In such data, common survey biases that might inflate the 
results are highly unlikely.  In particular, the unsupported hypotheses regarding the 
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relationship between political uncertainty and governance (H3) and the moderating 
impact of governance on the relationship between political uncertainty and 
performance (H13) are thought-provoking. The result suggests that firms should try 
to become more vertically integrated when facing political uncertainty which seems 
to contradict previous literature (cf. Gatignon and Anderson 1988; Oxley 1999; 
Nickerson, Hamilton and Wada 2001) and that vertical integration is the right 
decision as it can buffer the negative effect of this uncertainty on performance. This 
provides support that TCA‘s discriminating alignment hypothesis can be applied 
with the institutional variable and in a concurrent channels context.  Therefore, the 
reason H3 and H13 are unsupported is not that the relationships are not 
meaningful (although H3 is not meaningful in the baseline model, but its positive 
relationship is strong in the interaction effects model in which all the variables are 
specified), but because these hypotheses are based on the view point that favors 
flexibility which may need to be redefined and extended. 
The rest of the hypotheses are all concerned with industry-level market uncertainty 
and performance relationships. H6 and H9 deal with the effect demand uncertainty 
and its interactions with political uncertainty. H11 and H12 concerns the 
moderating effect of degree of vertical integration on the relationship between the 
two market uncertainties, demand and competitive on performance. All of these 
hypotheses are unsupported because none of the relationship is meaningful at 95% 
confidence. Our rationale for these insignificant relationships (which will be 
discussed in details in section 7.3.2) is that firms are familiar with these market 
uncertainties and already account them their budget planning; therefore, the 
changes in those uncertainties do not have substantial impact on performance. 
Overall, these unsupported hypotheses give the impression (which will be 
discussed in section 7.5) that variables from other relevant theoretical perspectives 
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should be included when transaction dimensions and performance relationships 
are investigated. 
The discussion in this section is divided into 2 sub-sections. Section 7.3.1 
discusses the unsupported hypotheses on the relationship between uncertainty 
and governance which are H3 and H5. Section 7.3.2 focuses on the unsupported 
hypotheses on the relationship between uncertainty and performance which are H6, 
H9, H11, and H12. 
7.3.1 Unsupported uncertainty-governance hypotheses 
The unsupported H3 which shows a positive political uncertainty-degree of vertical 
integration relationship provides rationale for the argument on whether flexibility or 
structured organizations are preferred. Although H3 is insignificant as the direction 
of the relationship is opposite to our hypothesis, the result reveals some interesting 
aspects of the uncertainty-governance relationship that might not be thoroughly 
explained under TCA.  
The result from this study demonstrates that firms deal with political uncertainty the 
same way in which they deal with the other two market uncertainties. The 
significant relationship provides support for TCA‘s discriminating alignment 
hypothesis that vertical integration is the approach that a firm uses to deal with 
political uncertainty. However, the empirical supports on how a firm should shift its 
governance, specifically channel deployment and its subsequent performance 
effect, in response to the change in the level of political uncertainty on the same 
country over time is not well established. We could only find evidence from Henisz 
and Williamson (1999) and Cadeux and Ng (2012). A rationale provided by Henisz 
and Williamson (1999) is that the increase in direct political hazards will lead a firm 
to increase its transaction-specific assets which will make vertical integration a 
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more economizing choice (Henisz and Williamson 1999). A thorough explanation is 
provided by the environmental uncertainty meta-analysis by Cadeux and Ng (2012) 
which suggests that when encountering enviornmental uncertainty in the domestic 
market, firms may choose to vertically integrate as they are familiar with the market 
and competitiors. Thus, they feel more confident in their ability to manage a sales 
force on their own. On the contrary, if the uncertainty is in the international market, 
the benefit of becoming more vertically integarated may not off-set the risk from the 
uncertainty. Due to context unfamiliarity, firms may prefer to use a third party 
(Cadeux and Ng 2012). As each hotel in our study is separately managed in each 
market, our findings are consistent with the explanation provided by Cadeux and 
Ng (2012).  
The second unsupported hypothesis is H5, which shows an insignificant effect of 
the interaction between political and competitive uncertainty on governance calls 
for further investigation in strategy literature, specifically on competitive strategy. 
We view that the explanation in competitive strategy literature could be applied in 
this case. Competitive strategy literature suggests that firms usually mimic the 
strategies and behaviors of their successful rivals to reduce uncertainty (Dickson 
1992; Grewal and Dhawadkar 2002). As governance structure is one of the key 
strategies, both the focal firm and its competitive set have already mimicked one 
another‘s strategy. Therefore, both the focal firm and its competitors are likely to 
adjust their governance structure in the same fashion for the given political 
situation. The change in the competitive set‘s governance structure is reflected in 
competitive set‘s performance which is the basis for constructing the competitive 
uncertainty measure. Hence, the reason why the interaction between political and 
competitive uncertainty has no effect on the degree of vertical integration is that the 
focal firm has already accounted for the changes in governance structure through 
its mimicking strategies.  
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7.3.2 Unsupported uncertainty-performance hypotheses 
The third unsupported hypothesis, H6, set precautious notion on the interpretation 
of uncertainty construct. Although the demand uncertainty positively affects 
performance at 95% confidence, the relationship is insignificant as the direction of 
the relationship is opposite to our directional hypothesis. This indicates that 
uncertainty is not always negative and careful consideration must be given to the 
conceptualization and operationalization of uncertainty. The unpredictability of 
demand might be on the upward trend which is actually beneficial to the focal firm.  
The fourth, fifth, and sixth unsupported hypotheses (H11, H12, H13) are three 
hypotheses regarding the moderating impact of the degree of vertical integration 
on the relationship between demand uncertainty (H11), competitive uncertainty 
(H12), and political uncertainty (H13) on performance. We view that the rationale 
behind the result of the moderating impact of the degree of vertical integration on 
the relationship between demand uncertainty (H11) and competitive uncertainty 
(H12) on performance might be similar. The result shows that becoming more 
vertically integrated in both high demand and competitive uncertainty cannot 
moderate the performance outcomes. The finding for H13 suggests that the degree 
of vertical integration can mitigate the negative effect of political uncertainty on 
performance at 95% confidence in an opposite direction to our hypothesis.  
A possible explanation behind the unsupported H11 and H12 could be that these 
two uncertainties are industry-level market uncertainties which firms have already 
taken into account. Focal firms usually have the information on those market 
factors such as the expected demand for each month and number of new direct 
competitors. Therefore, this information is already reflected in how the firm will plan 
its channel deployment. Hence, the change in channel deployment has no effect 
on performance since these changes have already been factored in. On the other 
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hand, political uncertainty is usually unforeseen. Therefore, it is unlikely that firms 
can factor those incidents in. Hence, the shift in channel deployment can result in 
the change in performance outcome.  
This view is consistent with the concept of dynamics capabilities from a resource-
based view (RBV). Dynamic capabilities are ―specific organizational and strategic 
processes by which managers alter their resource base‖ (Eisenhardt and Martin 
2000, p.1111). The concept of dynamics capabilities as provided in Eisenhardt and 
Martin (2000) is summarized as follows. Dynamics capability is the routine or best 
practice that an organization employed to deal with different levels of market 
dynamism. A moderately dynamic market is one that has frequent changes, but the 
industry structures are stable, such as the boundaries are clear, and the players 
and customers are known. Managers usually have knowledge about the situation 
and allocate the firm‘s resources according to the existing implicit knowledge. If the 
market becomes more dynamic, market boundaries, industry structures and 
players are ambiguous. As uncertainty cannot be modeled in advance because it is 
not possible to predict what will happen in the future, a firm does not have 
knowledge about the situation and has to create situation specific knowledge that 
is mostly simple and has only a little structure. Therefore, this knowledge will be 
easily forgotten which is why dynamic capabilities are difficult to sustain in highly 
dynamic markets (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000).  
The concept of dynamic capabilities is similar to the findings for the reason that 
demand and competitive uncertainty are market factors. The changes in these two 
uncertainties are similar to the moderately dynamic market in that they are clear 
and quite predictable. Therefore, firms usually have dynamic capabilities to deal 
with the situation meaning they have already factored this into their sales force 
deployment. Hence, the change in channel deployment does not affect 
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performance. On the other hand, political uncertainty is similar to a highly dynamic 
market in which firms have no existing knowledge and therefore, is unaccounted 
for in their sales force deployment. That is why changing the level of sales force 
deployment has a significant impact on performance outcomes. 
As for the direction of the relationship, following Rothaermel, Hitt and Jobe (2006), 
we view that performance outcomes might depend on the tradeoff of cost and 
gains between strategic flexibility and vertical integration. The rationale is that the 
higher the degree of vertical integration, the lower the flexibility and the greater the 
bureaucratic costs associated with it. Overemployment of indirect sales force to 
complete value chain activities could lead to opportunism and incur unnecessary 
transaction costs. It also limits the firm‘s ability to absorb external knowledge, 
therefore, lessening learning opportunities.  
While using indirect sales force is likely to increase the firm‘s flexibility in the short 
run, it also increases its path dependence in the use of partners. As the firm loses 
its internal capability to perform certain activities, it becomes increasingly reliant on 
its external partners. If the loss in strategic flexibility and the increase in 
bureaucratic costs offset the benefits gained through vertical integration, the 
performance outcome will be lower (Rothaermel, Hitt and Jobe 2006). 
7.4 Managerial implications arising from the research 
This study hopes to provide an in-depth understanding of different types of 
uncertainty, their impact and magnitude on channel deployment and performance. 
Managers have to face various types of industry-level market uncertainty i.e. usual 
changes in level of demand, increasing number of competitors, and the emerging 
of alternative destinations. In addition to those market uncertainties, managers 
have to cope with unforeseen non-market uncertainty such as natural disasters 
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and political unrest. Often, the plan to deal with these non-market uncertainties or 
institutional factors is a contingency and spontaneous and without sufficient 
knowledge about the situations. Some of these non-market uncertainties can be 
extremely hard for hotel managers to deal with because many traditional 
instruments, such as lowering the price or increasing advertising, are costly and 
time consuming, leaving shifts in the balance of channel deployment as one of the 
few remaining instruments. Often, due to unfamiliarity, management predicts the 
magnitude of these uncertainties inaccurately resulting in improper planning and 
poor business forecast. As a consequence, they cannot achieve their target 
performance level.  
We had the opportunity to discuss the quantitative findings with the General 
Manager (GM) of our focal firm and also learnt about the management‘s view on 
uncertainty. The feedback was that among the three types of uncertainty, demand 
and competitive uncertainty are volatile but take place over time in which 
management can prepare for the situation. Political uncertainty, on the other hand, 
is an unfamiliar territory. As for demand, tourists usually plan their vacation and 
made a booking in advance. The uncertainty in demand is due to unplanned trips 
or sudden cancellations. For example, a weak Russian economy results in a lower 
number of Russian tourists, but the short-term bookings are not very much affected. 
The hotel observes the trend in medium cancellations and long-term low booking. 
This uncertain demand will cause the revenue to be lower than forecast. However, 
the circumstances are known. The management can create a promotion plan that 
targets guests from other nationalities to make up for the loss from Russian tourists. 
For competitive uncertainty, marketing staffs always keep an eye on and record 
their competitors‘ activity. Each hotel also has very good information of its 
competitors such as average room rate, occupancy, and the number of new hotel 
rooms coming in a specific period. Therefore, when competition is intense, 
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management can promptly come up with sales and marketing activity to cope with 
competitive actions.  
Political uncertainty, on the other hand, is different from the above uncertainties. It 
is difficult for firms to have a clear strategic direction. The company has a business 
contingency plan in place to handle extreme situations, but those plans only deal 
with infrastructure of the company such as information systems. However, there 
are no sales and marketing plans in place. For example, sales and market 
activities to handle the recent political movements in Thailand were initiated swiftly 
on an ad-hoc basis without proper project record and evaluation. As a 
consequence, the capability on how to handle these events will often be lost when 
the responsible staffs leave the company. The company has never had solid ―best 
practice‖ from the event in 2007 to deal with the similar event in 2010. Often, the 
hotel has to work with limited resources such as tighter market expenditures or 
fewer personnel in accordance to the potential downward income shortfalls. This 
leaves its own sales force as the best resource to depend on. Although the hotel 
also tries to generate their sales from third parties, the result is rather disappointing. 
Those third party agents will work only on aggressive incentives under which the 
hotel cannot compete with its competitors and do not want to offer as a third party 
might use this low rate as a benchmark to negotiate future transactions. The GM 
suggests that it would be ideal if there is a way to incorporate the degree of political 
uncertainty in the budget revision in time of uncertainty. This way, the hotel can 
have a more accurate view of how the political uncertainty will affect its 
performance.  
Based on our quantitative findings and discussion with management, the first 
managerial implication is to provide management the understanding on how non-
market uncertainty or institutional environment affects business operations. In 
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practice, management usually makes business forecasts based on historical 
performance and market factors only. The non-market factors are often neglected. 
However, the result of this study shows that the effects of non-market uncertainty 
or institutional environment on performance are major and the negative impact can 
be mitigated. Therefore, it is crucial that management takes into account the non-
market factors in their business forecast to ascertain the sales organization will be 
set up in the most efficient way. 
The second implication aims to help management with overviews on how different 
types of uncertainty interact with one another. Managers can use this as a 
guideline to prepare a course of action that will yield optimum performance results 
under adverse conditions. Typically, managers do whatever it takes to secure the 
business in times of uncertainty without giving a thorough consideration to the most 
efficient way to allocate time and resources, which creates opportunity cost 
because those resources have not been spent on the ―right‖ activities. As this study 
uses real market evidence, managers can benefit from this insight by considering 
how each uncertainty present in the marketplace influences concurrent channel 
deployment and use this as a guideline to handle each specific type of uncertainty. 
7.5  Study‘s limitations and direction for future research 
The findings from this study have three key limitations. The first one concerns the 
exclusion of other transaction factors which allows this study to test only part of 
TCA and agency theory. The second limitation is the limited number of uncertainty 
variables. Our last limitation is the generalizability of the database as the data are 
obtained from a single firm.  
The first limitation is the exclusion of a number of factors such as transaction-
specific assets, frequency, and cost factors that would give the study a more 
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complete view on the antecedents and subsequent performance of governance. 
This is consistent with the suggestions from several studies. D'Aveni and 
Ravenscraft (1994) summarized the literature in strategy and industrial 
organization economies which indicated that ―the decision to vertically integrate 
might also depend on the type of production involved, the extent of transaction 
costs, the amount of specialized assets, the degree of market power at each stage 
of production, the activities, and the amount of uncertainty concerning prices and 
costs‖(p.1168), and suggested that future study should establish a causal link 
between integration decisions and associate bureaucracy costs (D'Aveni and 
Ravenscraft 1994). Rothaermel, Hitt and Jobe (2006) found that vertical integration 
results in higher performance and viewed that the positive performance effect 
might be due to cost saving from internal value chain activities. However, 
internalizing will limit access to new knowledge that would be essential in 
developing future successful new products and would put a firm‘s operations in a 
closed system. Therefore, while vertical integration reduces transaction costs, it 
also creates opportunity costs with potential negative performance implications 
(Rothaermel, Hitt and Jobe 2006). Heide, Kumar and Wathne (2014) also 
suggested that the trade-off between incremental performance benefits (that is a 
result of monitoring without the risk of promoting opportunism) and the direct cost 
of realignment might be another crucial factor in determining the choice of 
governance. The findings from our study which show that firms are likely to 
vertically integrate when facing uncertainty also reveals that vertical integration 
does not always result in subsequent performance effects. These findings give rise 
to the question ―if vertical integration is not the answer to deal with uncertainty, 
what else do we need to consider?‖ 
The examples above seem to agree that there is no exact prescription on how a firm 
should deal with any uncertainty in particular. It is likely that a governance decision 
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and the performance result depends on a tradeoff of cost and benefits among 
various transaction factors.  Another plausible explanation could be that studies 
usually concern testing the predictive power of a theory in a particular relationship 
rather than trying to include all the potential factors from all relevant theories that 
would explain that relationship.  Empirical insights on how these factors interact 
among themselves might be the answer on the antecedents of governance. 
Although, this study extends TCA to include institutional environment variable and 
curbs the aggregated effect of these potential factors on performance through 
Instrumental Variables (IV) Estimator using a Two-Stage Least Square (2SLS) in 
model 2, however, due to our preference in using secondary panel data as it is 
superior to cross-sectional data in measuring change, it is difficult to find the suitable 
measure for each potential variable. The inclusion of other relevant variables, both 
within and beyond the scope of TCA, should be reasonably achievable in other 
research designs such as cross-sectional data from scale-items questionnaire. 
Within the scope of TCA, the opportunism construct should be a good addition to 
our study as a number of the hypotheses are based on this variable. Had this 
variable been included, it would have allowed the study to rule out their effect on 
the dependent variable and make a stronger conclusion, especially on the question 
whether performance depends on the trade-off between choice of governance and 
opportunism.  
Beyond the scope of TCA, there are number of theories in sales, organization and 
governance i.e. Resource-Based View (RBV), Contingency theory, that focus on 
the factors that explain governance and variance in performance. The RBV 
perspective which views firms as bundles of resources (Eisenhardt and Martin 
2000) would provide a complementary perspective on internal organization factors 
in addition to general environment suggested by TCA and the Institutional 
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environment, specifically, on how organizational capabilities i.e. market orientation 
will influence governance decision and performance outcomes. Contingency theory 
which focuses on the most effective coordination and control tasks or practice in a 
given situation also suggests a number of useful variables i.e. firm size, the nature 
fo the task (Gupta, Dirsmith and Fogarty 1994). Even the growing popularity of 
electronics market itself can be considered as an antecedent of governance 
decision as firms may opt for market governance rather than hierarchy due to its 
lower coordination cost (Mallapragada, et al. 2014). Consumers may prefer making 
their purchases through online vendors due to convenience and familiarity.  
Future studies are recommended to investigate of these potential factors both within 
and beyond the scope of TCA individually to understand the individual effect of each 
variable in order to have the complete perspective on what drives governance 
decisions and subsequent performance outcomes. 
The second limitation is the number and choice of uncertainty variables, especially 
the non-market uncertainty. Although we are able to include three key uncertainties 
which are crucial to any business, having a greater number along any dimension of 
classification would enhance the perspective. For example, if uncertainty is to be 
considered based on domain of environment, there are a few interesting domains 
along the continuum of firm-specific to general environment such as partners, 
availability of substitute products, technology, and cultures that would yield 
interesting insights on uncertainty and governance relationship. If uncertainty were 
to be classified based on its type, it would be fruitful to focus on how different types 
of uncertainty such as complexity, volatility, or unpredictability interact in the same 
domain environment, and compare the effect of different types within the same 
research context. Our emphasis is on the inclusion of non-market uncertainty 
which, based on our findings, shows strong effect on other variables. However, 
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based on our uncertainty literature review (table 3.1 in chapter 3), when non-
market factors are considered, most study only central technological uncertainty (cf. 
Coles and Hesterly 1998; Santoro and McGill 2005; Geyskens, Steenkamp, and 
Kumar 2006; Parmigiani 2007; Kor, Mahoney, Watson 2008). Therefore, future 
research should try to be more systematic in selecting uncertainty variables in its 
study. In particular, future research should try to include more domains of non-
market uncertainty and investigate the interaction of market and non-market 
uncertainty on other outcome variables.  
 The last limitation falls into the issue of generalizability. Our study is based on one 
company from one industry and may have the issue of contextual influences 
constraints. This limitation is partly due to the need for fine-grained level monthly 
financial data such as revenue, gross operating profit, average room rate, and 
sales by segmentations, to ensure that the issue for construct validity is limited. 
This kind of financial information is mostly treated as highly confidential as it 
reveals the firm‘s entire operations. Hence, firms are unlikely to participate. We are 
deeply grateful to have one firm participate in our study. In our opinion, our focal 
firm is a good representative and provides good context for generalizability of the 
context as it operates a total of 16 hotels in 4 countries. The operations are run 
according to standards and managed by a group of executives both Thai and 
foreign. Nevertheless, generalizability might have to be exercised with caution. 
Future studies in this area are, therefore, encouraged to have more than one focal 
firm within the same industry in their research. In addition, we also suggest future 
study to test both primary and secondary data sources in the same study to see if 
there is any result discrepancy between primary and secondary data. 
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7.6  Conclusions 
This study focuses on choice of governance decisions in concurrent channels 
context in times of uncertainty. The study examines how a firm chooses to deploy 
its sales force in times of uncertainty and the subsequent performance outcome of 
that deployment. The theoretical framework is based on multiple theories in the 
area of governance. We extend the knowledge in this area by examining the 
relationship between governance decision and institutional environment variables. 
The relationship between uncertainty and choice of governance in a concurrent 
channel context follows TCA‘s prediction that vertical integration is the preferred 
choice of governance when uncertainty rises. As for the subsequent performance 
outcomes, the results show that although uncertainty seems to have a negative 
impact on performance, the result is subjective. This diversified result provides 
directions for future research opportunity to find the underlying assumption of this 
phenomenon. The findings for the central question of this research on whether 
vertical integration can lead to superior performance in times of uncertainty shows 
that becoming more vertically integrated cannot help moderate the effect of 
demand and competitive uncertainty which are the industry-level market 
uncertainty on performance, but can significantly moderate the effect of political 
uncertainty, which is the non-market uncertainty. Theoretically, this calls for 
examination of other variables from relevant governance theories in conjunction 
with TCA. Managerially this result provides insight to managers that non-market 
factors are crucial and that the shift in governance structure can play an important 
role in alleviating its impact. 
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